bernardo guimaraes

Names

first:	bernardo
last:	guimaraes

Identifer

RePEc Short-ID:

pgu115

Contact

homepage:

https://sites.google.com/site/bernaguima/

Affiliations

Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) / Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP)
- EDIRC entry
- location:

Research profile

author of:

Sales and Monetary Policy (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:2:p:844-76)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:11:y:2019:i:3:p:298-337)
by Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Imf Conditionalities, Liquidity Provision And Incentives For Fiscal Adjustment (RePEc:anp:en2013:071)
by Oz Solon Chovghi Iazdi & Bernardo Guimarães
Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:3:p:656-697)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Ana E. Pereira
Who matters in dynamic coordination problems? (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:3:p:452-469)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Gabriel Jardanovski
In Brief... How Pelé changed Brazilian football (RePEc:cep:cepcnp:624)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Joao Paulo Pessoa & Vladimir Ponczek
Optimal External Debt and Default (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0847)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0871)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
Sales and Monetary Policy (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0887)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy
US Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0952)
by Nathan Foley-Fisher & Bernardo Guimaraes
There Will Be Money (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1004)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes
A Model of Equilibrium Institutions (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1123)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy
Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football (RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1751)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Joao Paulo Pessoa & Vladimir Ponczek
A model of the confidence channel of fiscal policy (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1426)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Marcel Ribeiro
Financial Disruption as a Cost of Sovereign Default: a quantative assessment (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1427)
by Andre Diniz & Bernardo Guimaraes
Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus Policies (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1503)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado
Time-dependent or state-dependent pricing? Evidence from a large devaluation episode (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1504)
by Celio Feltrin & Bernardo Guimaraes
State-controlled companies and political risk: Evidence from the 2014 Brazilian election (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1702)
by Augusto Carvalho & Bernardo Guimaraes
The Determinants of IMF Fiscal Conditionalities: economics or politics? (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1703)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Carlos Eduardo Ladeira
How diabolic is the sovereign-bank loop? The effects of post-default fiscal policies (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1705)
by André Diniz & Bernardo Guimaraes
Political Specialization (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1710)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy
Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: theory and applications (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1726)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira
Contingent Judicial Deference: theory and application to usury laws (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1729)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Bruno Meyerhof Salama
Financial constraints and collateral crises (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:2007)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes & Diego Rodrigues
On the costs of sovereign default in quantitative models (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:2021)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Lucas Tumkus
The Contrarian Put (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:2106)
by Fernando Chague & Bruno Giovannetti & Bernardo Guimaraes
Short-squeeze bubbles (RePEc:cfm:wpaper:2109)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Pierluca Pannella
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000790)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001115)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris
A model of the confidence channel of fiscal policy (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10087)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Machado, Caio & Ribeiro, Marcel
Political Specialization (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11880)
by Sheedy, Kevin & Guimaraes, Bernardo
International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of the IMF's Catalytic Finance (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4383)
by Roubini, Nouriel & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Optimal external debt and default (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6035)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6487)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Monetary Policy, Default Risk and the Exchange Rate (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6501)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & ,
Sales and Monetary Policy (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6940)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin
Equilibrium selection in a fundamental model of money (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8200)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Araujo, Luis
A Model of Equilibrium Institutions (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8855)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin
Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9163)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & GonÃ§alves, Carlos Eduardo
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9284)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Campante, Filipe & Do, Quoc-Anh
The effect of options on coordination (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9294)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Araujo, Luis
Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9977)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Machado, Caio
How diabolic is the sovereign-bank loop? The effects of post-default fiscal policies (RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:27:y:2023:i:3:p:601-634_2)
by Diniz, André & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433r)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-058)
by Campante, Filipe R. & Do, Quoc-Anh & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Institutional specialization (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:150:y:2024:i:c:s0022199624000485)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:68:y:2006:i:1:p:141-158)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:95:y:2015:i:1:p:68-82)
by Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Intertemporal coordination with delay options (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:793-810)
by Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo
QWERTY is efficient (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:163:y:2016:i:c:p:819-825)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pereira, Ana Elisa
Short-covering bubbles (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:219:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000528)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pannella, Pierluca
Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:13-33)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pereira, Ana Elisa
International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:3:p:441-471)
by Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel
Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:8:p:2205-2230)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen
Coordination in the use of money (RePEc:eee:moneco:v:64:y:2014:i:c:p:38-46)
by Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo
State-controlled companies and political risk: Evidence from the 2014 Brazilian election (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:159:y:2018:i:c:p:66-78)
by Carvalho, Augusto & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football (RePEc:ehl:lserod:114417)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Cordeiro De Noronha Pessoa, Joao Paulo & Ponczek, Vladimir
There will be money (RePEc:ehl:lserod:121710)
by Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Sales and monetary policy (RePEc:ehl:lserod:25492)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
US real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:28683)
by Foley-Fisher, Nathan & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Optimal external debt and default (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3604)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
A model of equilibrium institutions (RePEc:ehl:lserod:42017)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
Unknown item RePEc:ehl:lserod:4804 (paper)
Unique equilibrium in a dynamic model of crises with frictions (RePEc:ehl:lserod:4907)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Vulnerability of currency pegs: evidence from Brazil (RePEc:ehl:lserod:4909)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Guarding the guardians (RePEc:ehl:lserod:65196)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: theory and applications (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86149)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Machado, Caio & Pereira, Ana Elisa
Political specialization (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86164)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
How diabolic is the sovereign-bank loop? The effects of post-default fiscal policies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86169)
by Diniz, Andre & Guimaraes, Bernardo
The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86171)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Ladeira, Carlos Eduardo
State-controlled companies and political risk: evidence from the 2014 Brazilian election (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86172)
by Carvalho, Augusto & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Time-dependent or state-dependent pricing? Evidence from a large devaluation episode (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86321)
by Feltrin Jr, Celio & Guimaraes, Bernardo
Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86322)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default: a quantitative assessment (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86329)
by Diniz, Andre & Guimaraes, Bernardo
A model of the confidence channel of fiscal policy (RePEc:ehl:lserod:86331)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Machado, Caio & Ribeiro, Marcel
US real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:295)
by Foley-Fisher, Nathan & Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:323)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Campante, Filipe Robin & Do, Quoc-Anh
The effect of options on coordination (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:324)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
Coordination in the use of money (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:325)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de
A model of the rule of law (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:378)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Sheedy, Kevin D.
Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:379)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Machado, Caio Henrique
Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:380)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves
A coordination approach to the essentiality of money (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:381)
by Araujo, Luis Fernando Oliveira de & Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
Time-dependent or state-dependent pricing? Evidence from firms’ response to inflation shocks (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:383)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Mazini, André Chaves & Mendonça, Diogo de Prince
The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics? (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:391)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Ladeira, Carlos Eduardo de Almeida
State-controlled companies and political risk: evidence from the 2014 Brazilian election (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:435)
by Carvalho, Augusto & Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
Contingent judicial deference: theory and application to usury laws (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:440)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Salama, Bruno Meyerhof
Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: theory and applications (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:461)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Machado, Caio Henrique & Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves
Who matters in dynamic coordination problems? (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:543)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Jardanovski, Gabriel
Permitting prohibitions (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:544)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Salama, Bruno Meyerhof
