Ming Li
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Concordia University
/ Department of Economics (weight: 60%)
-
Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) (weight: 40%)
Research profile
author of:
- On the paradox of mediocracy (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:31:y:2022:i:2:p:492-521)
by Qiang Fu & Ming Li & Xue Qiao - A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:12:y:2010:i:5:p:979-1002)
by Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar - Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:18)
by Li Ming - Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5014)
by Arianna Degan & Ming Li - Persuasion Bias in Science: An Experiment on Strategic Sample Selection (RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-24)
by Arianna Degan & Ming Li & Huan Xie - To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases (RePEc:crd:wpaper:04003)
by Ming Li - A psychologically-based model of voter turnout (RePEc:crd:wpaper:08008)
by Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar - Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission (RePEc:crd:wpaper:09008)
by Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov - Persuasive signalling (RePEc:crd:wpaper:15003)
by Arianna Degan & Ming Li - On the paradox of mediocracy (RePEc:crd:wpaper:20003)
by Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming & Qiao, Xue - Two (talking) heads are not better than one (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70004)
by Ming Li - When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:47-74)
by Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf - Ambiguous persuasion (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:312-365)
by Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming - Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:40:y:2015:i:pb:p:242-259)
by Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming - Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:110:y:2014:i:c:p:15-25)
by Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming - Disclosure of conflicts of interest: Theory and empirics (RePEc:elg:eechap:21115_10)
by Ming Li & Ting Liu - Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:2:p:25-:d:236869)
by Qingqing Cheng & Ming Li - Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:gla:glaewp:2016_22)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li - Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2010)
by LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy - Policy Making with Reputation Concerns (RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2010)
by FU, Qiang & LI, Ming - Persuasion Bias in Science : An Experiment on Strategic Sample Selection (RePEc:mtl:montec:14-2019)
by Arianna Degan & Ming Li & Huan Xie - Ambiguous Persuasion (RePEc:mtl:montec:25-2018)
by Dorian BEAUCHÊNE & Jian LI & Ming LI - A psychologically-based model of voter turnout (RePEc:pra:mprapa:10719)
by Li, Ming & Majumdar, Dipjyoti - Information collection in bargaining (RePEc:pra:mprapa:11108)
by Li, Ming - Persuasion with costly precision (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01346-9)
by Arianna Degan & Ming Li - Information collection in bargaining (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:481-498)
by Ming Li - Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-21)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li - Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i:6:p:1949-1964)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li