Jean Lainé
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM)
/ Département Économie, Finance, Assurance, Banque (EFAB) (weight: 90%)
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İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
/ Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi (weight: 10%)
Research profile
author of:
- Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_527_0119)
by Nicolas Curien & Emmanuelle Fauchart & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jacques Lesourne & François Moreau - Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:161:y:2017:i:c:p:105-107)
by Dindar, Hayrullah & Lainé, Jean - Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:1:p:1-4)
by Laine, Jean - On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:38:y:1992:i:4:p:399-403)
by Laine, Jean - The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:60-67)
by Dogan, Onur & Laffond, Gilbert & Lainé, Jean - Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:89:y:2020:i:c:p:66-78)
by Aslan, Fatma & Lainé, Jean - Representation in majority tournaments (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:39:y:2000:i:1:p:35-53)
by Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean - Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:52:y:2006:i:1:p:49-66)
by Laffond, G. & Laine, J. - Hyper-stable collective rankings (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:77:y:2015:i:c:p:70-80)
by Lainé, Jean - On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money (RePEc:eee:riceco:v:47:y:1993:i:4:p:363-383)
by Laine, Jean - Hyper-stable social welfare functions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01505809)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - The strong referendum paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271187)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271191)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271214)
by Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Metrizable preferences over preferences (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271221)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver - Hyper-stable collective rankings (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271230)
by Jean Lainé - Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03271247)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03335584)
by Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03335595)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Compromise in combinatorial vote (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03576075)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03851366)
by Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03958175)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00107961)
by G. Laffond & Jean Lainé - Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02613918)
by Fatma Aslan & Jean Lainé - Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00871312)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - The Budget-Voting Paradox (RePEc:kap:theord:v:64:y:2008:i:4:p:447-478)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum (RePEc:kap:theord:v:72:y:2012:i:4:p:525-536)
by Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé - A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition (RePEc:kee:keeldp:99/03)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Gauthier Lanot - Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox (RePEc:msc:wpaper:201301)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine - Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox (RePEc:msc:wpaper:201302)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine - Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule (RePEc:msc:wpaper:201303)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine - Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_hos_52_1_410280)
by Nicolas Curien & Emmanuelle Fauchart & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jacques Lesourne & François Moreau - Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9226-2)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:30:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09713-y)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - The strong referendum paradox (RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0361-y)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine - When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00260-9)
by Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:27:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00268-1)
by Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:75-93)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & Jean-François Laslier - Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:2:p:317-333)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Hyper-stable social welfare functions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:46:y:2016:i:1:p:157-182)
by Jean Lainé & Ali Ozkes & Remzi Sanver - Metrizable preferences over preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01235-0)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver - Compromise in combinatorial vote (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01387-6)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:61:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-022-01445-z)
by Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé - Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_7)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:21:y:2013:i:3:p:590-611)
by G. Laffond & J. Lainé - Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule (RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:22:y:2014:i:2:p:784-799)
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé