Daniel Friedman

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• University of Essex / Economics Department (weight: 20%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• University of California-Santa Cruz (UCSC) / Economics Department (weight: 80%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1778-1803)
  by Steven T. Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea
• A Continuous Dilemma (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:1:p:337-63)
  by Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea
• On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:74:y:1984:i:1:p:60-72)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Experimental Economics: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:1:p:264)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• The S-Shaped Value Function as a Constrained Optimum (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:5:p:1243-48)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:5:p:1374-78)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Monty Hall's Three Doors: Construction and Deconstruction of a Choice Anomaly (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:4:p:933-46)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• The Matching Market Institution: A Laboratory Investigation (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:5:p:1311-22)
  by Rich, Changhua Sun & Friedman, Daniel
• Motives for Delegating Financial Decisions (RePEc:arx:papers:2309.03419)
  by Mikhail Freer & Daniel Friedman & Simon Weidenholzer
• Inefficient Information Aggregation as a (RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:44:y:1992:i:4:p:251-79)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Aoki, Masanao
• Dissecting The Monty Hall Anomaly (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:3:p:1817-1826)
  by Duncan James & Daniel Friedman & Christina Louie & Taylor O'Meara
• Makin's MA RP: A Comment [Portfolio Theory and the Problem of Foreign Exchange Risk] (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:36:y:1981:i:3:p:739-41)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:42:y:1987:i:3:p:763-97)
  by Copeland, Thomas E & Friedman, Daniel
• Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset Markets (RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:46:y:1991:i:1:p:265-95)
  by Copeland, Thomas E & Friedman, Daniel
• A Laboratory Study of Customer Markets (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:1)
  by Cason Timothy N. & Friedman Daniel
• How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study (RePEc:cam:camdae:1681)
  by Friedman, Daniel. & Fan, Jijian. & Jonathan Gair & Sriya Iyer & Bartosz Redlicki & Chander Velu
• A Simulation Study of How Religious Fundamentalism Takes Root (RePEc:cam:camdae:2089)
  by Friedman, D. & Fan, J. & Gair, J. & Iyer, S. & Redlicki, B. & Velu, C.
• Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1017 (paper)
• Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1023 (paper)
• Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1024 (paper)
• Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1028 (paper)
• Unknown item RePEc:cdl:ucscec:1038 (paper)
• An Experiment on the Core∗ (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt0jq48184)
  by Yan, Huibin & Friedman, Daniel
• Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt0pr4g8h1)
  by Anderson, Steven T & Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan
• Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt0xp29105)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
• A Laboratory Investigation of Deferral Options (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt15t887m9)
  by Oprea, Ryan & Friedman, Daniel & Anderson, Steven T
• Buy it Now: A Hybrid Internet Market Institution (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt21d715v9)
  by Anderson, Steve & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar
• Separating the Hawks from the Doves ∗ (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt2zm6c64m)
  by Henwood, Keith J. & Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan
• A Continuous Dilemma ∗ (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt3475m3dq)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan
• Bubblesandcrashes:Gradientdynamicsinfinancial markets (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt3905j8kq)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Abraham, Ralph
• Seller Strategies on eBay (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt43z3965f)
  by Anderson, Steve & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar
• Order Protection through Delayed Messaging (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt4938f518)
  by Aldrich, Eric M & Friedman, Daniel
• Humans, Robots and Market Crashes: A Laboratory Study ∗ (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt4kf382p6)
  by Feldman, Todd & Friedman, Daniel
• Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt4nx5s4h8)
  by Rabanal, Jean Paul & Friedman, Daniel
• Tractable consumer choice (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt5kq1w4jv)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Sákovics, József
• Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: a Continuous Time Experiment (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt6947v2f5)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Cason, Timothy N & Hopkins, Ed
• Revealed Altruism (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt6rb5t4mc)
  by Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Sadiraj, Vjollca
• Boiling the frog optimally: An experiment on survivor curve shapes and internet revenue (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt7d79g6w8)
  by Aperjis, C & Bosch-Rosa, C & Friedman, D & Huberman, BA
• Dissecting The Monty Hall Anomaly (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt7tp7c0rk)
  by James, Duncan & Friedman, Daniel & Louie, Christina & O'Meara, Taylor
• Litigation With Symmetric Bargaining And Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt7vj7k9f6)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald
• Risky Curves: On the Empirical Failure of Expected Utility (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt87v8k86z)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Isaac, R. Mark & James, Duncan & Sunder, Shyam
• Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt8kp6c049)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel & Hopkins, Ed H
• Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt8n49r3t2)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
• Software for continuous game experiments (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt92h1b2br)
  by Pettit, James & Friedman, Daniel & Kephart, Curtis & Oprea, Ryan
• Revealed altruism (RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt9jr3v93s)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Sadiraj, Vjollca & Cox, James C.
• Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1001)
  by Daniel Friedman & Donald Wittman
• Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2420)
  by Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman
• Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3129)
  by Ryan Oprea & Keith Henwood & Daniel Friedman
• Equilibrium Vengeance (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_766)
  by Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh
• Online Ad Auctions: An Experiment (RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-05)
  by Kevin McLaughlin & Daniel Friedman
• Models of Integration Given Multiple Sources of Information (RePEc:cla:levarc:447)
  by D. Massaro & D. Friedman
• On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory (RePEc:cla:levarc:53)
  by Daniel Friedman
• From Imitation to Collusion: Long-run Learning in a Low-Information Environment (RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000457)
  by Daniel Friedman & Steffen Huck & Ryan Oprea & Simon Weidenholzer
• Revealed Altruism (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000595)
  by Jim C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj
• An Effective Scoring Rule for Probability Distibutions (RePEc:cla:uclawp:164)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Short-Run Fluctuations in Foreign Exchange Rates: An Exploration of the Data (RePEc:cla:uclawp:171)
  by Daniel Friedman & Stoddard Vandersteel
• Speculation, Arbitrage, and the Term Structure of Foreign Exchange Rates (RePEc:cla:uclawp:207)
  by Daniel Friedman
• The Informational Role of Futures Markets and Learning Behavious: Some Experimental Evidence (RePEc:cla:uclawp:248)
  by Daniel Friedman & Glen W. Harrison & Jon W. Salmon
• Price Formation in Double Auction Markets (RePEc:cla:uclawp:278)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Experimental Methods (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521456821)
  by Friedman,Daniel & Sunder,Shyam
• Privileged Traders and Asset Market Efficiency: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:28:y:1993:i:04:p:515-534_00)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Risky Curves: From Unobservable Utility to Observable Opportunity Sets (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1819)
  by Daniel Friedman & Shyam Sunder
• Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:428:p:22-53)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Ostroy, Joseph
• Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:434:p:1-25)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• A Laboratory Investigation of Networked Markets (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:120:y:2010:i:547:p:919-943)
  by A. Cassar & D. Friedman & P.H. Schneider
• Evolutionary Games in Economics (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:3:p:637-66)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Price Formation in Single Call Markets (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:2:p:311-346)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman
• Revealed Altruism (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:1:p:31-69)
  by James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj
• Buyer Search and Price Dispersion: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1549)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman
• Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (RePEc:edn:esedps:188)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins
• The marginal utility of money: A modern Marshallian approach to consumer choice (RePEc:edn:esedps:209)
  by Jozsef Sakovics & Daniel Friedman
• Tractable Consumer Choice (RePEc:edn:esedps:240)
  by Daniel Friedman & Jozsef Sakovics
• Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (RePEc:edn:sirdps:118)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel UC & Hopkins, Ed
• The marginal utility of money: A modern Marshallian approach to consumer choice (RePEc:edn:sirdps:349)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Sákovics, József
• Tractable Consumer Choice (RePEc:edn:sirdps:533)
  by Sakovics, Jozsef & Friedman, Daniel
• Short-run behavior of labor productivity: tests of the motivation hypothesis (RePEc:eee:beheco:v:9:y:1980:i:2:p:89-105)
  by Stern, David & Friedman, Daniel
• Price formation in double auction markets (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:20:y:1996:i:8:p:1307-1337)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel
• The dynamics of price dispersion, or Edgeworth variations (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:29:y:2005:i:4:p:801-822)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel & Wagener, Florian
• Markups in double auction markets (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:31:y:2007:i:9:p:2984-3005)
  by Zhan, Wenjie & Friedman, Daniel
• Bubbles and crashes: Gradient dynamics in financial markets (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:33:y:2009:i:4:p:922-937)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Abraham, Ralph
• Asset price bubbles from poorly aggregated information : A parametric example (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:21:y:1986:i:1:p:49-52)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Aoki, Masanao
• The Matching Market Institution (RePEc:eee:expchp:1-13)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Rich, Changhua
• A Comparison of Market Institutions (RePEc:eee:expchp:1-33)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel
• Learning to Forecast Rationally (RePEc:eee:expchp:2-35)
  by Kelley, Hugh & Friedman, Daniel
• Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games (RePEc:eee:expchp:4-53)
  by Bouchez, Nicole & Friedman, Daniel
• Varieties of risk preference elicitation (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:58-76)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Habib, Sameh & James, Duncan & Williams, Brett
• Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76)
  by Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45)
  by Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven
• Conspicuous consumption dynamics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:121-145)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Ostrov, Daniel N.
• Equilibrium vengeance (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:813-829)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
• An experiment on a core controversy (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:132-144)
  by Yan, Huibin & Friedman, Daniel & Munro, David
• Bargaining versus posted price competition in customer markets (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:223-251)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett H.
• Short-run fluctuations in foreign exchange rates : Evidence from the data 1973-1979 (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:13:y:1982:i:1-2:p:171-186)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Vandersteel, Stoddard
• International trade and the internal organization of firms: An evolutionary approach (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:41:y:1996:i:1-2:p:113-137)
  by Friedman, Daniel & K., C. Fung
• Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:108:y:2014:i:c:p:212-223)
  by Oprea, Ryan & Charness, Gary & Friedman, Daniel
• Producers' markets : A model of oligopoly with sales costs (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:11:y:1989:i:3:p:381-398)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• A simple testable model of double auction markets (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:15:y:1991:i:1:p:47-70)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• When are mixed equilibria relevant? (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:51-65)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Zhao, Shuchen
• A simulation study of how religious fundamentalism takes root (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:192:y:2021:i:c:p:465-481)
  by Fan, Jijian & Friedman, Daniel & Gair, Jonathan & Iyer, Sriya & Redlicki, Bartosz & Velu, Chander
• Experiments in decision, organization and exchange : Richard H. Day and Vernon L. Smith, eds., (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1993) viii + 380 pp (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:24:y:1994:i:2:p:239-241)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:35:y:1998:i:3:p:263-280)
  by Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel
• Market theories evolve, and so do markets (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:2:p:247-255)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Two microdynamic models of exchange (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:7:y:1986:i:2:p:129-146)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Cheating in markets: A laboratory experiment (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:240-259)
  by Cassar, Alessandra & Friedman, Daniel & Schneider, Patricia Higino
• Preferences, beliefs and equilibrium: What have experiments taught us? (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:1:p:29-33)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:2:p:232-260)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel
• Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2309-2331)
  by Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel & Hopkins, Ed
• Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2206-2225)
  by Oprea, Ryan & Henwood, Keith & Friedman, Daniel
• Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:743-777)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Ostrov, Daniel N.
• From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:185-205)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Huck, Steffen & Oprea, Ryan & Weidenholzer, Simon
• On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:205:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122001211)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A. & Zhao, Shuchen
• Speculative attacks: A laboratory study in continuous time (RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:28:y:2009:i:6:p:1064-1082)
  by Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel
• Gradient dynamics in population games: Some basic results (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:691-707)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Ostrov, Daniel N.
• Money-mediated disequilibrium processes in a pure exchange economy (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:6:y:1979:i:2:p:149-167)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:57:y:1995:i:1:p:67-83)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Wittman, Donald
• From Imitation to Collusion: Long-run Learning in a Low-Information Environment (RePEc:esx:essedp:8954)
  by Friedman, D & Huck, S & Oprea, R & Weidenholzer, S
• A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness (RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-05)
  by James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad
• Revealed Altruism (RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-09)
  by James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Vjollca Sadiraj
• Econmomically Applicable Evolutionary Games (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9226)
  by Friedman, D.
• How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:6:y:2015:i:2:p:150-160:d:50656)
  by Jean Paul Rabanal & Daniel Friedman
• Trade Specialists and Money in an Ongoing Exchange Economy (RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0141)
  by Clower, Robert W. & Friedman, Daniel
• Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time (RePEc:hkm:wpaper:072009)
  by Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman
• Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games (RePEc:hol:holodi:0002)
  by Nicole Marie Bouchez & Daniel Friedman
• Boiling the frog optimally: nan experiment on survivor curve shapes and internet revenue (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-058)
  by Christina Aperjis & Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Daniel Friedman & Bernardo A. Huberman
• Effective Scoring Rules for Probabilistic Forecasts (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:29:y:1983:i:4:p:447-454)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Order Protection Through Delayed Messaging (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:2:p:774-790)
  by Eric M. Aldrich & Daniel Friedman
• Human and Artificial Agents in a Crash-Prone Financial Market (RePEc:kap:compec:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:201-229)
  by Todd Feldman & Daniel Friedman
• Searching for the sunk cost fallacy (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:79-104)
  by Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garrett Milam & Bernardo Huberman
• Software for continuous game experiments (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:4:p:631-648)
  by James Pettit & Daniel Friedman & Curtis Kephart & Ryan Oprea
• Learning in a Laboratory Market with Random Supply and Demand (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:77-98)
  by Timothy Cason & Daniel Friedman
• Intolerable nuisances: some laboratory evidence on survivor curve shapes (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9501-4)
  by Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Christina Aperjis & Daniel Friedman & Bernardo A. Huberman
• Book reviews (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:65:y:1997:i:3:p:311-327)
  by D. Friedman & W. Trockel & S. Novkovic & Patricia Apps & A. Falk & C. Doyle
• Tractable consumer choice (RePEc:kap:theord:v:79:y:2015:i:2:p:333-358)
  by Daniel Friedman & József Sákovics
• How Trading Institutions Affect Financial Market Performance: Some Laboratory Evidence (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:31:y:1993:i:3:p:410-35)
  by Friedman, Daniel
• Learning to Forecast Price (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:4:p:556-573)
  by Hugh Kelley & Daniel Friedman
• Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:98-126)
  by Daniel Friedman & Donald Wittman
• Learning to Wait: A Laboratory Investigation (RePEc:oup:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:3:p:1103-1124)
  by Ryan Oprea & Daniel Friedman & Steven T. Anderson
• Cycles and Instability in a Rock--Paper--Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment (RePEc:oup:restud:v:81:y:2014:i:1:p:112-136)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & ED Hopkins
• Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds (RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199981151)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Sinervo, Barry
• Morals and Markets (RePEc:pal:palbok:978-0-230-61498-7)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Morals and Markets (RePEc:pal:palbok:978-1-137-33152-6)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_3)
  by Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh
• Prologue (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_1)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Markets for Crime and Markets for Punishment (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_10)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Mullahs’ Revenge (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_11)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Cooling the Earth (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_12)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Future Morals and Markets (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_13)
  by Daniel Friedman
• The Savanna Code (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_2)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Bazaar and Empire (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_3)
  by Daniel Friedman
• The Great Transformation (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_4)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Utopias of Cooperation (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_5)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Russia’s Transition to Kleptocracy (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_6)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Japan’s Bubbles and Zombies (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_7)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Towers of Trust (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_8)
  by Daniel Friedman
• From Hudson’s Bay to eBay (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61498-7_9)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Prologue: A Tale of Two Tilts (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_1)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Underworlds: The Tao of Gangs (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_10)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Cooling the Earth: The Preservation Markets (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_11)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• The World Ahead (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_12)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• The Savanna Code: What Good Are Morals? (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_2)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• The Rise of Wealth: How We Became Civilized and Started Shopping (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_3)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• From Melqart to Zombieworld: Adventures in Imbalance (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_4)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Madness, Lies, and Crashes: When Prices Run Free (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_5)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Blundering Back to Balance: TARP and Tear Gas (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_6)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• China: Morals and the Rush to Wealth (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_7)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• From Hudson’s Bay to eBay: Why Some People Like Going to Work (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_8)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Markets and Sin: Murder, Megacasinos, and Drug Wars (RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33152-6_9)
  by Daniel Friedman & Daniel McNeill
• Evolutionary games, climate and the generation of diversity (RePEc:plo:pone00:0184052)
  by Daniel Friedman & Jacopo Magnani & Dhanashree Paranjpe & Barry Sinervo
• Equilibrium Vengeance (RePEc:pra:mprapa:4321)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
• Buy it now: A hybrid market institution (RePEc:pra:mprapa:4322)
  by Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar
• Seller strategies on eBay: Does size matter? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:4324)
  by Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar
• A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness (RePEc:pur:prukra:1181)
  by Cox, J. & Friedman, D. & Gjerstad, S.
• Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (RePEc:pur:prukra:1233)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins
• An Experimental Investigation of Price Dispersion and Cycles (RePEc:pur:prukra:1324)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins
• Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples (RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:4:y:2014:i:4:p:448-467)
  by Jean Rabanal & Daniel Friedman
• Hotelling revisits the lab: equilibration in continuous and discrete time (RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:1:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40881-015-0009-z)
  by Curtis Kephart & Daniel Friedman
• Payoff and presentation modulation of elicited risk preferences in MPLs (RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:3:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s40881-016-0032-8)
  by Sameh Habib & Daniel Friedman & Sean Crockett & Duncan James
• On economic applications of evolutionary game theory (RePEc:spr:joevec:v:8:y:1998:i:1:p:15-43)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Evolutionary economics goes mainstream: A review of the theory of learning in games (RePEc:spr:joevec:v:8:y:1998:i:4:p:423-432)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Cheating in Markets: A Methodological Exploration (RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-68660-6_7)
  by Daniel Friedman
• Internet Congestion: A Laboratory Experiment (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24243-9_4)
  by Daniel Friedman & Bernardo Huberman
• Towards evolutionary game models of financial markets (RePEc:taf:quantf:v:1:y:2001:i:1:p:177-185)
  by D. Friedman
• Economically applicable evolutionary games (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:92b42ca6-0b7a-45d2-80cb-79d019fae691)
  by Friedman, D.
• Economically applicable evolutionary games (RePEc:tiu:tiutis:92b42ca6-0b7a-45d2-80cb-79d019fae691)
  by Friedman, D.
• Learning Liability Rules (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:145-64)
  by Wittman, Donald & Friedman, Daniel & Crevier, Stephanie & Braskin, Aaron
• The Market Value of Information: Some Experimental Results (RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:65:y:1992:i:2:p:241-66)
  by Copeland, Thomas E & Friedman, Daniel
• An Experimental Investigation of Price Dispersion and Cycles (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/712445)
  by Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & Ed Hopkins
• The Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:92:y:1984:i:3:p:349-408)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Harrison, Glenn W & Salmon, Jon W
• Financial Engineering and Rationality: Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem (RePEc:usi:labsit:007)
  by Brain Kluger & Daniel Friedman
• The Informational Role of Futures Markets and Learning Behaviour: Some experimental evidence (RePEc:uwa:wpaper:82-07)
  by D. Friedman & G.W. Harrison & J.W. Salmon
• Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market: Comment (RePEc:uwa:wpaper:82-11)
  by D. Friedman & G.W. Harrison & J.W. Salmon
• The Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets (RePEc:uwo:uwowop:8320)
  by Daniel Friedman & Glenn W. Harrison & Jon W. Salmon
• Naturally Occurring Preferences And General Equilibrium: A Laboratory Study (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:62:y:2021:i:2:p:831-859)
  by Sean Crockett & Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea
• Modeling Bounded Rationality By Ariel Rubinstein. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998. Pp. viii, 208. $16.95 (RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:2:p:366-368)
  by Daniel Friedman
• A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0406001)
  by James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad
• Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0407007)
  by Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garret Milam & Bernardo A. Huberman
• Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy (RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0407008)
  by Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garret Milam & Bernardo A. Huberman
• Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412003)
  by Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh
• Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412005)
  by Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh
• Buy it Now: A Hybrid Internet Market Institution (RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0412003)
  by Steven Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Garrett Milam & Nirvikar Singh
• Seller Strategies on eBay (RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0412004)
  by Steven Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Garrett Milam & Nirvikar Singh
• Boiling the frog optimally: Nan experiment on survivor curve shapes and internet revenue (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2014-058)
  by Aperjis, Christina & Bosch-Rosa, Ciril & Friedman, Daniel & Huberman, Bernardo A.
• From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment (RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012301)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Huck, Steffen & Oprea, Ryan & Weidenholzer, Simon
• From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment (RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012301r)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Huck, Steffen & Oprea, Ryan & Weidenholzer, Simon
• Eliciting risk preferences: Text vs. graphical multiple price lists (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2015501)
  by Habib, Sameh & Friedman, Daniel & Crockett, Sean & James, Duncan
• Emergence of networks and market institutions in a large virtual economy (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2015502)
  by Kephart, Curtis & Friedman, Daniel & Baumer, Matt
• Online ad auctions: An experiment (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2016501)
  by McLaughlin, Kevin & Friedman, Daniel
• Economic recommendation with surplus maximization (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2016502)
  by Zhang, Yongfeng & Zhao, Qi & Zhang, Yi & Friedman, Daniel & Zhang, Min & Liu, Yiqun & Ma, Shaoping
• Recommendation based on multiproduct utility maximization (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2016503)
  by Zhao, Qi & Zhang, Yongfeng & Zhang, Yi & Friedman, Daniel
• Aggregation and convergence in experimental general equilibrium economies constructed from naturally occurring preferences (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2017501)
  by Crockett, Sean & Friedman, Daniel & Oprea, Ryan
• Order protection through delayed messaging (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2017502)
  by Aldrich, Eric M. & Friedman, Daniel
• Economic recommendation based on pareto efficient resource allocation (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2017503)
  by Zhang, Yongfeng & Zhang, Yi & Friedman, Daniel
• Varieties of risk elicitation (RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2018501)
  by Friedman, Daniel & Habib, Sameh & James, Duncan & Crockett, Sean