Drew Fudenberg
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Affiliations
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
/ Economics Department
Research profile
author of:
- Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:2:p:720-49)
by Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber - Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:12:p:3651-84)
by Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki - Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:11:p:3780-3812)
by Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo - Predicting and Understanding Initial Play (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:12:p:4112-41)
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang - Justified Communication Equilibrium (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:9:p:3004-34)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg - The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:74:y:1984:i:2:p:361-66)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:2:p:176-83)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:2:p:274-79)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric - Superstition and Rational Learning (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:3:p:630-651)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:5:p:1449-1476)
by David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg - Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:4:p:186-215)
by Drew Fudenberg & Emanuel Vespa - Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:353-77)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:1:p:1-32)
by Drew Fudenberg & Gustav Karreskog Rehbinder - Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:3:p:34-68)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:131-45)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics (RePEc:aea:apandp:v:110:y:2020:p:763)
by Drew Fudenberg - Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk (RePEc:aea:apandp:v:112:y:2022:p:421-25)
by Drew Fudenberg & Indira Puri - Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:694-711)
by Drew Fudenberg - Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games (RePEc:aea:jecper:v:30:y:2016:i:4:p:151-70)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning and Equilibrium (RePEc:anr:reveco:v:1:y:2009:p:385-420)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events (RePEc:arx:papers:1608.05002)
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He & Lorens Imhof - Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games (RePEc:arx:papers:1702.01819)
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games (RePEc:arx:papers:1709.01024)
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium (RePEc:arx:papers:1712.08954)
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model (RePEc:arx:papers:1908.05824)
by Drew Fudenberg & Whitney K. Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki - Measuring the Completeness of Theories (RePEc:arx:papers:1910.07022)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jon Kleinberg & Annie Liang & Sendhil Mullainathan - How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories (RePEc:arx:papers:2007.09213)
by Drew Fudenberg & Wayne Gao & Annie Liang - A Reputation for Honesty (RePEc:arx:papers:2011.07159)
by Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei - Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models (RePEc:arx:papers:2201.00776)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - The Transfer Performance of Economic Models (RePEc:arx:papers:2202.04796)
by Isaiah Andrews & Drew Fudenberg & Lihua Lei & Annie Liang & Chaofeng Wu - Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News (RePEc:arx:papers:2406.11024)
by Tuval Danenberg & Drew Fudenberg - Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:4:p:373-390)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:117:y:2015:i:3:p:771-800)
by Drew Fudenberg - Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt2cs887vq)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. - NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt7tr3c98t)
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. - Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview (RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt9j39n20f)
by Fudenberg, Drew - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (RePEc:cla:levarc:103)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:1098)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization (RePEc:cla:levarc:11694000000000130)
by Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001695)
by Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi - Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis (RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002317)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:172)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible (RePEc:cla:levarc:180)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent (RePEc:cla:levarc:2015)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:2058)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - An Easier Way to Calibrate (RePEc:cla:levarc:2059)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:2147)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:218)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps - Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:219)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (RePEc:cla:levarc:220)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality (RePEc:cla:levarc:2205)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud - Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players (RePEc:cla:levarc:221)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning in Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:2222)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:224)
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (RePEc:cla:levarc:227)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (RePEc:cla:levarc:229)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:370)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:373)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty (RePEc:cla:levarc:379)
by E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg - Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:382)
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:394)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - Learning Mixed Equilibria (RePEc:cla:levarc:415)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps - Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning (RePEc:cla:levarc:425)
by A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg - Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (RePEc:cla:levarc:435)
by G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg - Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (RePEc:cla:levarc:470)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Conditional Universal Consistency (RePEc:cla:levarc:471)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks (RePEc:cla:levarc:496)
by D. Fudenberg & C. Harris - Competing Auctions (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000092)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius - Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? (RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000098)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (RePEc:cla:levarc:508)
by D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:cla:levarc:518)
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps - Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:546)
by D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (RePEc:cla:levarc:571)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:59)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin - Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets (RePEc:cla:levarc:603)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents (RePEc:cla:levarc:604)
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps - An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:607)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players (RePEc:cla:levarc:608)
by D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin - When is Reputation Bad (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000016)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000030)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Superstition and Rational Learning (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000731)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000865)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Learning and Belief Based Trading (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000975)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad (RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000992)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - The Theory of Learning in Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:624)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000151)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:cla:levarc:627)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - Timing and Self-Control (RePEc:cla:levarc:659843000000000008)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000312)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' (RePEc:cla:levarc:671757000000000001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Eric Maskin - A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games (RePEc:cla:levarc:671757000000000010)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent (RePEc:cla:levarc:699152000000000019)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:cla:levarc:699152000000000028)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Word of Mouth Learning (RePEc:cla:levarc:723)
by Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg - Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (RePEc:cla:levarc:7571)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning (RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000683)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000390)
by Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers - An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000472)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000685)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Altruism and Self Control (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000962)
by Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & David G Rand - Whither Game Theory? (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001307)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001375)
by Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001509)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001547)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - On Concave Functions over Lotteries (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001804)
by Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001821)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:cla:levarc:81)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000002)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000009)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique (RePEc:cla:levarc:843644000000000022)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs (RePEc:cla:levarc:843644000000000332)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Interim Correlated Rationalizability (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001188)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Random matching in adaptive dynamics (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000815)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof - Interim Rationalizability (RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000526)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Topologies on Types (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000061)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Learning with Recency Bias (RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000000846)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (RePEc:cla:uclawp:216)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (RePEc:cla:uclawp:242)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (RePEc:cla:uclawp:289)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (RePEc:cla:uclawp:398)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine - Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12126)
by Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew - Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries (RePEc:don:donwpa:034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:3:p:533-54)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric - A Theory of Exit in Duopoly (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:4:p:943-60)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:57:y:1989:i:4:p:759-78)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:6:p:1279-1319)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:3:p:523-45)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:3:p:547-73)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K - The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:5:p:997-1039)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric - Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:4:p:965-976)
by Drew Fudenberg & Dorothy Hodges - Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:5:p:1673-1710)
by Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto - Timing and Self‐Control (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:80:y:2012:i:1:p:1-42)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Consistency and cautious fictitious play (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:5-7:p:1065-1089)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:22:y:1983:i:1:p:3-31)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean - Learning in games (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:631-639)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - “I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:726-743)
by Arechar, Antonio A. & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. - Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:364-381)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro - Payoff information and learning in signaling games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:96-120)
by Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin - Conditional Universal Consistency (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:104-130)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - An Easier Way to Calibrate (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:131-137)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Word-of-mouth learning (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:1-22)
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew - Learning to play Bayesian games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:282-303)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Learning Mixed Equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367)
by Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M. - Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:1:p:27-49)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru - When is reputation bad? (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:498-526)
by Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Random matching in adaptive dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:98-114)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. - Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:2-23)
by Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:100-120)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru - Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:86-99)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech - Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:20-55)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. - Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview (RePEc:eee:indchp:1-05)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:116:y:2015:i:c:p:481-499)
by Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna - Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:2:p:606-612)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:98:y:2014:i:c:p:41-55)
by Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. - Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:104:y:2002:i:2:p:473-478)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Imitation processes with small mutations (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:131:y:2006:i:1:p:251-262)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. - The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:461-473)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:550-567)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam - Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:140:y:2008:i:1:p:229-245)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. - Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:6:p:2354-2371)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1664-1683)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi - Learning from private information in noisy repeated games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1733-1769)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi - Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:150:y:2014:i:c:p:487-514)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke - Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:161:y:2016:i:c:p:1-36)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A. - Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000557)
by Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin - Working to learn (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:197:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001642)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Georgiadis, George & Rayo, Luis - A reputation for honesty (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000989)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry - Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:206:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001594)
by Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin - Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:31:y:1983:i:2:p:227-250)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:31:y:1983:i:2:p:251-268)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Limit games and limit equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:38:y:1986:i:2:p:261-279)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:1:p:1-18)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - On the robustness of equilibrium refinements (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:44:y:1988:i:2:p:354-380)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K. - Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:51:y:1990:i:1:p:1-31)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul - Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:51:y:1990:i:1:p:194-206)
by Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E. - Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:52:y:1990:i:2:p:243-267)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:2:p:236-260)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:2:p:428-438)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric - An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:54:y:1991:i:1:p:26-47)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:57:y:1992:i:2:p:420-441)
by Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C. - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:62:y:1994:i:1:p:103-135)
by Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K. - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:1:p:46-71)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:2:p:165-185)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:84-115)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:41:y:2014:i:c:p:55-67)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias - On concave functions over lotteries (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:110:y:2024:i:c:s0304406823001295)
by Corrao, Roberto & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Unobserved punishment supports cooperation (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:78-86)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A. - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:els:esrcls:032)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:els:esrcls:040)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:fth:harver:1774)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks (RePEc:fth:harver:1803)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria (RePEc:fth:harver:1817)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry (RePEc:fth:harver:1870)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Customer Poaching and Brand Switching (RePEc:fth:harver:1871)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good (RePEc:fth:harver:1873)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (RePEc:fth:harver:1926)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Competing Auctions (RePEc:fth:harver:1960)
by Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg - The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (RePEc:fth:harver:1961)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (RePEc:fth:harver:1962)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions (RePEc:fth:harver:2033)
by Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl - Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi (RePEc:fth:harver:2034)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (RePEc:fth:harver:2035)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (RePEc:fth:harver:2049)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Imitation Processes with Small Mutations (RePEc:fth:harver:2050)
by Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient (RePEc:fth:harver:2051)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi - Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents (RePEc:fth:harver:2056)
by Robert M. Anderson & Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Interim Rationalizability (RePEc:fth:harver:2064)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - Topologies on Types (RePEc:fth:harver:2093)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris - A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (RePEc:fth:harver:2112)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Superstition and Rational Learning (RePEc:fth:harver:2114)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:fth:teavfo:9-99)
by Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00812781)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Unknown item RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-00812781 (paper)
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00812781)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Timing and Self-Control (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11005331)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11005332)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, LA - On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11005333)
by Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew - Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11022184)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Lavine, David K. - Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11223697)
by Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11224965)
by Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi - Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11880354)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke - Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics (RePEc:hrv:faseco:11923167)
by Dreber-Almenberg, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G. - Tail probabilities for triangular arrays (RePEc:hrv:faseco:13041349)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David Saul - An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk (RePEc:hrv:faseco:13051803)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias - Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown (RePEc:hrv:faseco:13411374)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi - Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium (RePEc:hrv:faseco:13477947)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion (RePEc:hrv:faseco:14397609)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Strzalecki, Tomasz - Winners Don't Punish (RePEc:hrv:faseco:2252594)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin - Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27303656)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro - Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27303657)
by Fudenberg, Drew - It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27304431)
by Rand, David Gertler & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna - Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755296)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Peysakhovich, Alexander - Unobserved punishment supports cooperation (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755297)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A. - Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755298)
by Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755310)
by Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew - Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal (RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755311)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech - Competing Auctions (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3043414)
by Ellison, Glenn & Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew - Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3043420)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam - Topologies on Types (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160489)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160491)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160492)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160493)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn - A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3160494)
by Tirole, Jean & Fudenberg, Drew - Imitation Processes with Small Mutations (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3190369)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens - Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3190370)
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew - Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3190371)
by Imhof, Lorens & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196300)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196301)
by Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Superstition and Rational Learning (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196330)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196331)
by Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine - Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196332)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - Interim Correlated Rationalizability (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196333)
by Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196334)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196335)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196336)
by Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - When is Reputation Bad? (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196337)
by Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew - Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196338)
by Imhof, Lorens & Fudenberg, Drew - Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3198694)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200611)
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200612)
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200613)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200614)
by Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew - Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200671)
by Imhof, Lorens & Nowak, Martin & Fudenberg, Drew - The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203772)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - An Easier Way to Calibrate (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203773)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203774)
by Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3203775)
by Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Conditional Universal Consistency (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3204826)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3208222)
by Fudenberg, Drew - Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3226950)
by Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3350443)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3350444)
by Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew - Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3374509)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Diamond, Peter - Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3708929)
by Holden, Richard T. & Fudenberg, Drew & Aghion, Philippe - Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation (RePEc:hrv:faseco:3804483)
by Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A. - Learning and Equilibrium (RePEc:hrv:faseco:4382413)
by Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew - Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique (RePEc:hrv:faseco:4686412)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:hrv:faseco:8896226)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi - Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games (RePEc:hrv:faseco:9962008)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi - Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms (RePEc:hrv:faseco:9962009)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Archetti, Marco & Green, Jerry R. & Pierce, Naomi Ellen & Yu, Douglas W. & Úbeda, Francisco - A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents (RePEc:ide:wpaper:4559)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks (RePEc:ide:wpaper:762)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher - Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (RePEc:ide:wpaper:766)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - Learning and Belief-Based Trade (RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:42:y:2005:i:126:p:199-208)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine - Competing Auctions (RePEc:isu:genres:32106)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus - Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions (RePEc:isu:genres:32111)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam - The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information (RePEc:mit:worpap:310)
by E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg - Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers (RePEc:mit:worpap:366)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole - Predation Without Reputation (RePEc:mit:worpap:377)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview (RePEc:mit:worpap:445)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player (RePEc:mit:worpap:461)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium (RePEc:mit:worpap:465)
by Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg - Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents (RePEc:mit:worpap:466)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps - On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games (RePEc:mit:worpap:467)
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin - Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships (RePEc:mit:worpap:468)
by Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom - Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty (RePEc:mit:worpap:471)
by Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel - Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:mit:worpap:474)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin - Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales (RePEc:mit:worpap:490)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (RePEc:mit:worpap:494)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note (RePEc:mit:worpap:496)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains (RePEc:mit:worpap:499)
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin - The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information (RePEc:mit:worpap:523)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E. - Equilibrium Payoffs Long-Run And Short-Run Players And Imperfect Public Information (RePEc:mit:worpap:524)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information (RePEc:mit:worpap:525)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Monopoly And Credibility In Asset Markets: An Example (RePEc:mit:worpap:539)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Self-Confirming Equilibrium (RePEc:mit:worpap:581)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (RePEc:mit:worpap:589)
by Fudenberg, D. - Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games (RePEc:mit:worpap:590)
by Fudenberg, D. - Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:mit:worpap:591)
by Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. - Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (RePEc:mit:worpap:92-12)
by Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D. - Learning Mixed Equilibria (RePEc:mit:worpap:92-13)
by Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M. - Game Theory (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262061414)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - The Theory of Learning in Games (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262061945)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Indirect reciprocity with simple records (RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:11344-11349)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky - Testing the drift-diffusion model (RePEc:nas:journl:v:117:y:2020:p:33141-33148)
by Drew Fudenberg & Whitney Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki - Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations (RePEc:nat:nature:v:428:y:2004:i:6983:d:10.1038_nature02414)
by Martin A. Nowak & Akira Sasaki & Christine Taylor & Drew Fudenberg - Winners don’t punish (RePEc:nat:nature:v:452:y:2008:i:7185:d:10.1038_nature06723)
by Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak - Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15167)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden - Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9528)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Unknown item RePEc:nos:voprec:2017-05-6 (article)
- Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games (RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2017:id:306)
by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine - When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1114)
by Drew Fudenberg - Learning to Play Bayesian Games (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1322)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - When is Reputation Bad? (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1358)
by Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Topologies on Type (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1417)
by Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg - Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:102:y:1987:i:1:p:37-50.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole - Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:110:y:1995:i:1:p:93-125.)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:2:p:507-536.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:118:y:2003:i:4:p:1249-1278.)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:124:y:2009:i:1:p:233-265.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:127:y:2012:i:4:p:1843-1881)
by Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux - Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (RePEc:oup:restud:v:50:y:1983:i:2:p:221-247.)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology (RePEc:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:3:p:383-401.)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents (RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:4:p:541-568.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps - Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players (RePEc:oup:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:4:p:555-573.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:3:p:561-579.)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
[Has Punishment Played a Role in the Evolution of Cooperation? A Critical Review] (RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:5:p:2179-2209.)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky - Predicting and Understanding Initial Play (RePEc:pen:papers:17-026)
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang - Predicting and Understanding Initial Play (RePEc:pen:papers:18-009)
by Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang - Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models (RePEc:pen:papers:22-003)
by Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:136731)
by Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki - Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:167691)
by Drew Fudenberg & Peysakhovich, A - Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:254346)
by Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki - Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion (RePEc:qsh:wpaper:40033)
by Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki - Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:red:issued:06-189)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" (RePEc:red:issued:06-189c)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (RePEc:red:sed006:680)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors (RePEc:red:sed007:1031)
by Drew Fudenberg - Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance (RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:autumn:p:522-530)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation (RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:autumn:p:366-376)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks (RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:summer:p:235-258)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry (RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:summer:p:253-272)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg - Customer Poaching and Brand Switching (RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:winter:p:634-657)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole - Intervention with limited information (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00796-8)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RePEc:the:publsh:1362)
by , & , - Interim correlated rationalizability (RePEc:the:publsh:140)
by , & , & , - Topologies on types (RePEc:the:publsh:141)
by , & , & , - Active learning with a misspecified prior (RePEc:the:publsh:2480)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp - Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory (RePEc:the:publsh:2626)
by Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. - Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs (RePEc:the:publsh:5206)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo & Strack, Philipp - Which misspecifications persist? (RePEc:the:publsh:5298)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo - Competing Auctions (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:30-66)
by Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius - Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8602)
by Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps. - Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8613)
by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. - Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games (RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8736)
by D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin. - Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/718371)
by Drew Fudenberg & Jon Kleinberg & Annie Liang & Sendhil Mullainathan - Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:4:p:612-43)
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew - A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:1:p:75-93)
by Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean - Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:3:p:606-19)
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew - Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:99:y:1991:i:1:p:218-19)
by Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew - Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i::p:2371-2409)
by Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki - Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:83:y:2015:i::p:651-691)
by Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki - Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:86:y:2018:i:4:p:1215-1255)
by Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He - Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:89:y:2021:i:3:p:1065-1098)
by Drew Fudenberg & Giacomo Lanzani & Philipp Strack - A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games (RePEc:wsi:wsbook:6880)
by None - Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0001)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0002)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine - Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0003)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Finite Player Approximations To A Continuum Of Players (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0004)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0005)
by Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine - When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0006)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0007)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0008)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0009)
by Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer - When is reputation bad? (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0010)
by Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0011)
by Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin - The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0012)
by Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin - Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0013)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0014)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0015)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine - Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0016)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi - Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring (RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0017)
by Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine