Ronald M. Harstad
Names
| first: |
Ronald |
| middle: |
M. |
| last: |
Harstad |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Missouri
/ Economics Department
Research profile
author of:
- Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:51:y:2013:i:2:p:496-511)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Reinhard Selten - Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0816)
by Ronald M Harstad - Behavioral Efficiency I: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0818)
by Ronald M Harstad - Behavioral Efficiency II: A Simple Laboratory Demonstration (RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0819)
by Ronald M Harstad - Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1275-1304)
by Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan - Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:20:y:1986:i:4:p:315-319)
by Levin, Dan & Harstad, Ronald M. - Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:33:y:1990:i:1:p:35-40)
by Harstad, Ronald M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan - Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:249-252)
by Harstad, Ronald M. - Diminished-dimensional political economy (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:83:y:2016:i:c:p:213-219)
by Harstad, Ronald M. & Selten, Reinhard - On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions (RePEc:eee:ejores:v:74:y:1994:i:3:p:572-581)
by Rothkopf, Michael H. & Harstad, Ronald M. - Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:476-508)
by Harstad, Ronald M. & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia - Implementation of mechanism by processes : Public good allocation experiments (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:2:y:1981:i:2:p:129-151)
by Harstad, Ronald M. & Marrese, Michael - Private information revelation in common-value auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:109:y:2003:i:2:p:264-282)
by Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M. - Behavioral explanations of efficient public good allocations (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:19:y:1982:i:3:p:367-383)
by Harstad, Ronald M. & Marrese, Michael - Judgment, Evaluation And Information Processing In Second- Price Common Value Auctions (RePEc:fth:housto:14)
by Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D. & Harstad, R.M. - The Welfare Cost of Signaling (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:1:p:11-:d:89765)
by Fan Yang & Ronald M. Harstad - Information Variability Impacts in Auctions (RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:137-142)
by Justin Jia & Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf - Auctioning the Right to Choose When Competition Persists (RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:78-85)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf (RePEc:inm:orinte:v:38:y:2008:i:5:p:367-380)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč - Expected-Utility-Maximizing Price Search with Learning (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:27:y:1981:i:1:p:75-80)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Andrew Postlewaite - Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:40:y:1994:i:3:p:364-384)
by Michael H. Rothkopf & Ronald M. Harstad - Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:44:y:1998:i:8:p:1131-1147)
by Michael H. Rothkopf & Aleksandar Pekev{c} & Ronald M. Harstad - An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:46:y:2000:i:1:p:1-12)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf - Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly? (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:49:y:2003:i:1:p:71-84)
by Michael H. Rothkopf & Ronald M. Harstad & Yuhong Fu - Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:43:y:1995:i:6:p:983-994)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf - Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:261-280)
by Ronald Harstad - Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:123-140)
by Glenn W. Harrison & Ronald M. Harstad & E. Elisabet Rutstr–m - Privately Informed Seekers of an Uncertain Rent (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:83:y:1995:i:1-2:p:81-93)
by Harstad, Ronald M - Franchise Bidding without Holdups: Utility Regulation with Efficient Pricing and Choice of Provider (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:141-63)
by Harstad, Ronald M & Crew, Michael A - Experimental Tests of Consciously Parallel Behaviour in Oligopoly (RePEc:kud:kuieci:1997-07)
by Ronald Harstad & Stephen Martin & Hans-Theo Normann - Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive (RePEc:nos:voprec:2014-05-1)
by R. M. Harstad & R. Selten. - Behavioral Explanations of Efficient Public Good Allocations (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:422)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Michael Marrese - A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:3:p:525-528.)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Dan Levin - Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bid Takers (RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:179-192)
by Keith Waehrer & Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf - Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:399-410)
by Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad - Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:3:p:293-319)
by Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan & Harstad, Ronald M - Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions (RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:68:y:1995:i:2:p:257-67)
by Rothkopf, Michael H & Harstad, Ronald M - Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:98:y:1990:i:2:p:421-29)
by Harstad, Ronald M - Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0504)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0515)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares - Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0518)
by Ronald M. Harstad - William S. Vickrey (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0519)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0605)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin - Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder? (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0711)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify Adverse Selection (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0907)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Robert Bordley - Information Variability Impacts in Auctions (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0908)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf & Justin Jia - Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder? (RePEc:umc:wpaper:0909)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Behavioral Efficiency I: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1120)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Behavioral Efficiency II: A Simple Laboratory Demonstration (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1121)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Applied Signaling: Graduate School Admissions and Frequency of STEM Majors (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1305)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Jordan Pandolfo - Efficiency Measurement via Revealed Thresholds, Without Knowing Valuations (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1405)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Diminished-Dimensional Political Economy (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1414)
by Ronald M. Harstad & Reinhard Selten - Efficiency Measurement via Revealed Thresholds, Without Knowing Valuations (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1603)
by Ronald M. Harstad - Credible Signaling via Transfers, Job Application Fees (RePEc:umc:wpaper:1610)
by Fan Yang & Ron Harstad