Vitali Gretschko
Names
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Vitali |
| last: |
Gretschko |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) (weight: 50%)
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Universität Mannheim
/ Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:3:p:189-245)
by Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach - Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher (RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:046)
by Vitali Gretschko & Axel Ockenfels - Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations (RePEc:bla:randje:v:47:y:2016:i:4:p:914-934)
by Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach - Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_225v2)
by Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach - Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_434)
by Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass - Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3983)
by Vitali Gretschko & Stephan Knapek & Achim Wambach - Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4045)
by Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach - Information design in sequential procurement (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:79-85)
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - On the strictly descending multi-unit auction (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:50:y:2014:i:c:p:79-85)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim - Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:212:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001037)
by Riehm, Tobias & Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Werner, Peter - Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015 (RePEc:eee:telpol:v:41:y:2017:i:5:p:325-340)
by Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten - Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:7:p:5146-5161)
by Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich - Excess information acquisition in auctions (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:3:p:335-355)
by Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko - Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-016-0108-x)
by Philippe Gillen & Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rasch - Information acquisition during a descending auction (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:55:y:2014:i:3:p:731-751)
by Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach - Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer
[Procurement Conflicts: VW and Its Suppliers] (RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:96:y:2016:i:9:d:10.1007_s10273-016-2026-9)
by Vitali Gretschko & Nicolas Fugger & Philippe Gillen - Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions (RePEc:the:publsh:4555)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene - Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher (RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:103:y:2023:i:2:p:105-111:n:12)
by Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel - Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism (RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79774)
by Wambach, Achim & Gretschko, Vitali - Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation (RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113064)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015 (RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145809)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Bichler, Martin & Janssen, Maarten - Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement (RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168217)
by Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Contract Design With Limited Commitment (RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168269)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17056)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17058)
by Mass, Helene & Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Contract design with limited commitment (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18054)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18056)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene - Sequential procurement with limited commitment (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19030)
by Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:19040)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin - Social norms and market behavior: Evidence from a large population sample (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21017)
by Riehm, Tobias & Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Werner, Peter - Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen (RePEc:zbw:zewexb:2107)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim - Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen (RePEc:zbw:zewpbs:32021)
by Gretschko, Vitali & Ott, Marion