Richard Holden
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Richard |
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Holden |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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UNSW Sydney
/ UNSW Business School
/ School of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:113-44)
by John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden - A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running (RePEc:aea:apandp:v:113:y:2023:p:248-52)
by Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden - The Original Management Incentive Schemes (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:4:p:135-144)
by Richard T. Holden - Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years? (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:25:y:2011:i:2:p:181-97)
by Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden - Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus (RePEc:arx:papers:2206.10065)
by Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden - Should We Worry about Government Debt? Thoughts on Australia's COVID‐19 Response (RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:53:y:2020:i:4:p:557-565)
by Chris Edmond & Richard Holden & Bruce Preston - Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision (RePEc:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:4:p:819-854)
by Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer - The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5300)
by Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening - Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002358)
by Alberto Alesina & Richard Holden - Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000875)
by Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret A. Meyer - Network Capital (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11763)
by Akerlof, Robert & Holden, Richard - Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13526)
by Dessein, Wouter & Holden, Richard - Incentives to Discover Talent (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13979)
by Friebel, Guido & Bruenner, Tobias & Holden, Richard & Prasad, Suraj - Network Externalities and Market Dominance (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16783)
by Akerlof, Robert & Holden, Richard & Rayo, Luis - Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9319)
by Meyer, Margaret & Ederer, Florian & Holden, Richard - Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts? (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781009001397)
by Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup - Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1935)
by Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer - Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:284-290)
by Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard - Registration costs and voter turnout (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:176:y:2020:i:c:p:91-104)
by Bhatt, Rachana & Dechter, Evgenia & Holden, Richard - Optimal primaries (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:109:y:2014:i:c:p:64-75)
by Hummel, Patrick & Holden, Richard - A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:1:p:4-:d:86874)
by Richard Holden - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00812781)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00943301)
by Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden - The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01756795)
by Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening - Unknown item RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-00812781 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00943301 (paper)
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00812781)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00943301)
by Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden - The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01756795)
by Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11224965)
by Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi - Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans (RePEc:hrv:faseco:13456931)
by Fryer, Roland Gerhard & Holden, Richard - Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3708929)
by Holden, Richard T. & Fudenberg, Drew & Aghion, Philippe - An Examination of Velocity and Initial Coin Offerings (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:12:p:9026-9041)
by Richard Holden & Anup Malani - Network Externalities and Market Dominance (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:6:p:4037-4050)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden & Luis Rayo - The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation (RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8971)
by Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom - Carbon offsets aren’t helping the planet — four ways to fix them (RePEc:nat:nature:v:620:y:2023:i:7976:d:10.1038_d41586-023-02649-8)
by Philip W. Boyd & Lennart Bach & Richard Holden & Christian Turney - Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13456)
by Roland G. Fryer, Jr & Richard T. Holden - Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14143)
by Alberto F. Alesina & Richard T. Holden - Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15167)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden - Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15779)
by Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell - Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15783)
by Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell - Vertical versus Horizontal Incentives in Education: Evidence from Randomized Trials (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17752)
by Roland G. Fryer, Jr & Tanaya Devi & Richard T. Holden - Optimal Primaries (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19340)
by Patrick Hummel & Richard Holden - Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25833)
by Richard T. Holden & Anup Malani - The ICO Paradox: Transactions Costs, Token Velocity, and Token Value (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26265)
by Richard Holden & Anup Malani - A Solomonic Solution to Ownership Disputes: An Application to Blockchain Front-Running (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29780)
by Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden - Allocating Scarce Information (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29846)
by Richard T. Holden & Anup Malani & Chris Teh - Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30189)
by Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden - Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court (RePEc:nuf:econwp:1702)
by Richard Holden & Michael Keane & Matthew Lilley - The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation (RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:16:y:2018:i:1:p:232-274.)
by Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening - A Theory of Rule Development (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:30:y:2014:i:4:p:649-682.)
by Glenn Ellison & Richard Holden - Capital Assembly (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:35:y:2019:i:3:p:489-512.)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden - Incentives to Discover Talent (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:38:y:2022:i:2:p:309-344.)
by Tobias Brünner & Guido Friebel & Richard Holden & Suraj Prasad - Political Capital
[“Formal and Real Authority in Organizations] (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:38:y:2022:i:3:p:632-674.)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Barton E Lee - The race that stopped a nation: lessons from Australia’s Covid vaccine failures (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:38:y:2022:i:4:p:818-832.)
by Richard Holden & Andrew Leigh - Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:127:y:2012:i:4:p:1813-1841)
by Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:127:y:2012:i:4:p:1843-1881)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Movers and Shakers (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:131:y:2016:i:4:p:1849-1874.)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden - When to Drop a Bombshell (RePEc:oup:restud:v:85:y:2018:i:4:p:2139-2172.)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:640)
by Margaret Meyer & Florian Ederer & Richard Holden - The effects of government policies targeting ethics and governance processes on clinical trial activity and expenditure: a systematic review (RePEc:pal:palcom:v:9:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-022-01269-3)
by Sam Crosby & Esther Rajadurai & Stephen Jan & Richard Holden & Bruce Neal - Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-020-00188-3)
by John N. Friedman & Richard Holden - The nature of tournaments (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:2:p:289-313)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden - Timing Information Flows (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2015-16)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - Movers and Shakers (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2015-18)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden - When to Drop a Bombshell (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-13)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin - Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2019-01)
by Richard Holden & Michael Keane & Matthew Lilley - Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2019-01b)
by Richard Holden & Michael Keane & Matthew Lilley - Political Capital (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2019-04)
by Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Barton E. Lee - Cultural Context in Standardized Tests (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2021-08)
by Isabella Dobrescu & Alberto Motta & Richard Holden & Adrian Piccoli - Getting the Picture (RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-02)
by Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden & Hongyi Li - Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/661511)
by Roland G. Fryer Jr. & Richard Holden - Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/718852)
by Wouter Dessein & Richard Holden - Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/721153)
by Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening - Peer effects on the United States Supreme Court (RePEc:wly:quante:v:12:y:2021:i:3:p:981-1019)
by Richard Holden & Michael Keane & Matthew Lilley - The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation (RePEc:zur:econwp:189)
by Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening