William Kaempfer
Names
first: |
William |
middle: |
H. |
last: |
Kaempfer |
Identifer
Contact
phone: |
303-717-5063 |
postal address: |
William H. Kaempfer, Interim Dean, Leeds School of Business; Senior Vice Provost and Associate Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs for Budget and Planning University of Colorado at Boulder Campus Box |
Affiliations
-
University of Colorado
/ Department of Economics
/ Carl McGuire Center for International Studies
Research profile
author of:
- The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:4:p:786-93)
by Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D - The Theory of International Economic Sanctions--A Public Choice Approach: Reply (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:5:p:1304-06)
by Kaempfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D - A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:4:p:952-60)
by Bohara, Alok K & Kaempfer, William H - Comments (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:17:y:2003:i:4:p:227-235)
by Luigi L. Pasinetti & Franklin M. Fisher & Jesus Felipe & Robert L. Greenfield & Avi J. Cohen & William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & Lance E. Davis & Stanley Engerman - Impact Of Anti‐Apartheid Sanctions On South Africa: Some Trade And Financial Evidence (RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:6:y:1988:i:4:p:118-129)
by William H. Kaempfer & Michael H. Moffett - Performance Contingent Protection (RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:261-275)
by William H. Kaempfer & Edward Tower & Thomas D. Willett - International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator (RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:29-51)
by William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens - A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions: The Case of South Africa (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:39:y:1986:i:3:p:377-396)
by William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg - A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions: The Case of South Africa (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:39:y:1986:i:3:p:377-96)
by Kaempfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D - Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions? (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:625-46)
by Kaempfer, William H & Marks, Stephen V & Willett, Thomas D - Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions? (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:625-646)
by William H. Kaempfer & Stephen V. Marks & Thomas D. Willett - Tariffication of a Distorted Economy: A CGE Analysis (RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:1:y:1997:i:2:p:207-18)
by Kaempfer, William H & Ross, Martin T & Rutherford, Thomas F - Tariffication of a Distorted Economy: A CGE Analysis (RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:1:y:1997:i:2:p:207-218)
by William H. Kaempfer & Martin T. Ross & Thomas F. Rutherford - The Possibility of Inefficient Liberalization through Tariffication (RePEc:bla:reviec:v:2:y:1994:i:2:p:123-30)
by Kaempfer, William H & Marks, Stephen V - The Dynamics of Tariff Retaliation between the United States and Canada: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:bla:reviec:v:6:y:1998:i:1:p:30-49)
by Bohara, Alok K & Gawande, Kishore & Kaempfer, William H - Determinants of the Economic and Political Effects of Trade Sanctions (RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:56:y:1988:i:4:p:167-172)
by W. H. Kaempfer & A. D. Slowenberg - Economic Sanctions and Interest Group Analysis: A Reply (RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:59:y:1991:i:1:p:53-56)
by W. H. Kaempfer & A. D. Lowenberg - The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from US Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority (RePEc:bla:worlde:v:16:y:1993:i:6:p:725-740)
by William H. Kaempfer & Stephen V. Marks - Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice between Tariffs and Quotas (RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:2:p:228-36)
by William H. Kaempfer & J. Harold, Jr McClure & Thomas D. Willett - Divestment, investment sanctions, and disinvestment: an evaluation of anti-apartheid policy instruments (RePEc:cup:intorg:v:41:y:1987:i:03:p:457-473_02)
by Kaempfer, William H. & Lehman, James A. & Lowenberg, Anton D. - Trade Protectionism (RePEc:duk:dukeec:02-20)
by Kaempfer, William H. & Tower, Edward & Willett, Thomas D. - A public choice model of the role of multinational firms in international relations (RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:14:y:2003:i:1:p:131-144)
by Jing, Chao & Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D. - Free trade area formation with quota protection (RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:4:y:1993:i:2:p:157-163)
by Goodman, D. Jay & Kaempfer, William H. - Testing the endogeneity of tariff policy in the U.S. : Further evidence (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:311-315)
by Bohara, Alok K. & Kaempfer, William H. - Endogenous protection and retaliation between Canada and the United States (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:38:y:1992:i:3:p:335-339)
by Bohara Alok K. & Kaempfer William H. - Tariff behavior in five European countries: Further evidence (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:45:y:1994:i:2:p:213-216)
by Bohara, Alok K. & Kaempfer, William H. - The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (RePEc:eee:hdechp:2-27)
by Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D. - South african managed trade policy: The wasting of a mineral endowment : Graham A Davis Praeger Press: Westport, CT, 1994, 153pp (RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:20:y:1994:i:4:p:288-289)
by Kaempfer, William H - Optimal Commercial Policy under Increasing Returns to Scale with Sector‐specific Capital (RePEc:eme:jespps:01443589110004055)
by Pablo E. Guidotti & William H. Kaempfer & Alexander M. Pietruska & Leonard F.S. Wang - Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:1:p:79-86)
by William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett - Using Threshold Models to Explain International Relations (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:73:y:1992:i:4:p:419-43)
by Kaempfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D - The Effect of Unit Fees on the Consumption of Quality (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:23:y:1985:i:2:p:341-48)
by Kaempfer, William H & Brastow, Raymond T - Industry Income and Congressional Regulatory Legislation: Interest Groups vs. Median Voter (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:1:p:47-56)
by Cahan, Steven F & Kaempfer, William H - The Impact of Monopoly Pricing on the Lerner Symmetry Theorem: A Comment (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:98:y:1983:i:3:p:529-533.)
by Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman & William H. Kaempfer & Edward Tower - International trade: theory and evidence (RePEc:pra:mprapa:21989)
by Markusen, James R. & Melvin, James R. & Maskus, Keith E. & Kaempfer, William - Baseball Salaries and Income Taxes (RePEc:sae:jospec:v:13:y:2012:i:6:p:619-634)
by James Alm & William H. Kaempfer & Edward Batte Sennoga - Instrument Choice and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions: A Simultaneous Equations Approach (RePEc:sae:joupea:v:40:y:2003:i:5:p:519-535)
by Chao Jing & William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg - Who Pays the Ticket Tax? (RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:1:p:27-40)
by James Alm & William H. Kaempfer - A Threshold Model of Electoral Policy and Voter Turnout (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:107-126)
by William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg - The balance of payments approach to trade tax symmetry theorems (RePEc:spr:weltar:v:118:y:1982:i:1:p:148-165)
by William Kaempfer & Edward Tower - Arbitration versus negotiation: the risk aversion of players (RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:5:y:1998:i:3:p:187-190)
by David Frederick & William Kaempfer & Martin Ross & Richard Wobbekind - Cigarette demand and tax policy for race groups in South Africa (RePEc:taf:applec:v:33:y:2001:i:9:p:1167-1173)
by Gregory Berg & William Kaempfer - The political market for immigration restrictions: Model and test (RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:16:y:2007:i:2:p:159-192)
by Orn B. Bodvarsson & William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens - Income Inequality and Tax Policy for South African Race Groups (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:85:y:2003:i:3:p:755-760)
by Gregory D. Berg & William H. Kaempfer - Baseball Salaries and Income Taxes: The "Home Field Advantage" of Income Taxes on Free Agent Salaries (RePEc:tul:wpaper:1209)
by James Alm & William H. Kaempfer & Edward Batte Sennoga