Institutional Specialization (RePEc:fgv:eesptd:545)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D.
A Possibilidade de Saltos no Câmbio Implícita nos Prêmios das Opções (RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:56:y:2002:i:3:a:818)
by Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & da Silva, Marcos Eugênio
Monetary policy, default risk and the exchange rate in Brazil (RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:65:y:2011:i:1:a:1402)
by Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo & Guimaraes, Bernardo Guimaraes
O Comunicado do Banco Central (RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:69:y:2015:i:3:a:29341)
by Cabral, Rodolfo & Guimaraes, Bernardo
U.S. real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies (RePEc:fip:fedgif:1051)
by Nathan Foley-Fisher & Bernardo Guimarães
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03391885)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Unknown item RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03393227 (paper)
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03391885)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03393227)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03460226)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03473904)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03393227)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03460226)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03473904)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:hal:wpspec:hal-03460226)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Dynamic Coordination with Timing Frictions: Theory and Applications (RePEc:ioe:doctra:502)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira
IMF conditionalities, liquidity provision, and incentives for fiscal adjustment (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:22:y:2015:i:5:p:705-722)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Oz Iazdi
U.S. Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies (RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i:5:p:967-975)
by Nathan Foley-Fisher & Bernardo Guimaraes
International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10125)
by Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19028)
by Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo V. Guimaraes
Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies (RePEc:pra:mprapa:48895)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Machado, Caio
IMF conditionalities, liquidity provision, and incentives for fiscal adjustment (RePEc:pra:mprapa:48896)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Iazdi, Oz
Code files for "Sovereign default: which shocks matter?" (RePEc:red:ccodes:09-166)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
Code and data files for "A Coordination Approach to the Essentiality of Money" (RePEc:red:ccodes:15-53)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes
Code and data files for "Financial constraints and collateral crises" (RePEc:red:ccodes:19-225)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes & Diego Rodrigues
Sovereign default: which shocks matter? (RePEc:red:issued:09-166)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
A Coordination Approach to the Essentiality of Money (RePEc:red:issued:15-53)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes
Financial constraints and collateral crises (RePEc:red:issued:19-225)
by Luis Araujo & Bernardo Guimaraes & Diego Rodrigues
Market Expectations and Currency Crises: Theory and Empirics (RePEc:red:sed005:174)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
Optimal external debt and default (RePEc:red:sed007:104)
by Bernardo Guimaraes
Sales and Monetary Policy (RePEc:red:sed009:365)
by Kevin Sheedy & Bernardo Guimaraes
A model of equilibrium institutions (RePEc:red:sed011:49)
by Kevin Sheedy & Bernardo Guimaraes
The effect of options on coordination (RePEc:red:sed012:474)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Luis Araujo
Political Specialization (RePEc:red:sed016:668)
by Kevin Sheedy & Bernardo Guimaraes
Qualis as a measuring stick for research output in Economics (RePEc:sbe:breart:v:31:y:2011:i:1:a:4060)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo
Time-dependent or State-dependent Pricing? Evidence from Firms' Response to Inflation Shocks (RePEc:sbe:breart:v:36:y:2016:i:1:a:26962)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Mazini, Andre & Prince, Diogo de
Time-Dependent or State-Dependent Pricing? Evidence From a Large Devaluation (RePEc:sbe:breart:v:36:y:2016:i:2:a:56757)
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Feltrin Jr, Celio
Optimal fiscal adjustment and the commitment-to-forgive issue (RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon01)
by Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves & Bernardo Guimaraes
Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment (RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon23)
by Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves & Bernardo Guimarães
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3gffacsuvp8q9p62340u1dgcib)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/11auergscg875893gvc2mtel3q)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3gffacsuvp8q9p62340u1dgcib)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4eh5eurum690ur8datvh2sb4g9)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4hgajj9cf48dladkd9pn9jcj4p)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence (RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/gac8g25hn9gdbnog775lou0p2)
by Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do & Bernardo Guimaraes
Permitting Prohibitions (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/720184)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Bruno Meyerhof Salama
The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionality: Economics or politics? (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:54:y:2021:i:3:p:1361-1399)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Carlos Eduardo Ladeira
Guarding the Guardians (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:606:p:2441-2477)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy
Dynamic Coordination and the Optimal Stimulus Policies (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:615:p:2785-2811)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado
U.S. Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies (RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:45:y:2013:i:5:p:967-975)
by Nathan Foley‐Fisher & Bernardo Guimaraes
A Model of the Confidence Channel of Fiscal Policy (RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:48:y:2016:i:7:p:1363-1395)
by Bernardo Guimaraes & Caio Machado & Marcel Ribeiro
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm424)
by Stephen Morris & Bernardo Guimaraes

The profile is maintained by bernardo guimaraes

Permanent link: http://authors.repec.org/pro/pgu115/