R. Mark Isaac

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Florida State University / Department of Economics
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:2:p:166-71)
  by Grether, David M & Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R
• Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:3:p:448-59)
  by Isaac, R Mark & Plott, Charles R
• Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:4:p:995-1004)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James
• Book Review - Regulation and Market (RePEc:aen:journl:1989v10-04-a15)
  by Mark Isaac
• Limiting the Leader: Fairness Concerns in Team Production with Leader-Determined Monitoring (RePEc:apl:wpaper:21-11)
  by Luke Boosey & R. Mark Isaac & Abhijit Ramalingam
• Individual Behavior And Bidding Heterogeneity In Sealed Bid Auctions Where The Number Of Bidders Is Unknown (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:50:y:2012:i:2:p:516-533)
  by Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt S. Schnier
• Endogenous Group Formation (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:171-194)
  by T. K. Ahn & R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon
• Risky Curves: On the Empirical Failure of Expected Utility (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt87v8k86z)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Isaac, R. Mark & James, Duncan & Sunder, Shyam
• Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Very Large Groups (RePEc:cla:levarc:11)
  by R. M Isaac & J. Walker & A. Williams
• Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism (RePEc:cla:levarc:310)
  by R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker
• Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:clt:sswopa:181)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
• The Inherent Disadvantage of the Presidential Party in Midterm Congressional Elections (RePEc:clt:sswopa:191)
  by Calvert, Randall L. & Isaac, R. Mark.
• Petroleum Price Controls When Information Is a Joint Product (RePEc:clt:sswopa:251)
  by Isaac, R. Mark.
• Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examination (RePEc:clt:sswopa:253)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
• The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade: An Experimental Study (RePEc:clt:sswopa:255)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
• Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices (RePEc:clt:sswopa:273)
  by Isaac, R. Mark.
• Cooperative Institutions for Sharing in the Oil Industry (RePEc:clt:sswopa:308)
  by Isaac, R. Mark.
• The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity among Competitors (RePEc:clt:sswopa:350)
  by Grether, David M. & Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
• Demand-Revealing Mechanisms for Private Good Auctions (RePEc:clt:sswopa:351)
  by Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark.
• Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment (RePEc:clt:sswopa:428)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R.
• Theories and Tests of (Blind Bidding) in Sealed Bid Auctions (RePEc:clt:sswopa:670)
  by Forsythe, Robert & Isaac, R. Mark & Palfrey, Thomas R.
• Improving Environmental Quality Through Aid: An Experimental Analysis of Aid Structures With Heterogeneous Agents (RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:146:y:2018:i:c:p:435-446)
  by Chambers, Paul E. & Glenn Dutcher, E. & Mark Isaac, R.
• Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint (RePEc:eee:expchp:1-19)
  by Cox, James C. & Isaac, R. Mark
• Procurement Contracting (RePEc:eee:expchp:5-71)
  by Cox, James C. & Isaac, R. Mark
• Price level regulation for diversified public utilities: Jordan Jay Millman and Ronald R. Braeutigam, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1989) (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:4:y:1989-1990:i:3:p:271-273)
  by Isaac, R. Mark
• Rent seeking in groups (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:116-125)
  by Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C.
• Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:132:y:2016:i:pa:p:26-41)
  by Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R.
• Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:17:y:1992:i:1:p:59-100)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S.
• The opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade : An experimental study (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:2:y:1981:i:1:p:1-30)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Plott, Charles R.
• Reputation and market structure in experimental platforms (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:205:y:2023:i:c:p:528-559)
  by Solimine, Philip & Isaac, R. Mark
• Limiting the leader: Fairness concerns and opportunism in team production (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:218:y:2024:i:c:p:209-244)
  by Boosey, Luke & Isaac, R. Mark & Ramalingam, Abhijit
• The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:5:y:1984:i:2:p:191-222)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Ramey, Valerie & Williams, Arlington W.
• Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:6:y:1985:i:2:p:139-159)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M.
• A theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:62:y:2007:i:1:p:144-164)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C. & Zillante, Arthur
• Cooperative institutions for information sharing in the oil industry (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:14:y:1987:i:3:p:191-211)
  by Isaac, R. Mark
• The value of information in resource exploration: The interaction of strategic plays and institutional rules (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:14:y:1987:i:4:p:313-322)
  by Isaac, R. Mark
• Can buyer “mobility” reduce aggregation failures in land-assembly? (RePEc:eee:juecon:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:16-30)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Kitchens, Carl & Portillo, Javier E.
• Public goods provision in an experimental environment (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:26:y:1985:i:1:p:51-74)
  by Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R.
• Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:54:y:1994:i:1:p:1-36)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W.
• Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:1-2:p:336-351)
  by Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C.
• The pay-what-you-want business model: Warm glow revenues and endogenous price discrimination (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:57:y:2015:i:c:p:215-223)
  by Isaac, R. Mark & P. Lightle, John & A. Norton, Douglas
• Cooperation, contributor types, and control questions (RePEc:eee:soceco:v:85:y:2020:i:c:s2214804319300783)
  by Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R. & Norton, Douglas & Stinn, Joseph
• Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion? (RePEc:elg:eechap:2759_17)
  by R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams
• Research in Experimental Economics (RePEc:eme:rexepp)
  from Emerald Publishing Ltd as editor
• Unknown item RePEc:eme:rexepp:rexe.2014.16 (book)
• Research in Experimental Economics (RePEc:eme:rexezz)
  from Emerald Group Publishing Limited as editor
• Experimental economics methods in the large undergraduate classroom: Practical considerations (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(01)08002-4)
  by R.Mark Isaac & James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams
• Asymmetric benefits in the voluntary contribution mechanism: A boundary experiment (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(01)08006-1)
  by Dean Packard & R.Mark Isaac & Joseph Bial
• Revenue from the Saints, the Showoffs and The Predators: Comparisons of Auctions with Price-preference Values (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(06)11001-7)
  by Timothy C. Salmon & R. Mark Isaac
• Sealed Bid Variations on the Silent Auction (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(06)11002-9)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Kurt Schnier
• Experiments with public goods: From cooperation to formation (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(2010)0000013003)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Endogenous production technology in a public goods enterprise (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(2010)0000013008)
  by Douglas A. Norton & R. Mark Isaac
• Introduction (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(2011)0000014003)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Introduction (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620220000021001)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Carl Kitchens
• The Robustness of Lemons in Experimental Markets (RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620220000021009)
  by Blake Dunkle & R. Mark Isaac & Philip Solimine
• Individual Behavior In Auctions with Price Proportional Benefits (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2008_07_01)
  by Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Tim C. Salmon
• Individual Behaavior and Bidding Heterogeneity in Sealed Bid Auctions Where the Number of Bidders is Unknown (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2008_07_02)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt Schnier
• Just the Facts Ma'am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2011_08_01)
  by R. Mark R. Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Network Monitoring and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2014_12_01)
  by Luke Boosey & R. Mark Isaac
• The Robustness of Lemons in Experimental Markets (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2020_01_02)
  by Blake Dunkle & R. Mark Isaac & Philip C. Solimine
• Reputation and Market Structure in Experimental Platforms (RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2021_08_01)
  by Philip C. Solimine & R. Mark Isaac
• Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:2:y:1991:i:3:p:329-370)
  by R. Isaac & Deborah Mathieu & Edward Zajac
• Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:3:p:191-206)
  by R. Isaac & James Walker
• Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers? (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:1:p:14-44)
  by R. Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Timothy Salmon
• Experts with a conflict of interest: a source of ambiguity? (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:2:p:260-277)
  by Douglas Norton & R. Isaac
• In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom: The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:1:p:1-3)
  by James Walker & Mark Isaac
• A new experimental mechanism to investigate polarized demands for public goods: the effects of censoring (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9593-0)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton & Svetlana Pevnitskaya
• Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:31-53)
  by R. Isaac & Duncan James
• Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse? (RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:177-87)
  by Isaac, R Mark & James, Duncan
• Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:102:y:2000:i:1-2:p:95-114)
  by Attiyeh, Greg & Franciosi, Robert & Isaac, R Mark
• Rebecca B. Morton, Kenneth C. Williams: Experimental political science and the study of causality: from nature to the lab (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:1:p:263-264)
  by R. Isaac
• Endogenous institutions and the possibility of reverse crowding out (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:253-284)
  by R. Isaac & Douglas Norton
• The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:1:p:141-146)
  by Randall Calvert & R. Isaac
• Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:2:p:113-149)
  by R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas
• The assurance problem in a laboratory market (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:3:p:217-236)
  by R. Isaac & David Schmidtz & James Walker
• Heterogenous Demand for Public Goods: Behavior in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:85:y:1995:i:3-4:p:249-66)
  by Fisher, Joseph & Isaac, R. Mark & Schatzberg, Jeffrey W & Walker, James M.
• Price Cap Regulation: A Case Study of Some Pitfalls of Implementation (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:193-210)
  by Isaac, R Mark
• In Search of the Winner's Curse (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:22:y:1984:i:4:p:579-92)
  by Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark
• In Search of the Winner's Curse: Reply (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:24:y:1986:i:3:p:517-20)
  by Cox, James C & Isaac, R Mark
• Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:26:y:1988:i:4:p:585-608)
  by Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M
• Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:715-733)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Kurt Schnier
• Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:1:p:179-199.)
  by R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker
• Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:103:y:1988:i:4:p:647-671.)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Stanley S. Reynolds
• Just the Facts Ma’am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department (RePEc:pal:palbok:978-1-137-35439-6)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Introduction (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_1)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• A Brief History of Los Angeles: Conditions for Institutional Change (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_2)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Corruption Reform, Equilibrium Selection, and the Institutional Entrepreneur (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_3)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Essential Components of the Success of Parker’s Reforms (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_4)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Application to Economic Development (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_5)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Appendix (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_6)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton
• Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanisms and the Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:13:y:1982:i:spring:p:158-169)
  by R. Mark Isaac
• Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs (RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:spring:p:69-84)
  by Don Coursey & R. Mark Isaac & Margaret Luke & Vernon L. Smith
• Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:autumn:p:348-359)
  by James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac
• Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions (RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:summer:p:214-238)
  by Robert Forsythe & R. Mark Isaac & Thomas R. Palfrey
• Introduction to the Special Issue: Insights from Experiments for Public Economics and Public Policy (RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:48:y:2020:i:6:p:711-713)
  by James C. Cox & R. Mark Isaac & Abhijit Ramalingam
• Stochastic Innovation and Product Market Organization (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:4:p:525-45)
  by Reynolds, Stanley S & Isaac, R Mark
• An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:2:p:287-313)
  by R. Isaac & Timothy Salmon & Arthur Zillante
• Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/665830)
  by Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac
• Natural Monopoly and Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:27:y:1984:i:1:p:91-113)
  by Coursey, Don & Isaac, R Mark & Smith, Vernon L
• In Search of Predatory Pricing (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:93:y:1985:i:2:p:320-45)
  by Isaac, R Mark & Smith, Vernon L
• Petroleum Price Controls When Information Is a Joint Product (RePEc:uwp:landec:v:56:y:1980:i:2:p:181-187)
  by R. Mark Isaac
• Absolute and relative rewards for individuals in team production (RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:299-310)
  by David L. Dickinson & R. Mark Isaac
• Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:69:y:2003:i:4:p:936-951)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Duncan James
• A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0404002)
  by R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon & Arthur Zillante