László Á. Kóczy

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem / Gazdaság- és Társadalomtudományi Kar / Pénzügyek Tanszék (weight: 34%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont / Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet / Játékelméleti Kutatócsoport (weight: 66%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (RePEc:ags:feemdp:54365)
  by Koczy, Laszlo A.
• Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (RePEc:ags:iaae18:277231)
  by Kovacs, A. & Ferto, I. & Koczy, L. & Sziklai, B. & Nas, A.A.
• Brexit: The Belated Threat (RePEc:arx:papers:1808.05142)
  by D'ora Gr'eta Petr'oczy & Mark Francis Rogers & L'aszl'o 'A. K'oczy
• A characterisation theorem of the logarithmic function modulo 1 (RePEc:cmt:pumath:puma1998v009pp0311-0318)
  by Erdős, P., Joó, I. & Kóczy, L.à .
• The core in the presence of externalities (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01aa0027)
  by László Kóczy
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02aa0011)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Core in a Normal Form Game (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02aa0012)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:209:y:2011:i:1:p:57-62)
  by Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Miklós
• Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks (RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:80:y:2019:i:c:p:355-365)
  by Csercsik, Dávid & Hubert, Franz & Sziklai, Balázs R. & Kóczy, László Á.
• The impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions (RePEc:eee:enepol:v:144:y:2020:i:c:s0301421520304201)
  by Sziklai, Balázs R. & Kóczy, László Á. & Csercsik, Dávid
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:67-79)
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
• The coalition structure core is accessible (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:86-93)
  by Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:2:p:277-298)
  by Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:559-565)
  by Kóczy, László Á.
• Stable allocations of risk (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:266-276)
  by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
• Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective (RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:31:y:2007:i:8:p:2517-2534)
  by Csoka, Peter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Koczy, Laszlo A.
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:43:y:2006:i:1:p:56-64)
  by Koczy, Laszlo A.
• Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:61:y:2015:i:c:p:104-110)
  by Kóczy, LászlóÁ.
• Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:2:p:152-158)
  by Kóczy, László Á.
• Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:77:y:2015:i:c:p:32-41)
  by Biró, Péter & Kóczy, László Á. & Sziklai, Balázs
• Does risk sorting explain overpricing in experimental asset markets? (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s2214804322000568)
  by Kiss, Hubert J. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Ágnes & Sziklai, Balázs R.
• The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (RePEc:ete:ceswps:500556)
  by Laszlo Aron Koczy & Luc Lauwers
• A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (RePEc:ete:ceswps:500558)
  by Laszlo Aron Koczy
• The Core of a Partition Function Game (RePEc:ete:ceswps:500647)
  by Laszlo Aron Koczy
• The Core of a Partition Function Game (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0025)
  by Laszlo A Koczy
• A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0217)
  by László Á.Kóczy
• The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0218)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0219)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers
• The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0220)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers
• The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.50)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers
• Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.83)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:51-:d:578572)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:13:y:2022:i:1:p:18-:d:743774)
  by Dóra Gréta Petróczy & Mark Francis Rogers & László Á. Kóczy
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00780511)
  by Fabien Lange & Laszlo A Koczy
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (RePEc:has:discpr:0421)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers
• The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks (RePEc:has:discpr:0512)
  by Laszlo.A.Koczy
• Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective (RePEc:has:discpr:0611)
  by Péter Csóka & Jean-Jacques Herings & László Kóczy
• Stable Allocations of Risk (RePEc:has:discpr:0704)
  by Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, & Laszlo A. Koczy
• Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (RePEc:has:discpr:0820)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The World Cup of Economics Journals: A Ranking by a Tournament Method (RePEc:has:discpr:1018)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Martin Strobel
• Prospects after the Voting Reform of the Lisbon Treaty (RePEc:has:discpr:1020)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy
• Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks (RePEc:has:discpr:1125)
  by David Csercsik & Laszlo A. Koczy
• The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees (RePEc:has:discpr:1129)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Miklos Pinter
• The Intellectual Influence of Economic Journals: Quality versus Quantity (RePEc:has:discpr:1215)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Alexandru Nichifor
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (RePEc:has:discpr:1220)
  by Fabien Lange & Laszlo A. Koczy
• Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core (RePEc:has:discpr:1226)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy
• Electing the Pope (RePEc:has:discpr:1315)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Balazs Sziklai
• Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation (RePEc:has:discpr:1338)
  by Peter Biro & Laszlo A. Koczy & Balazs Sziklai
• Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions (RePEc:has:discpr:1431)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality (RePEc:has:discpr:1716)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Peter Biro & Balazs Sziklai
• Bounds on Malapportionment (RePEc:has:discpr:1801)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy & Balazs Sziklai
• The geopolitical impact of Nord Stream 2 (RePEc:has:discpr:1821)
  by Balazs Sziklai & Laszlo A. Koczy & David Csercsik
• Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks (RePEc:has:discpr:1904)
  by David Csercsik & Franz Hubert & Balazs R. Sziklai & Laszlo A. Koczy
• Does risk sorting explain bubbles? (RePEc:has:discpr:1905)
  by Hubert J. Kiss & Laszlo A. Koczy & Agnes Pinter & Balazs R. Sziklai
• The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty (RePEc:has:discpr:1906)
  by Laszlo A. Koczy
• The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games (RePEc:has:discpr:2022)
  by P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• Power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (RePEc:has:discpr:2114)
  by Imre Fertő & László Á. Kóczy & Kovács Attila & Balázs R. Sziklai
• Efficiency and Stability in Electrical Power Transmission Networks: a Partition Function Form Approach (RePEc:kap:netspa:v:17:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11067-017-9363-0)
  by Dávid Csercsik & László Á. Kóczy
• A recursive core for partition function form games (RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:1:p:41-51)
  by László Kóczy
• Központi felvételi rendszerek. Taktikázás és stabilitás
  [Central admission systems. Stratagems and stability] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1096)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai
  [Specific features of Hungarys system of school and university admissions] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1148)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• Az ellenzék ereje - általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok
  [Minority power - generalized weighted voting games] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1248)
  by Kóczy Á., László & Pintér, Miklós
• Lisszaboni kilátások
  [Lisbon prospects] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1281)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• Választókörzetek igazságosan?
  [Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1343)
  by Kóczy Á., László & Biró, Péter & Sziklai, Balázs
• Elméleti játékok, 2012. 8th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meetings on Game Theory (SING8)
  [Theoretical Games 2012. The 8th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING8)] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1347)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• Válogatás az MKE 2012. évi konferenciájának előadásaiból. A vendégszerkesztő előszava
  [Selected lectures from the 2012 Hungarian Economics Association conference. Introduction by the guest editor] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:1408)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• A Neumann-féle játékelmélet
  [Neumanns game theory] (RePEc:ksa:szemle:814)
  by Kóczy Á., László
• Hart and Holmström’s Contributions to Contract Theory (RePEc:mnb:finrev:v:16:y:2017:i:1:p:162-174)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Hubert János Kiss
• The power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (RePEc:oup:erevae:v:47:y::i:5:p:1897-1919.)
