Vijay Krishna
Names
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Vijay |
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Krishna |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Pennsylvania State University
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- On the Benefits of Costly Voting (RePEc:ads:wpaper:0083)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - On Communication and Collusion (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:2:p:285-315)
by Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna - Asymmetric Auctions with Resale (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:87-112)
by Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna - Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:4:p:339-75)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result (RePEc:arx:papers:2402.05276)
by Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna - Contracting for information under imperfect commitment (RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:905-925)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Information exchange in cartels (RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:2:p:421-446)
by Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna - Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment (RePEc:cdl:compol:qt4010c6w9)
by Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John - On the Convergence of Fictitious Play (RePEc:cla:levarc:417)
by Vijay Krishna & T. Sjostrom - Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections (RePEc:cla:najeco:814577000000000498)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Eliciting Information from an Expert: The Art of Conversation (joint with John Morgan) (RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000092)
by Vijay Krishna - Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:02:p:435-452_00)
by Krishna, Vijay - Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-34)
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay - The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-08)
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay - Finitely Repeated Games (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:4:p:905-22)
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay - Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:2:p:303-23)
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay - Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:4:p:1113-19)
by Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot - Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:1-31)
by Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W. - Entry deterrence and dynamic competition : The role of capacity reconsidered (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:9:y:1991:i:4:p:477-495)
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay - Asymmetric English auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:2:p:261-288)
by Krishna, Vijay - The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:117:y:2004:i:2:p:147-179)
by Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John - Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:6:p:2083-2123)
by Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John - Panics and prices (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:217:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000243)
by Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay - An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:72:y:1997:i:2:p:343-362)
by Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John - Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:589-602)
by Hafalir, Isa & Krishna, Vijay - Auction Theory (RePEc:eee:monogr:9780123745071)
by Krishna, Vijay - Auction Theory (RePEc:eee:monogr:9780124262973)
by Krishna, Vijay - Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (RePEc:fth:bostin:0056)
by Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal - Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining (RePEc:fth:harver:10)
by Krishna, V. & Serrano, R. - On the Convergence of Fictitious Play (RePEc:fth:harver:1717)
by Vijay Krishna & Tomas Sjostrom - Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (RePEc:fth:pensta:04-95-06)
by Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W. - On the Convergence of Ficticious Play (RePEc:fth:pensta:04-95-07)
by Sjostrom, T. & Krishna, V. - The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (RePEc:fth:pensta:1-96-3)
by Benoit, J.P. & Krishna, V. - Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining (RePEc:fth:pensta:10-93-31)
by Krishna, V. & serrano, R. - A Model of Expertise (RePEc:fth:priwpu:206)
by Krishna, V. & Morgan, J. - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:479-511 (article)
- The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis (RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9603)
by Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna - A Model of Expertise (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:2:p:747-775.)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities (RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:1:p:23-35.)
by Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna - Multilateral Bargaining (RePEc:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:61-80.)
by Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano - Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders (RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:1:p:155-179.)
by Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna - A Model of Expertise (RePEc:pri:wwseco:dp206.pdf)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - International Journal of Game Theory (RePEc:spr:jogath)
from Springer;Game Theory Society as editor - Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:3:p:259-72)
by Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto - Vijay Krishna on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_12)
by Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna - Communication and cooperation in repeated games (RePEc:the:publsh:3049)
by Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay - Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/660731)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&D (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/711953)
by Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna - An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9409002)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - On the Convergence of Fictitious Play (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503003)
by Vijay Krishna & Tomas Sjostrom - Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503004)
by Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal - The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9601001)
by Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna - Efficient Mechanism Design (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703010)
by Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry - Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9805001)
by Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna - The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902001)
by Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna - A Model of Expertise (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902003)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan - Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment (RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0504006)
by Vijay Krishna & John Morgan