Anton Kolotilin
Names
first: |
Anton |
last: |
Kolotilin |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
UNSW Sydney
/ UNSW Business School
/ School of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0115)
by Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin & Anton Kolotilin - Relational Communication (RePEc:arx:papers:1901.05645)
by Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li - Persuasion Meets Delegation (RePEc:arx:papers:1902.02628)
by Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk - The Persuasion Duality (RePEc:arx:papers:1910.11392)
by Piotr Dworczak & Anton Kolotilin - Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences (RePEc:arx:papers:2206.09164)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:arx:papers:2304.09381)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport (RePEc:arx:papers:2311.02889)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching (RePEc:arx:papers:2402.17142)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Euclidean Fairness And Efficiency (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:3:p:1689-1690)
by Gabriele Gratton & Anton Kolotilin - Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0115)
by Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin & Anton Kolotilin - Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6755)
by Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin & Kolotilin, Anton - Experimental design to persuade (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:215-226)
by Kolotilin, Anton - Optimal limited authority for principal (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2344-2382)
by Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei - The heterogeneity of concentrated prescribing behavior: Theory and evidence from antipsychotics (RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:40:y:2015:i:c:p:26-39)
by Berndt, Ernst R. & Gibbons, Robert S. & Kolotilin, Anton & Taub, Anna Levine - Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:gla:glaewp:2016_22)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li - Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03415478)
by Anton Kolotilin & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin - The Diversity of Concentrated Prescribing Behavior: An Application to Antipsychotics (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16823)
by Anna A. Levine Taub & Anton Kolotilin & Robert S. Gibbons & Ernst R. Berndt - Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:27:y::i:2:p:301-323)
by Sergei Guriev & Anton Kolotilin & Konstantin Sonin - When to Drop a Bombshell (RePEc:oup:restud:v:85:y:2018:i:4:p:2139-2172.)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - Experimental Design to Persuade (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-17)
by Anton Kolotilin - Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-19)
by Anton Kolotilin - Timing Information Flows (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2015-16)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - When to Drop a Bombshell (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-13)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-21)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li - Persuasion Meets Delegation (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-06)
by Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk - Estimation of a Scale-Free Network Formation Model (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-10)
by Anton Kolotilin & Valentyn Panchenko - Relational Communication (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-12)
by Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi - Relational Communication (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-12a)
by Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi - Relational Communication (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2018-12b)
by Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi - Assortative Information Disclosure (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2020-08)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2020-12)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-06)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-07)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-12)
by Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky - Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-01)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Persuasion Meets Delegation (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-04)
by Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk - On Monotone Persuasion (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-05)
by Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li & Andriy Zapechelnyuk - The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-06)
by Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky - Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach (RePEc:the:publsh:1805)
by Kolotilin, Anton - Relational communication (RePEc:the:publsh:3734)
by Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi - Censorship as optimal persuasion (RePEc:the:publsh:4071)
by Kolotilin, Anton & Mylovanov, Timofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - The persuasion duality (RePEc:the:publsh:5900)
by Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton - Distributions of posterior quantiles via matching (RePEc:the:publsh:6057)
by Kolotilin, Anton & Wolitzky, Alexander - Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i:6:p:1949-1964)
by Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li