  by Imre Fertő & László Á Kóczy & Attila Kovács & Balázs R Sziklai
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0801)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Stable Allocations of Risk (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0802)
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0803)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Invariant Method is Manipulable (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0804)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Martin Strobel
• Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0805)
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy
• Proportional power is free from paradoxes (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0806)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Központi felvételi rendszerek: Taktikázás és stabilitás (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0809)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Központi felvételi rendszerek: Taktikázás és stabilitás (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0901)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Article length bias in journal rankings (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0902)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor & Martin Strobel
• Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0903)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0904)
  by Péter Csóka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér
• Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0905)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Voting games with endogenously infeasible coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0908.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0909.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Fabien Lange
• Voting games with endogenously infeasible coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1001.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1002.rdf)
  by Fabien Lange & László Á. Kóczy
• Intellectual Infl uence: Quality versus Quantity (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1009.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor & Martin Strobel
• The World Cup of Economics Journals: A Ranking by a Tournament Method (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1011.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Martin Strobel
• Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1012.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Az ellenzék ereje: Általános súlyozott szavazási játékok (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1013.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér
• Lisszaboni kilátások (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1014.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1103.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Dávid Csercsik
• The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1104.rdf)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Miklós Pintér
• The Intellectual Influence of Economic Journals: Quality versus Quantity (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1202)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor
• Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1203)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Fair apportionment of voting districts in Hungary? (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1204)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Péter Biró & Balázs Sziklai
• Electing the Pope (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1301)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Balázs Sziklai
• Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1302)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Balázs Sziklai & Péter Biró
• Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1401)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• How Brexit affects European Union power distribution (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1601)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The contributions of Hart and Holmström to Contract Theory (RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1701)
  by László Á. Kóczy & János Kiss Hubert
• About Cooperation, Selfishness and Joint Risks in Clusters (RePEc:pra:mprapa:65053)
  by Gedai, Endre & Kóczy, László Á. & Meier zu Köcker, Gerd & Zombori, Zita
• Cluster games: A novel, game theory-based approach to better understand incentives and stability in clusters (RePEc:pra:mprapa:65095)
  by Gedai, Endre & Kóczy, László Á. & Zombori, Zita
• Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:318:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-022-04669-5)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Editorial (RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:23:y:2015:i:4:p:723-725)
  by Ferenc Forgó & László Kóczy & Miklós Pintér
• Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:19:y:2010:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9161-2)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions (RePEc:spr:homoec:v:33:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-016-0002-7)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:52:y:2013:i:3:p:863-884)
  by László Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor
• Balancedness conditions for exact games (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:74:y:2011:i:1:p:41-52)
  by Péter Csóka & P. Herings & László Kóczy
• The invariant method can be manipulated (RePEc:spr:scient:v:81:y:2009:i:1:d:10.1007_s11192-008-2134-4)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Martin Strobel
• Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:281-292)
  by Fabien Lange & László Kóczy
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_1
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_10
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_11
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_12
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_13
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_14
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_2
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_3
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_4
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_5
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_6
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_7
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_8
• Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-319-69841-0_9
• Partition Function Form Games (RePEc:spr:thdlic:978-3-319-69841-0)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Equivalence of the Minimal Dominant Set and the Myopic Stable Set for Coalition Function Form Games (RePEc:unm:umagsb:2020017)
  by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
• The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004018)
  by Herings, P.J.J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J.
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (RePEc:unm:umamet:2004019)
  by Kóczy, L.Á. & Lauwers, L.
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005043)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• Strategic aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU enlargements (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005044)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006016)
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á.
• A recursive core for partition function form games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006031)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006047)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• Voting Paradoxes and the Human Intuition (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006048)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• Strategic power indices: quarrelling in coalitions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2006049)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• A note on Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin's (1979) domain richness condition (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007039)
  by Bochet, O.L.A. & Klaus, B.E.
• Balancedness conditions for exact games (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007040)
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á.
• Stable allocations of risk (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007041)
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á.
• Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008028)
  by Kóczy, L.Á.
• The invariant method is manipulable (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008029)
  by Kóczy, L.Á. & Strobel, M.
• Article length bias in journal rankings (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009016)
  by Kóczy, L.Á. & Nichifor, A. & Strobel, M.
• Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility (RePEc:unm:umamet:2009031)
  by Csóka, P. & Herings, P.J.J. & Kóczy, L.Á. & Pintér, M.
• Intellectual Influence: quality versus quantity (RePEc:unm:umamet:2010029)
  by Koczy, L. & Nichifor, A. & Strobel, M.
• The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity (RePEc:unm:umamet:2012025)
  by Koczy, L. & Nichifor, A.
• The Core of a Partition Function Game (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012004)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0110001)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers
• Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0111002)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202001)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203006)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0210002)
  by László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers
• The Core of a Normal Form Game (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0302002)
  by László Á. Kóczy
• Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming (RePEc:wut:journl:v:31:y:2021:i:2:p:61-76:id:1576)
  by Jochen Staudacher & László Á. Kóczy & Izabella Stach & Jan Filipp & Marcus Kramer & Till Noffke & Linuss Olsson & Jonas Pichler & Tobias Singer