Thomas A. Gresik
Names
| first: |
Thomas |
| middle: |
A. |
| last: |
Gresik |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
University of Notre Dame
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:800-838)
by Thomas A. Gresik - Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:3:p:887-924)
by Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik - Allowing Firms to Choose Between Formula Apportionment and Separate Accounting Taxation (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4560)
by Thomas Gresik - The Effect of Tax Havens on Host Country Welfare (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5314)
by Thomas Gresik & Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup - Immobilizing Corporate Income Shifting: Should it be Safe to Strip in the Harbour? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5609)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup - Tax Havens, Accounting Experts, and Fee-Setting Rules (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6774)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Kai A. Konrad - Unilateral Tax Reform: Border Adjusted Taxes, Cash Flow Taxes, and Transfer Pricing (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7320)
by Eric Bond & Thomas A. Gresik - Playing Easy or Playing Hard to Get: When and How to Attract FDI (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8415)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup - On the Incentive Compatibility of Universal Adoption of Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8836)
by Eric Bond & Thomas A. Gresik - Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal (RePEc:ecm:nawm04:42)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond - Formula apportionment vs. separate accounting: A private information perspective (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:1:p:133-149)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Introduction to the special section on multinational taxation and tax competition (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:54:y:2010:i:1:p:80-81)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & von Hagen, Juergen - The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:139-148)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:36:y:1994:i:3-4:p:309-331)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Nelson, Douglas R. - The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:304-332)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A. - Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:1:p:131-145)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:1:p:173-184)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:1:p:199-205)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:1:p:41-63)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:1:p:26-48)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Rationing rules and European Central Bank auctions (RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:20:y:2001:i:6:p:793-808)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Allowing firms to choose between separate accounting and formula apportionment taxation (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:138:y:2016:i:c:p:32-42)
by Gresik, Thomas A. - Immobilizing corporate income shifting: Should it be safe to strip in the harbor? (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:68-78)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm - Unilateral tax reform: Border adjusted taxes, cash flow taxes, and transfer pricing (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:184:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720300244)
by Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A. - Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:59:y:1996:i:1:p:33-53)
by Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A. - The Strategic Effects of Batch Processing Under Constant Returns to Batch Size (RePEc:fth:pensta:11-95-1)
by Gresik, T.A. & Mansley, E.C. - Competition Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals (RePEc:fth:pensta:11-95-13)
by Bond, E.W. & Gresik & T.A. - Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Foreign-Owned Subsidiary (RePEc:fth:pensta:5-91-3)
by Gresik, T.A. & Nelson, D.R. - Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals (RePEc:fth:pensta:8-98-1)
by Bond, E.W. & Gresik, T.A. - Incentive-Efiicient Bargaining with Sealed-Offer Rules (RePEc:fth:pensta:9-91-9)
by Gresik, T.A. - The Effect of Tax Havens on Host Country Welfare (RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2015_019)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm - Immobilizing Corporate Income Shifting: Should It Be Safe to Strip in the Harbor? (RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2015_031)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm - Playing Easy or Playing Hard to Get: When and How to Attract FDI (RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2020_007)
by Gresik, Thomas A. & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm - Tax induced transfer pricing under universal adoption of the destination-based cash-flow tax (RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2022_008)
by Thomas A., Gresik & Schjelderup, Guttorm - The Strategic Effects of Batch Processing (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:42:y:2001:i:3:p:697-728)
by Gresik, Thomas A & Mansley, Edward C - Tax Competition and Foreign Capital (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:2:p:127-45)
by Davies, Ronald B & Gresik, Thomas A - Transfer pricing in vertically integrated industries (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:15:y:2008:i:3:p:231-255)
by Thomas Gresik & Petter Osmundsen - On the incentive compatibility of universal adoption of destination-based cash flow taxation (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:30:y:2023:i:6:d:10.1007_s10797-022-09766-6)
by Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik - Transfer pricing under global adoption of destination-based cash-flow taxation (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:31:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10797-023-09783-z)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Guttorm Schjelderup - The Number of Traders Required to Make a Market Competitive: The Beginnings of a Theory (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:551)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite - The Rate at Which a Simple Market Becomes Efficient as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:641)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite - The Rate At Which a Simple Market Becomes Efficient as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:708)
by Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite - Tax Competition and Foreign Capital (RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2001-15)
by Ronald B. Davies & Thomas A. Gresik - Competition between asymmetrically informed principals (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:2:p:227-240)
by Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik - Immobilizing Corporate Income Shifting: Should It Be Safe to Strip in the Harbor? (RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145477)
by Schindler, Dirk Steffen & Gresik, Thomas & Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm