Ritesh Jain
Names
| first: | Ritesh |
| last: | Jain |
Identifer
| RePEc Short-ID: | pja636 |
Contact
| homepage: | https://sites.google.com/site/ritesh16eco/ |
Affiliations
-
Academia Sinica
/ Institute of Economics
- EDIRC entry
- location:
Research profile
author of:
- A Note On The Arrow’S Impossibility Theorem (RePEc:beo:journl:v:60:y:2015:i:207:p:39-48)
by Ritesh Jain - Generalized Groves–Ledyard mechanisms (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:204-217)
by Healy, Paul J. & Jain, Ritesh - Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:127:y:2021:i:c:p:47-66)
by Jain, Ritesh - Symmetric mechanism design (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:108-118)
by Azrieli, Yaron & Jain, Ritesh - Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences (RePEc:sin:wpaper:19-a002)
by Ritesh Jain - A Systematic Test of the Independence Axiom Near Certainty (RePEc:sin:wpaper:20-a001)
by Ritesh Jain & Kirby Nielsen - Behavioral Strong Implementation (RePEc:sin:wpaper:20-a002)
by T Hayashi & R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi - Behavioral Strong Implementation (RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp141)
by Takashi Hayashi & Ritesh Jain & Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi