Flip Klijn
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
/ Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica CSIC (IAE-CSIC)
Research profile
author of:
- Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1860-74)
by Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (RePEc:ags:feemdp:50480)
by Calsamiglia, Caterina & Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip - Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange (RePEc:arx:papers:2102.00167)
by P'eter Bir'o & Flip Klijn & Xenia Klimentova & Ana Viana - Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:aub:autbar:552.02)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations (RePEc:aub:autbar:553.02)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Bas van Velzen - Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment (RePEc:aub:autbar:561.03)
by Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Flip Klijn & Estela S?chez - Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (RePEc:aub:autbar:582.03)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Distribution Center Consolidation Games (RePEc:aub:autbar:602.04)
by Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker - Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:604.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:616.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Sequencing Games without Initial Order (RePEc:aub:autbar:622.04)
by Flip Klijn & Estela S?chez - A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (RePEc:aub:autbar:624.04)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker & Bas van Velzen - Employment by Lotto Revisited (RePEc:aub:autbar:627.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] (RePEc:aub:autbar:628.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Median Stable Matching for College Admission (RePEc:aub:autbar:632.04)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:653.05)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Constrained School Choice (RePEc:aub:autbar:671.06)
by Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn - The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:aub:autbar:694.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Smith and Rawls Share a Room (RePEc:aub:autbar:706.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:aub:autbar:708.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (RePEc:aub:autbar:757.08)
by Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn - Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:aub:autbar:816.10)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests (RePEc:aub:autbar:835.10)
by Itai Ashlagi & Flip Klijn - Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement (RePEc:aub:autbar:866.11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' (RePEc:aub:autbar:877.11)
by Flip Klijn - Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1115)
by Christopher Kah & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1119)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:117)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Distribution Center Consolidation Games (RePEc:bge:wpaper:118)
by Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker - Academic Integrity in On-line Exams: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1210)
by Flip Klijn & Mehdi Mdaghri Alaoui & Marc Vorsatz - Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1235)
by Péter Biró & Flip Klijn & Xenia Klimentova & Ana Viana - Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1255)
by Péter Biró & Flip Klijn & Szilvia Pápai - Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1264)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental QRE Analysis (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1270)
by Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz - Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1341)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1399)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Seçkin Özbilen - Online Academic Exams: Does Multiplicity of Exam Versions Mitigate Cheating? (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1430)
by Flip Klijn & Mehdi Mdaghri Alaoui & Marc Vorsatz - Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:145)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1468)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jay Sethuraman - Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:156)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Median Stable Matching for College Admission (RePEc:bge:wpaper:165)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (RePEc:bge:wpaper:221)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker & Bas Van Velzen - Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples (RePEc:bge:wpaper:261)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Toshifumi Nakamura - Employment by Lotto Revisited (RePEc:bge:wpaper:263)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Constrained School Choice (RePEc:bge:wpaper:294)
by Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn - The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:296)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Smith and Rawls Share a Room (RePEc:bge:wpaper:315)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:357)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching (RePEc:bge:wpaper:36)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (RePEc:bge:wpaper:365)
by Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn - Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:384)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:385)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:bge:wpaper:447)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests (RePEc:bge:wpaper:479)
by Itai Ashlagi & Flip Klijn - Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement (RePEc:bge:wpaper:538)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem" (RePEc:bge:wpaper:567)
by Flip Klijn & Ay?e Yaz?c? - Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (RePEc:bge:wpaper:610)
by Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:632)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn - Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (RePEc:bge:wpaper:686)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn - Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate (RePEc:bge:wpaper:709)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker - Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice (RePEc:bge:wpaper:752)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:bge:wpaper:78)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó - Outsourcing with Identical Suppliers and Shortest-First Policy: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:bge:wpaper:846)
by Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz - Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists (RePEc:bge:wpaper:892)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:bge:wpaper:894)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:bge:wpaper:926)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (RePEc:bge:wpaper:956)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn - School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms (RePEc:bge:wpaper:957)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn - Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers (RePEc:bge:wpaper:960)
by Flip Klijn - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:6:p:921-933)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:19:y:2019:i:1:p:9:n:9)
by Klijn Flip - Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (RePEc:col:000089:009425)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kayi & Flip Klijn - On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (RePEc:col:000089:010316)
by Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kay & Flip Klijn - Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare (RePEc:col:000089:010737)
by Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (RePEc:col:000089:015610)
by Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms (RePEc:col:000089:015611)
by Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (RePEc:col:000092:009381)
by Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (RePEc:col:000092:009997)
by Paula Jaramillo & Kagi Cagatay & Flip Klijn - Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (RePEc:col:000092:010724)
by Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn - Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems (RePEc:col:000092:015499)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kayi & Flip Klijn - School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms (RePEc:col:000092:015501)
by Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn - A Dual Egalitarian Solution (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70007)
by Flip Klijn & Stef Tijs & Marco Slikker - Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:139:y:2016:i:c:p:72-75)
by Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc - Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:98-101)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519304318)
by Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc - Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:3:p:323-326)
by Klijn, Flip & Tijs, Stef & Hamers, Herbert - On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:119:y:1999:i:3:p:678-691)
by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Suijs, Jeroen - On the nucleolus of neighbor games (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:146:y:2003:i:1:p:1-18)
by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries - A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: Equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:273:y:2019:i:2:p:634-645)
by Braat, Jac & Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Slikker, Marco - Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:222-229)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:147-163)
by Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc - Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:428-453)
by Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia - Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:234-254)
by Feng, Di & Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:231-239)
by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Pere Villar, Joan - Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:42:y:2003:i:1:p:91-100)
by Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi - Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:1:p:154-171)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:693-701)
by Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip - Stable matchings and preferences of couples (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:121:y:2005:i:1:p:75-106)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - Constrained school choice (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1921-1947)
by Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip - Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:2227-2233)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Nakamura, Toshifumi - Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2218-2240)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus - A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:392-396)
by Calsamiglia, Caterina & Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip - Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:93:y:2022:i:c:s0167487022000666)
by Klijn, Flip & Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi & Vorsatz, Marc - Farsighted house allocation (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:817-824)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus - Local and global consistency properties for student placement (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:3:p:222-229)
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip - A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’ (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:63-73)
by Klijn, Flip & Yazıcı, Ayşe - School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s0304406821000343)
by Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip - The egalitarian solution for convex games: some characterizations (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:1:p:111-121)
by Klijn, Flip & Slikker, Marco & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose - Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:3:p:295-312)
by Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Klijn, Flip & Sanchez, Estela - On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:101-103)
by Klijn, Flip - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.29)
by Guillaume Haeringer & Caterina Calsamiglia & Flip Klijn - Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey (RePEc:has:discpr:1139)
by Peter Biro & Flip Klijn - Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-111)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Farsighted House Allocation (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-129)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-135)
by Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl - Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-093)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:ise:remwps:wp0042017)
by Joana Pais & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz - Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance (RePEc:ise:remwps:wp0982019)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:16:y:2013:i:1:p:1-22)
by Flip Klijn & Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz - Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment (RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9579-3)
by Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz - Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.07)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.08)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.01)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets (RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.06)
by Di Feng & Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:109:y:2002:i:1:p:265-277:10.1023/a:1016360404530)
by Pedro Calleja & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker - On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games (RePEc:spr:annopr:v:137:y:2005:i:1:p:161-175:10.1007/s10479-005-2252-9)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Bas Velzen - Procedurally fair and stable matching (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:431-447)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:411-416)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Characterizations of a multi-choice value (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:521-532)
by José Zarzuelo & Marco Slikker & Flip Klijn - Median Stable Matching for College Admissions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:1-11)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Fair and efficient student placement with couples (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0651-9)
by Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn - Neighbor games and the leximax solution (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:58:y:2003:i:2:p:191-208)
by Flip Klijn & Dries Vermeulen & Herbert Hamers & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs & Joan Pere Villar - Sequencing games without initial order (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:63:y:2006:i:1:p:53-62)
by Flip Klijn & Estela Sánchez - Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers (RePEc:spr:mathme:v:89:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00186-018-0645-1)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker - Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:175-184)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó - An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:201-215)
by Flip Klijn - Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:4:p:647-667)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:23-33)
by Itai Ashlagi & Flip Klijn - On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:4:p:793-811)
by Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:603-633)
by Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn - Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01312-3)
by Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl & Christopher Kah - Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:61:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01458-2)
by Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz - On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:0511fa02-e967-42b3-b9f8-33c9dbbb004a)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & van Velzen, S. - Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:0a127ca4-b1ae-47e7-a135-36f7a4ed46f9)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J. - On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:16a7563a-1803-4a1d-8b46-44a52dea74a6)
by Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. - On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:24d16e9c-4dab-4284-8b39-f21cd2a39d03)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D. - A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2f17d69d-3255-42b6-b988-39084c3da78f)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & van Velzen, S. - On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:7579f715-83ed-4532-aa3d-4f246f26b161)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J. - Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:7a24fce2-14e6-4670-8dbb-8e21de9bfa01)
by Klijn, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Hamers, H.J.M. - A Dual Egalitarian Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9116c2a6-bf36-4b9c-a029-3f4604308ac7)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. - Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b9f5b0ab-bfc5-4ad3-a4ba-8e17abb96e59)
by Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J. - On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c3573ae5-8914-487e-a2f1-5e276a186c45)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Suijs, J.P.M. - Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12)
by Klijn, F. & Masso, J. - Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects : An Algorithm and an Application (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:2a7e4e1e-bdbf-4666-9aaf-3d4c1d420b62)
by Klijn, F. - Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:fb52ef4b-d73a-486d-b154-f3fc512c5a96)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Zarzuelo, J. - On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0511fa02-e967-42b3-b9f8-33c9dbbb004a)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & van Velzen, S. - Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:0a127ca4-b1ae-47e7-a135-36f7a4ed46f9)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J. - On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:16a7563a-1803-4a1d-8b46-44a52dea74a6)
by Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. - On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:24d16e9c-4dab-4284-8b39-f21cd2a39d03)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D. - Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects : An Algorithm and an Application (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2a7e4e1e-bdbf-4666-9aaf-3d4c1d420b62)
by Klijn, F. - A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2f17d69d-3255-42b6-b988-39084c3da78f)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & van Velzen, S. - The egalitarian solution for convex games : Some characterizations (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:614b77cd-430c-4048-856f-896f47509cec)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, I. - On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:618c2e4c-dc9f-47bc-bb10-a6e9253ea36a)
by Borm, P.E.M. & Calleja, P. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. - A dual egalitarian solution (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:67e789f7-49fd-4dba-9142-a8e629883a29)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. - On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7579f715-83ed-4532-aa3d-4f246f26b161)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J. - Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:7a24fce2-14e6-4670-8dbb-8e21de9bfa01)
by Klijn, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Hamers, H.J.M. - A Dual Egalitarian Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9116c2a6-bf36-4b9c-a029-3f4604308ac7)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Tijs, S.H. - Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b8df93ae-a2c4-4d53-849e-eeafba937bb1)
by Klijn, F. & Tijs, S.H. & Hamers, H.J.M. - Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b9f5b0ab-bfc5-4ad3-a4ba-8e17abb96e59)
by Klijn, F. & Vermeulen, D. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J. - On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c3573ae5-8914-487e-a2f1-5e276a186c45)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Suijs, J.P.M. - A game theoretic approach to assignment problems (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:d1d22a76-f7bf-4483-badc-b72e44bf8a0d)
by Klijn, F. - Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:da67df69-7b64-4f98-ba8a-8e2c29896a22)
by Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Pere Villar, J. - Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fb52ef4b-d73a-486d-b154-f3fc512c5a96)
by Klijn, F. & Slikker, M. & Zarzuelo, J. - Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fecc2417-7dcd-4374-ac18-29a76a165b12)
by Klijn, F. & Masso, J. - The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007012)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M. - Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007025)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Nakamura, T. - Smith and Rawls share a room (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007026)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. - Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008009)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. - Stochastic stability for roommate markets (RePEc:unm:umamet:2008010)
by Klaus, B.E. & Klijn, F. & Walzl, M. - Employment By Lotto Revisited (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002248)
by Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn - A Cooperative Approach To Queue Allocation Of Indivisible Objects (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002273)
by Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker & Bas Van Velzen - Matching With Couples: A Multidisciplinary Survey (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s0219198913400082)
by Péter Biró & Flip Klijn