Francoise Forges

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Laboratoire d'Économie de Dauphine (LEDa) (weight: 50%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
  Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, adr:anecst:y:2008:i:89:p:3-61)
• Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion
  Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES (2020)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, adr:anecst:y:2020:i:137:p:3-30)
• Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
  Sustainable Development Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2010)
  by Forges, Francoise & Orzach, Ram
  (ReDIF-paper, ags:feemdp:96668)
• Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations
  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell (1998)
  by Olivier De Wolf & Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:2:p:529-535)
• Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey
  Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics (2000)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra
  (ReDIF-paper, bro:econwp:2000-22)
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects
  Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics (2001)
  by Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra
  (ReDIF-paper, bro:econwp:2001-01)
• Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems
  Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics (2011)
  by Francoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
  (ReDIF-paper, bro:econwp:2011-15)
• Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs
  Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po (2007)
  by Riham Barbar & Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, cai:recosp:reco_585_0965)
• Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes
  Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz (2007)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, cai:repdal:redp_176_0873)
• Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth
  Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz (2013)
  by Françoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-article, cai:repdal:redp_235_0663)
• Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques
  Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz (2017)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, cai:repdal:redp_274_0467)
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : des jeux répétés à l'analyse « coût-bénéfice »
  Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po (2012)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, cai:rferfe:rfe_123_0019)
• Long Persuasion Games
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2006)
  by Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_1669)
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2006)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_1686)
• Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2006)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_1703)
• Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2010)
  by Omer Biran & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_3067)
• Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2011)
  by Péter Vida & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_3360)
• Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2013)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_4498)
• Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
  CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2014)
  by Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon
  (ReDIF-paper, ces:ceswps:_4700)
• An Approach to Communication Equilibrium
  Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine (2010)
  by F. Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, cla:levarc:516)
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1)
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1984)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1984006)
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2)
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1984)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1984011)
• Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3)
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1984)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1984012)
• An approach to communication equilibria
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1984)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1984035)
• Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1986)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1986039)
• Universal mechanisms
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1987)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1987004)
• Can sunspots replace a mediator ?
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1987)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1987045)
• Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1988)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1988005)
• Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1988)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1988006)
• Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1988)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1988025)
• Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1990029)
• Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1990071)
• Posterior efficiency
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1991)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1991045)
• Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1991)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1991053)
• Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1993)
  by FORGES , Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1993009)
• A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1993)
  by FORGES , Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1993043)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1994)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1994044)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1994)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1994058)
• On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1995)
  by DE WOLF , Olivier & FORGES , Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:1995048)
• The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2001)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:2001001)
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2001)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:2001043)
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
  LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2006)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvco:2006041)
• Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1992)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1012)
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1993)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1071)
• Posterior efficiency
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1994)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1077)
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1994)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1111)
• Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1995)
  by Forges, F. & Peck, J.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1140)
• Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1995)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1165)
• Rational choice in strategic environments: further observations
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1998)
  by DE WOLF, Olivier & FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1338)
• A note on the incentive compatible core
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2001)
  by FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1523)
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2001)
  by FORGES, Françoise & HEIFETZ , Aviad & MINELLI, Enrico
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:1555)
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): des jeux répétés à l'analyse "coût-bénéfice"
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2013)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:2563)
• Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1982)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:503)
• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1984)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:573)
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1985)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:663)
• A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1986)
  by Forges, F. & Mertens, J.F. & Neyman, A.
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:673)
• Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1986)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:700)
• An approach to communication equilibria
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1986)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:721)
• Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1988)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:809)
• Can sunspots replace a mediator?
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1988)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:825)
• Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:883)
• Equilibria with communication in a job market example
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:885)
• Universal mechanisms
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:914)
• Repeated games with incomplete information
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1990)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:933)
• Sunspot eqilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept
  LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1991)
  by FORGES, Françoise
  (ReDIF-paper, cor:louvrp:952)
• Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices
  Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) (1995)
  by Françoise FORGES
  (ReDIF-paper, ctl:louvre:1995014)
• Interview With Jean-François Mertens (1946–2012)
  Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press (2014)
  by Forges, Françoise
  (ReDIF-article, cup:macdyn:v:18:y:2014:i:08:p:1832-1853_00)
• Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités
  Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University (2011)
  by Biran, Omer
  (ReDIF-book, dau:thesis:123456789/7238)
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
  Econometrica, Econometric Society (1986)
  by Forges, Francoise M
  (ReDIF-article, ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:6:p:1375-85)
• Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
  Econometrica, Econometric Society (1990)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:2:p:515)
• Universal Mechanisms
  Econometrica, Econometric Society (1990)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, ecm:emetrp:v:58:y:1990:i:6:p:1341-64)
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
  Econometrica, Econometric Society (2002)
  by Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra
  (ReDIF-article, ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:5:p:1865-1892)
• Tenable Threats when Nash Equilibrium is the Norm
  Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh (2021)
  by Francoise Forges & Jozsef Sakovics
  (ReDIF-paper, edn:esedps:301)
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
  Economics Letters, Elsevier (2015)
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:167-170)
• A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting
  Economics Letters, Elsevier (1986)
  by Forges, F. & Mertens, J. F. & Neyman, A.
