James Malcomson
Names
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James |
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M |
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Malcomson |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Oxford University
/ Department of Economics (weight: 90%)
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CESifo (weight: 5%)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) (weight: 5%)
Research profile
author of:
- Turnover Costs, Efficiency Wages and Cycles (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1995:i:37-38:p:55-74)
by W. Bentley Macleod & James M. Malcomson - Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:4:p:811-37)
by MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M - Motivation and Markets (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:3:p:388-411)
by MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M - Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:35:y:1997:i:4:p:1916-1957)
by James M. Malcomson - Labour Turnover And The Natural Rate Of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage V.S Frictional Unemployment (RePEc:aub:autbar:113-89)
by Macleod, B.W. & Malcomson, J.M. - Wage Premiums And Profit Maximization In Efficiency Wage Models (RePEc:aub:autbar:114.89)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle (RePEc:aub:autbar:304.95)
by Fairburn, J.A. & Malcomson, J.M. - Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:1:p:83-120)
by James M. Malcomson - Capital Utilization and the Measurement of the Elasticity of Substitution (RePEc:bla:manch2:v:45:y:1977:i:2:p:103-11)
by Malcomson, James M - Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US (RePEc:bla:obuest:v:79:y:2017:i:6:p:997-1017)
by James M. Malcomson & Sophocles Mavroeidis - Motivation and Markets (RePEc:boc:bocoec:339)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson - Principal and Expert Agent (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:17)
by Malcomson James M - Choice and Competition in Public Service Provision (RePEc:cep:stippp:29)
by Timothy Besley & James M. Malcolmson - Health Service Gatekeepers (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1063)
by James Malcomson - Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1407)
by James Malcomson - Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2943)
by James Malcomson - Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5462)
by James Malcomson - Competition in Public Service Provision: The Role of Not-for-profit Providers (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6759)
by Timothy Besley & James Malcomson - General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_696)
by James M. Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick - Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information (RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:2:p:336-67)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - The multiperiod principal-agent problem (RePEc:cor:louvrp:803)
by MALCOMSON, James M. & SPINNEWYN, Frans - Choice and Competition in Public Service Provision (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11441)
by Besley, Tim & Malcomson, James M - Capital Utilization and Empirical Analysis (RePEc:ctl:louvre:1984039)
by James M. MALCOMSON - Hospital cost differences and payment by results (RePEc:cup:hecopl:v:2:y:2007:i:04:p:429-433_00)
by Malcomson, James M. - Contracts for the National Health Service (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:439:p:1691-1701)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M - Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:108:y:1998:i:449:p:1093-1110)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M - Unemployment and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:91:y:1981:i:364:p:848-66)
by Malcomson, James M - Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:93:y:1983:i:369a:p:51-65)
by Malcomson, James M - Dynamic Inconsistency, Rational Expectations, and Optimal Government Policy (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:52:y:1984:i:6:p:1437-51)
by Hillier, Brian & Malcomson, James M - Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:2:p:447-80)
by MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M - Trade union labour contracts : An introduction (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:31:y:1987:i:1-2:p:139-148)
by Malcomson, James M. - Involuntary unemployment in dynamic contract equilibria (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:31:y:1987:i:1-2:p:427-435)
by Macleod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James M. - Specific investment and wage profiles in labour markets (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:37:y:1993:i:2-3:p:343-354)
by MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James M. - Wage premiums and profit maximization in efficiency wage models (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:37:y:1993:i:6:p:1223-1249)
by MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James M. - Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:3-4:p:683-690)
by Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M. - Trade unions and seniority employment rules (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:8:p:1595-1611)
by Frank, Jeff & Malcomson, James M. - General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:47:y:2003:i:2:p:197-227)
by Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry - Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:92:y:2015:i:c:p:122-137)
by Malcomson, James M. - Government purchasing of health services (RePEc:eee:heachp:1-15)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M. - Replacement and the rental value of capital equipment subject to obsolescence (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:10:y:1975:i:1:p:24-41)
by Malcomson, James M. - Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality (RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:17:y:1998:i:1:p:1-19)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M. - Individual employment contracts (RePEc:eee:labchp:3-35)
by Malcomson, James M. - Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:162:y:2018:i:c:p:158-172)
by Besley, Timothy & Malcomson, James M. - Tax policy and investment demand : A vintage approach (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:19:y:1982:i:2:p:225-241)
by Malcomson, James M. - Some analytics of the laffer curve (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:29:y:1986:i:3:p:263-279)
by Malcomson, James M. - Some analytics of the Laffer curve : Reply (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:35:y:1988:i:1:p:131-132)
by Malcomson, James M. - Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:84:y:2002:i:2:p:219-249)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M. - Relational contracts and specific training (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:1:p:51-62)
by Malcomson, James M. - Competition in public service provision: the role of not-for-profit providers (RePEc:ehl:lserod:87517)
by Besley, Timothy & Malcomson, James M. - Labour Turnover And The Natural Rate Of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage Vs Frictional Unemployment (RePEc:fth:lseple:336)
by Macleaod, W.B. & Malcomson, J. - Wage Premiums And Profit Maximisation In Efficiency Wage Models (RePEc:fth:lseple:337)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J. - Efficient Specific Investments, Incomplete Contracts, And The Role Of Market Alternatives (RePEc:fth:tilbur:8946)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Capacity Utilization, the User Cost of Capital and the Cost of Adjustment (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:16:y:1975:i:2:p:352-61)
by Malcomson, James M - Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15881)
by MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James - Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8806)
by Malcomson, James & Mavroeidis, Sophocles - Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2023-0040)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - Wage Premiums and the Profit Maximization in Efficiency Wage Models (RePEc:mtl:montde:9033)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Contracts Bargaining for Flows of Goods and Services in Finite Terms (RePEc:mtl:montde:9111)
by Macleod, B.W. & Malcomson, J.M. - Investments, Hold Up and the Reform of Market Contracts (RePEc:mtl:montde:9114)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Dual Economies (RePEc:mtl:montde:9123)
by MacLeod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Wage Premiums And The Profit Maximization In Efficiency Wage Models (RePEc:mtl:montec:9033)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Contracts Bargaining for Flows of Goods and Services in Finite Terms (RePEc:mtl:montec:9111)
by MacLeod, B.W. & Malcomson, J.M. - Investments, Hold Up And The Reform Of Market Contracts (RePEc:mtl:montec:9114)
by Macleod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Uncertainty, Investment and Productivity with Relational Contracts (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:22:y:2024:i:3:p:1139-1176.)
by James M Malcomson - Incomplete Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:37:y:1985:i:2:p:196-209)
by Malcomson, James M - Competition in NHS Quasi-markets (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:12:y:1996:i:4:p:89-99)
by Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M - Prices vs. Quantities: A Critical Note on the Use of Approximations (RePEc:oup:restud:v:45:y:1978:i:1:p:203-207.)
by James M. Malcomson - The Estimation of a Vintage Model of Production for UK Manufacturing (RePEc:oup:restud:v:46:y:1979:i:4:p:719-736.)
by James M. Malcomson & Michael J. Prior - Corporate Tax Policy and the Service Life of Capital Equipment (RePEc:oup:restud:v:48:y:1981:i:2:p:311-316.)
by James M. Malcomson - Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:5:p:807-817.)
by James M. Malcomson - The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem (RePEc:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:3:p:391-407.)
by James M. Malcomson & Frans Spinnewyn - Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle (RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:45-66.)
by James A. Fairburn & James M. Malcomson - The Specification of Diagnosis-Related Groups (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:162)
by James Malcomson - Health Service Gatekeepers (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:169)
by James Malcomson - Principal and Expert Agent (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:193)
by James Malcomson - Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:221)
by James Malcomson - Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:26)
by James Malcomson & James A. Fairburn & University of Sussex - Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:453)
by James Malcomson - Relational Incentive Contracts (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:508)
by James Malcomson - Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:511)
by James Malcomson & Sophocles Mavroeidis - Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:633)
by James Malcomson - Relational Incentive Contracts with Productivity Shocks (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:634)
by James Malcomson - Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:69)
by James Malcomson & Martin Chalkley & University of Dundee - Relational Contracts and Specific Training (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:732)
by James Malcomson - General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:86)
by James Malcomson & James W. Maw & University of Swansea Wales & Barry McCormick & University of Southampton - Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:940)
by James Malcomson - Grouping agents with persistent types (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:941)
by James Malcomson - Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:9926)
by Fairburn, J.A. & Malcomson, J.M. - Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:9969)
by Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M. - Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:997)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson - Choice and Competition in Public Service Provision (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:number-801)
by James Malcomson & Timothy Besley - Contract Inefficiency, Wages and Employment: An Assessment (RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-23953-5_11)
by James M. Malcomson - Efficient Labour Organization: Incentives, Power and the Transactions Cost Approach (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-06663-6_7)
by James M. Malcomson - Relational Incentive Contracts
[The Handbook of Organizational Economics] (RePEc:pup:chapts:9889-25)
by James M. Malcomson - Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment (RePEc:qed:wpaper:585)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment (RePEc:qed:wpaper:628)
by Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - Involuntary Unemployment in Dynamic Contract Equilibria (RePEc:qed:wpaper:656)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - Labour Turnover and the Natural Rate of Unemployment: An Incomplete Contracts Approach (RePEc:qed:wpaper:697)
by W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson - Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency wages in a matching model for the US (RePEc:red:sed011:776)
by Sophocles Mavroeidis & James Malcomson - Health Service Gatekeepers (RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:2:p:401-421)
by James M. Malcomson - Supplier Discretion Over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care (RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:2:p:412-429)
by James M. Malcomson - Efficient specific investments, incomplete contracts, and the role of market alternatives (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:34b53901-1851-4918-827c-8896c6e2f52f)
by MacLeod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - Efficient specific investments, incomplete contracts, and the role of market alternatives (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:34b53901-1851-4918-827c-8896c6e2f52f)
by MacLeod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M. - The Measurement of Labour Cost in Empirical Models of Production and Employment (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:62:y:1980:i:4:p:521-28)
by Malcomson, James M - Labor Turnover and the Natural Rate of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage versus Frictional Unemployment (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:12:y:1994:i:2:p:276-315)
by MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M & Gomme, Paul - Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:92:y:1984:i:3:p:486-507)
by Malcomson, James M - Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:96:y:1988:i:4:p:832-54)
by MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M - Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:84:y:2016:i::p:317-346)
by James M. Malcomson