Jörg Franke
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Affiliations
-
University of Bath
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Does Affirmative Action Reduce Effort Incentives? A Contest Game Analysis (RePEc:aub:autbar:711.07)
by Jörg Franke - The Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action in a Real-Effort Tournament (RePEc:bge:wpaper:404)
by Caterina Calsamiglia & Jörg Franke & Pedro Rey-Biel - Lotteries and Lindahl prices in public good provision (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:6:p:840-848)
by Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger - Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2744)
by Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Väth - On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4109)
by Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger - Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6274)
by Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser - Effort Maximization in Asymmetric Contest Games with Heterogeneous Contestants (RePEc:dar:wpaper:86028)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra - Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem (RePEc:dar:wpaper:86031)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra - On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:436-439)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang - Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:104:y:2018:i:c:p:22-37)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric - Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:116-126)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra - Workers’ participation in wage setting: A gift-exchange experiment (RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:151-162)
by Franke, Jörg & Gurtoviy, Ruslan & Mertins, Vanessa - Affirmative action in contest games (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:1:p:105-118)
by Franke, Jörg - Conflict networks (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:104-113)
by Franke, Jörg & Öztürk, Tahir - The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:98:y:2013:i:c:p:15-31)
by Calsamiglia, Caterina & Franke, Jörg & Rey-Biel, Pedro - The Incentive Effects of Leveling the Playing Field - An Empirical Analysis of Amateur Golf Tournaments (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00670763)
by Jörg Franke - Workers' Participation in Wage Setting and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment (RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201407)
by Jörg Franke & Ruslan Gurtoviy & Vanessa Mertins - Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage (RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:113:y:2014:i:3:p:253-273)
by Jörg Franke - Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:52:y:2013:i:2:p:589-630)
by Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz - The incentive effects of levelling the playing field -- an empirical analysis of amateur golf tournaments (RePEc:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:9:p:1193-1200)
by Jörg Franke - Repeated Contests with Draws (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:1016)
by Franke, Jörg & Metzger, Lars P. - Conflict Networks (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:116)
by Franke, Jörg & Öztürk, Tahir - Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-person Contest Games (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:130)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Väth, Alexandra - Does Affirmative Action Reduce Effort Incentives? – A Contest Game Analysis (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:185)
by Franke, Jörg - Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:315)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra - On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:399)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang - Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests (RePEc:zbw:rwirep:524)
by Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric - Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem (RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79998)
by Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra