Rene Kirkegaard
Names
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Rene |
| last: |
Kirkegaard |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Guelph
/ Gordon Lang School of Business and Economics
/ Department of Economics and Finance
Research profile
author of:
- Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand (RePEc:aah:aarhec:2003-4)
by Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer - Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions (RePEc:aah:aarhec:2005-17)
by Kirkegaard, René & Per Baltzer Overgaard - Contest Design with Stochastic Performance (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:201-38)
by René Kirkegaard - Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands (RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:770-789)
by René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard - Contracting with private rewards (RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:2:p:589-612)
by René Kirkegaard - Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:21)
by Kirkegaard Rene - A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions (RePEc:brk:wpaper:0504)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds (RePEc:brk:wpaper:0702)
by René Kirkegaard - Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps (RePEc:brk:wpaper:0805)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (RePEc:cca:wpaper:207)
by Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard & Harry J. Paarsch - A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:5:p:2349-2364)
by René Kirkegaard - Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:3:p:328-332)
by Kirkegaard, Rene - Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:64:y:2013:i:c:p:98-110)
by Kirkegaard, René - Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:373-387)
by Kirkegaard, René - Scale effects in multi-unit auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:116:y:2019:i:c:p:116-121)
by Elskamp, Rebecca & Kirkegaard, René - Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:234-239)
by Kirkegaard, René - Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:145-165)
by Kirkegaard, René & Overgaard, Per Baltzer - Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:226-248)
by Kirkegaard, René - Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:60-69)
by Kirkegaard, René - Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:31:y:2013:i:3:p:261-266)
by Kirkegaard, René - Asymmetric first price auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1617-1635)
by Kirkegaard, René - Endogenous criteria for success (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:214:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001564)
by Kirkegaard, René - Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s0304406821000161)
by Kirkegaard, René - Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests (RePEc:gue:guelph:2010-12.)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction (RePEc:gue:guelph:2010-5.)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order (RePEc:gue:guelph:2011-01.)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders (RePEc:gue:guelph:2015-02)
by Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard - Contracting with Private Rewards (RePEc:gue:guelph:2015-04)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Microfounded Contest Design (RePEc:gue:guelph:2020-03)
by René Kirkegaard - Financial Constraints and Multivariate Incomplete Information in the Mixture Model of Contests (RePEc:gue:guelph:2024-02)
by Rene Kirkegaard - Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (RePEc:kap:compec:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:241-266)
by Timothy Hubbard & René Kirkegaard & Harry Paarsch - Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand (RePEc:kud:kuieci:2003-01)
by René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard - Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions (RePEc:kud:kuieci:2005-04)
by René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard - A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:449-452)
by René Kirkegaard - A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems (RePEc:the:publsh:2008)
by Kirkegaard, René