Jacques Lawarree
Names
first: |
Jacques |
last: |
Lawarree |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Washington
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Collusive Auditors (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:2:p:442-46)
by Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques - Productivite, Cout Et Caracteristiques Technologiques Des Societes Belges De Transports Urbains (RePEc:bla:annpce:v:58:y:1987:i:4:p:369-396)
by Bemard THlRY & Jacques LAWARREE - Collusion Et Audit D'Entreprises Publiques (RePEc:bla:annpce:v:60:y:1989:i:2:p:217-227)
by Jacques LAWARRÉE - Incitations Manageriales Dans Les Entreprises Publiques (RePEc:bla:annpce:v:61:y:1990:i:4:p:469-488)
by Jacques LAWARREE - Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:31:y:2022:i:3:p:762-783)
by Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:269-291)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée - Use it or lose it (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:6:p:991-1016)
by Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree - Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils (RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:179-198)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun - Contracts offered by bureaucrats (RePEc:bla:randje:v:44:y:2013:i:4:p:686-711)
by Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée - Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information (RePEc:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:4:p:872-890)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott - Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard (RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:1:p:179-206)
by Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique (RePEc:bxr:bxrceb:2013/13278)
by Jacques Lawarree - Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1993)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun - Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4497)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott - Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4511)
by Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée - Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7310)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov - Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8863)
by Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:3:p:629-56)
by Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques - Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:269)
by Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree & Dongsoo Shin - Moral Hazard and Limited Liability (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0971)
by Jacques Lawarree & Marc van Audenrode - Cost observation, auditing and limited liability (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:39:y:1992:i:4:p:419-423)
by Lawarree, Jacques P. & Van Audenrode, Marc A. - Exit option in hierarchical agency (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:8-9:p:1265-1287)
by Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo - Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120301009)
by Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander - Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:66:y:1995:i:1:p:139-157)
by Khalil Fahad & Lawarree Jacques - Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:71:y:1996:i:2:p:514-531)
by Lawarree, Jacques P. & Van Audenrode, Marc A. - A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:59:y:1996:i:1:p:117-136)
by Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques - On the optimality of allowing collusion (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:61:y:1996:i:3:p:383-407)
by Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques - Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:82:y:2001:i:3:p:327-347)
by Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques - On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing (RePEc:fth:washer:0001)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring (RePEc:fth:washer:0006)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid (RePEc:fth:washer:0052)
by Karl Seeley & Jacques Lawarree & Chen-Ching Liu - Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market (RePEc:fth:washer:0054)
by Roger Bjorgan & Chen-Ching Liu & Jacques Lawarree - Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (RePEc:fth:washer:91-01)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence (RePEc:fth:washer:91-15)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability (RePEc:fth:washer:92-09)
by Lawarree, J. & Van Audenrode, M.A. - Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? (RePEc:fth:washer:93-01)
by Khalil, F. & Lawarree, J. - On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion (RePEc:fth:washer:93-02)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability (RePEc:fth:washer:93-07)
by Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M. - Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200512)161:4_621:ofacta_2.0.tx_2-5)
by Jacques Lawarrée & Dongsoo Shin - On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200906)165:2_281:otirof_2.0.tx_2-r)
by Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée - On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing (RePEc:udb:wpaper:0001)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring (RePEc:udb:wpaper:0006)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid (RePEc:udb:wpaper:0052)
by Karl Seeley & Jacques Lawarree & Chen-Ching Liu - Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market (RePEc:udb:wpaper:0054)
by Roger Bjorgan & Chen-Ching Liu & Jacques Lawarree - Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (RePEc:udb:wpaper:91-01)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence (RePEc:udb:wpaper:91-15)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability (RePEc:udb:wpaper:92-09)
by Lawarree, J. & Van Audenrode, M.A. - Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? (RePEc:udb:wpaper:93-01)
by Khalil, F. & Lawarree, J. - On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion (RePEc:udb:wpaper:93-02)
by Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J. - Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability (RePEc:udb:wpaper:93-07)
by Lawarree, J.P. & Van Audenrode, M. - Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2003-02-fc)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2005-09-p)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree - Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2007-11-p)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Sungho Yun - On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2008-24-p)
by Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree - Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2011-08)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Troy J Scott - Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats (RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2013-01)
by Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree - Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment (RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/245733)
by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree