Laurent Lamy

Names

first:	Laurent
last:	Lamy

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pla326

Contact

Affiliations

Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)
- EDIRC entry
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Research profile

author of:

On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:8:p:2595-2643)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:bla:randje:v:44:y:2013:i:2:p:194-214)
by Laurent Lamy
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (RePEc:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:2:p:241-270)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Marchés et allotissement : regroupement ou dégroupement ? (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0075)
by Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent
Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used? (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000316)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10758)
by Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent
Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11376)
by Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11564)
by Lamy, Laurent & Jehiel, Philippe
On discrimination in procurement auctions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9790)
by Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9791)
by Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent
The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle' (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2005-35)
by Laurent Lamy
On the Comparative Statics of the Optimal Reserve Price : A Comment on "Reserve price Signaling" (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-23)
by Laurent Lamy
The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-24)
by Laurent Lamy
The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-25)
by Laurent Lamy
Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions : Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-27)
by Laurent Lamy
Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-28)
by Laurent Lamy
Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2019-15)
by Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:eee:econom:v:167:y:2012:i:1:p:113-132)
by Lamy, Laurent
Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts (RePEc:eee:econom:v:235:y:2023:i:2:p:1172-1202)
by Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:990-999)
by Lamy, Laurent
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:390-413)
by Lamy, Laurent
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2498-2504)
by Lamy, Laurent
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-01557585)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:ciredw:halshs-01557657)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688231)
by Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688237)
by Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel
On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel) (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688249)
by Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel) (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688252)
by Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688261)
by Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel
Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688267)
by Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01688318)
by Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel
Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03924664)
by Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754404)
by Laurent Lamy
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754414)
by Laurent Lamy
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754436)
by Laurent Lamy
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754581)
by Laurent Lamy
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754606)
by Laurent Lamy
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00840844)
by Laurent Lamy
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01155875)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01206167)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling?
[Mercados y parcelación: ¿agrupación o división?] (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01509658)
by Olivier Compte & Lamy Laurent & Laurent Emmanuel
On the Benefits of Set-Asides (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03229982)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling ?
[Marchés et allotissements : Regroupement ou dégroupement ?] (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03957955)
by Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00754581)
by Laurent Lamy
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00754606)
by Laurent Lamy
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00840844)
by Laurent Lamy
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01155875)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry (RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01206167)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01688318)
by Laurent Lamy & Philippe Jehiel
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754404)
by Laurent Lamy
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754414)
by Laurent Lamy
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754436)
by Laurent Lamy
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754581)
by Laurent Lamy
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754606)
by Laurent Lamy
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00840844)
by Laurent Lamy
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01155875)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01206167)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling?
[Mercados y parcelación: ¿agrupación o división?] (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01509658)
by Olivier Compte & Lamy Laurent & Laurent Emmanuel
On the Benefits of Set-Asides (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03229982)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling ?
[Marchés et allotissements : Regroupement ou dégroupement ?] (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03957955)
by Olivier Compte & Laurent Lamy & Emmanuel Laurent
Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564887)
by Laurent Lamy
"Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564888)
by Laurent Lamy
Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00575076)
by Laurent Lamy
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586039)
by Laurent Lamy
Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586068)
by Laurent Lamy
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01557585)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01557657)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564887)
by Laurent Lamy
"Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry? (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564888)
by Laurent Lamy
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586039)
by Laurent Lamy
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01557585)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
On the benefits of set-asides (RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01557657)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Modulation of Saturn’s radio clock by solar wind speed (RePEc:nat:nature:v:450:y:2007:i:7167:d:10.1038_nature06237)
by Philippe Zarka & Laurent Lamy & Baptiste Cecconi & Renée Prangé & Helmut O. Rucker
The auroral footprint of Enceladus on Saturn (RePEc:nat:nature:v:472:y:2011:i:7343:d:10.1038_nature09928)
by Wayne R. Pryor & Abigail M. Rymer & Donald G. Mitchell & Thomas W. Hill & David T. Young & Joachim Saur & Geraint H. Jones & Sven Jacobsen & Stan W. H. Cowley & Barry H. Mauk & Andrew J. Coates & Jacq
On the Benefits of Set-Asides (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:4:p:1655-1696.)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:503-510)
by Laurent Lamy
A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/696273)
by Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy

The profile is maintained by Laurent Lamy

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pla326/