Christoph Kuzmics

Names

first:	Christoph
last:	Kuzmics

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pku154

Contact

homepage:

https://homepage.uni-graz.at/de/christoph.kuzmics/

Affiliations

Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz / Social- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (RePEc:arx:papers:2005.05713)
by Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics
Limit Orders and Knightian Uncertainty (RePEc:arx:papers:2208.10804)
by Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics
An Ellsberg paradox for ambiguity aversion (RePEc:arx:papers:2212.03603)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
Randomization advice and ambiguity aversion (RePEc:arx:papers:2301.03304)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives (RePEc:arx:papers:2309.04193)
by Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics
Farkas' Lemma and Complete Indifference (RePEc:arx:papers:2404.02620)
by Florian Herold & Christoph Kuzmics
Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics (RePEc:bie:wpaper:451)
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph
Inferring preferences from choices under uncertainty (RePEc:bie:wpaper:462)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games (RePEc:bie:wpaper:466)
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:bie:wpaper:468)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W.
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria (RePEc:bie:wpaper:489)
by Diehl, Christoph & Kuzmics, Christoph
Coordination with independent private values: why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other (RePEc:bie:wpaper:501)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem w (RePEc:bie:wpaper:504)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
Efficiency based measures of inequality (RePEc:bie:wpaper:512)
by Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph & Rogers, Brian W.
A case for standard theory? (RePEc:bie:wpaper:542)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Rodenburger, Daniel
Preferences under ignorance (RePEc:bie:wpaper:546)
by Gossner, Olivier & Kuzmics, Christoph
Cognitive empathy in conflict situations (RePEc:bie:wpaper:551)
by Gauer, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget (RePEc:bie:wpaper:553)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik
The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction (RePEc:bla:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:52-66)
by Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics
The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction (RePEc:bpj:germec:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:52-66)
by Balkenborg Dieter & Kuzmics Christoph & Hofbauer Josef
Representative Consumer's Risk Aversion and Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules (RePEc:cam:camdae:0452)
by Hara, C. & Christoph Kuzmics
An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000332)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers
The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000248)
by Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000943)
by Christoph Kuzmics
Preferences under ignorance (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2017-52)
by Olivier Gossner & Christoph Kuzmics
Noisy evolution in normal form games (RePEc:ecm:latm04:50)
by Christoph Kuzmics
Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:666-673)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360] (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:318-323)
by Günther, Michael & Kuzmics, Christoph & Salomon, Antoine
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:51-76)
by Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph
Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:321-336)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:542-551)
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:452-466)
by Kuzmics, Christoph
The evolution of taking roles (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:174:y:2020:i:c:p:38-63)
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:84:y:2012:i:2:p:681-700)
by Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph
Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:137:y:2007:i:1:p:652-672)
by Hara, Chiaki & Huang, James & Kuzmics, Christoph
Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:346-358)
by Hara, Chiaki & Huang, James & Kuzmics, Christoph
Hidden symmetries and focal points (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:226-258)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kuzmics, Christoph
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:25-67)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W.
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:56-69)
by Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik
Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001442)
by Külpmann, Philipp & Kuzmics, Christoph
Efficiency-based measures of inequality (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:85:y:2019:i:c:p:60-69)
by Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph & Rogers, Brian W.
Preferences under ignorance (RePEc:ehl:lserod:87332)
by Gossner, Olivier & Kuzmics, Christoph
Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics (RePEc:exe:wpaper:0806)
by Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics
Unknown item RePEc:grz:wpaper:2016-02 (paper)
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The evolution of taking roles (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2017-09)
by Florian Herold & Christoph Kuzmics
The distribution of article quality and inefficiencies in the market for scientific journals (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2017-11)
by Philipp Kohlgruber & Christoph Kuzmics
A case of evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium in the lab (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2018-05)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger
A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327 360] (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2018-16)
by Michael Guenther & Christoph Kuzmics & Antoine Salomon
Limit Orders under Knightian Uncertainty (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-03)
by Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics
Is Ellsberg behavior evidence of ambiguity aversion? (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-07)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
On the Predictive Power of Theories of One-Shot Play (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-09)
by Philipp Kuelpmann & Christoph Kuzmics
Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-10)
by Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics
An Ellsberg paradox for ambiguity aversion (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2022-05)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
Randomization advice and ambiguity aversion (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2023-01)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
Farkas' Lemma and Complete Indifference (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-08)
by Florian Herold & Christoph Kuzmics
Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives (RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-09)
by Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics
Effects of Background Risks on Cautiousness with an Application to a Portfolio Choice Problem (RePEc:hit:piecis:368)
by Hara, Chiaki & 原, 千秋 & ハラ, チアキ & Huang, James & Kuzmics, Christoph
Representative Consumer's Risk Aversion and Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules (RePEc:hit:piedp2:323)
by Hara, Chiaki & 原, 千秋 & ハラ, チアキ & Huang, James & Kuzmics, Christoph
Tail-Dependence in Stock-Return Pairs (RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:126)
by Fortin, Ines & Kuzmics, Christoph
Optimal Bandwidth Selection in Non-Parametric Spectral Density Estimation (RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:62)
by Fortin, Ines & Kuzmics, Christoph
Randomization advice and ambiguity aversion (RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:69:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11166-024-09436-4)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers & Xiannong Zhang
Representative Consumer's Risk Aversion and Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:620)
by Chiaki Hara & James Huang & Christoph Kuzmics
Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes and Background Risks (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:621)
by Chiaki Hara & James Huang & Christoph Kuzmics
Effects of Background Risks on Cautiousness with an Application to a Portfolio Choice Problem (RePEc:kyo:wpaper:654)
by Chiaki Hara & James Huang & Christoph Kuzmics
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1551)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Thomas Palfrey & Brian Rogers
Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version) (RePEc:pra:mprapa:102926)
by Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph
A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:70:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01224-5)
by Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:165-193)
by Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00774-0)
by Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics
Assessing COVID-19 Prevalence in Austria with Infection Surveys and Case Count Data as Auxiliary Information (RePEc:taf:jnlasa:v:119:y:2024:i:547:p:1722-1735)
by Stéphane Guerrier & Christoph Kuzmics & Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser
Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics (RePEc:the:publsh:652)
by Balkenborg, Dieter G. & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph
Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points (RePEc:twi:respas:0035)
by Carlos Alï¿½s-Ferrer & Christoph Kuzmics
Preferences Under Ignorance (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:1:p:241-257)
by Olivier Gossner & Christoph Kuzmics
Cognitive Empathy In Conflict Situations (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:4:p:1659-1678)
by Florian Gauer & Christoph Kuzmics
Tail‐dependence in stock‐return pairs (RePEc:wly:isacfm:v:11:y:2002:i:2:p:89-107)
by Ines Fortin & Christoph Kuzmics
The evolution of taking roles (RePEc:zbw:bamber:115)
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
Farkas' lemma and complete indifference (RePEc:zbw:bamber:289614)
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
Coordination with Independent Private Values: why Pedestrians sometimes bump into each other (RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100529)
by Kuzmics, Christoph

The profile is maintained by Christoph Kuzmics

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pku154/