  (ReDIF-article, eee:ecolet:v:20:y:1986:i:1:p:7-7)
• A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
  Economics Letters, Elsevier (1994)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:ecolet:v:46:y:1994:i:1:p:27-31)
• Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum
  Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier (1992)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-chapter, eee:gamchp:1-06)
• A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
  Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1997)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
  (ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:159-175)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games
  Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1998)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
  (ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:292-310)
• Posterior Efficiency
  Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1994)
  by Forges Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:238-261)
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
  Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2011)
  by Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:52-64)
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
  Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2013)
  by Forges, Françoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:gamebe:v:78:y:2013:i:c:p:64-71)
• Long persuasion games
  Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2008)
  by Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric
  (ReDIF-article, eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:1-35)
• Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
  Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2009)
  by Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico
  (ReDIF-article, eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:135-145)
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
  Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2015)
  by Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:70-104)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations
  Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (1997)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
  (ReDIF-article, eee:jetheo:v:75:y:1997:i:2:p:388-406)
• A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core
  Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2001)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico
  (ReDIF-article, eee:jetheo:v:98:y:2001:i:1:p:179-188)
• Can sunspots replace a mediator?
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (1988)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:17:y:1988:i:4:p:347-368)
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2002)
  by Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:1-41)
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2005)
  by Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:41:y:2005:i:7:p:793-811)
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2011)
  by Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:760-767)
• Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2014)
  by Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:54:y:2014:i:c:p:1-6)
• Sender–receiver games with cooperation
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2018)
  by Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich
  (ReDIF-article, eee:mateco:v:76:y:2018:i:c:p:52-61)
• The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
  Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2004)
  by Forges, Francoise
  (ReDIF-article, eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:135-151)
• The Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2000)
  by F. Forges & J. F. Mertens & R. Vohra
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2000-34)
• Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2002)
  by F. Forges & B. von Stengel
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2002-05)
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2002)
  by F. Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2002-07)
• Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2003)
  by F. Forges & Frederic Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2003-10)
• Long Persuasion Games
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2006)
  by Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2006-01)
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification)
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2006)
  by Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2006-04)
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2006)
  by Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:2006-14)
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1996)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:96-05)
• Rational Choice in Strategic Environments : Further Observations
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1996)
  by O. De Wolf & F. Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:96-23)
• Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1996)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:96-24)
• Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1998)
  by F. Forges.
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:98-10)
• Le cœur d'une économie d'échange en information asymétrique
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1998)
  by F. Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:98-29)
• A note on the incentive compatible core
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1999)
  by F. Forges & E. Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:99-02)
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
  THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (1999)
  by F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ema:worpap:99-06)
• Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
  Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2010)
  by Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach
  (ReDIF-paper, fem:femwpa:2010.119)
• Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1995)
  by Forges,F. & Minelli,E.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:9518)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1996)
  by Forges, F. & Minelli, E.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:9605)
• Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1996)
  by Forges, F. & Minelli, E.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:9624)
• Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1998)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:9810)
• Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1998)
  by Forges, F.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:9829)
• Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics
  Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. (1999)
  by Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:pnegmi:99-06)
• Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies
  Papers, Tel Aviv (1999)
  by Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E.
  (ReDIF-paper, fth:teavfo:34-99)
• Long persuasion games
  Post-Print, HAL (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360719)
• Afriat's theorem for generalized budget sets
  Post-Print, HAL (2009)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360726)
• Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity
  Post-Print, HAL (2008)
  by Francoise Forges & Bernhard von Stengel
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360729)
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types
  Post-Print, HAL (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360739)
• Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs
  Post-Print, HAL (2007)
  by Francoise Forges & Riham Barbar
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360742)
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
  Post-Print, HAL (2006)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360743)
• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
  Post-Print, HAL (2006)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360744)
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
  Post-Print, HAL (2008)
  by Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00360746)
• Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
  Post-Print, HAL (2011)
  by Omer Biran & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00632260)
• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
  Post-Print, HAL (2011)
  by Francoise Forges & Ram Orzach
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00659016)
• Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Francoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-00822561)
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
  Post-Print, HAL (2015)
  by Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01252921)
• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
  Post-Print, HAL (2015)
  by Eliaz Kfir & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01252926)
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01252953)
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Vida Peter & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01252955)
• Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”
  Post-Print, HAL (2014)
  by Enrico Minelli & Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01519845)
• Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01519884)
• J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice"
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01519888)
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
  Post-Print, HAL (2008)
  by Françoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-01869115)
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
  Post-Print, HAL (2016)
  by Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02276751)
• Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes
  Post-Print, HAL (2007)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02276813)
• Sender-receiver games with cooperation
  Post-Print, HAL (2018)
  by Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02313962)
• Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques
  Post-Print, HAL (2017)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02315008)
• Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion
  Post-Print, HAL (2019)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02315317)
• Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games
  Post-Print, HAL (2012)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02447604)
• Games and Incentives
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Françoise Forges & Johannes Horner
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:hal-02455043)
• Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization
  Post-Print, HAL (2013)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:halshs-00727806)
• Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods
  Post-Print, HAL (2014)
  by Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:journl:halshs-00870052)
• Long persuasion games
  PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:pseptp:hal-00360719)
• Multistage communication with and without verifiable types
  PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:pseptp:hal-00360739)
• Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification
  PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL (2008)
  by Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:pseptp:hal-00360746)
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
  Working Papers, HAL (2014)
  by Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:wpaper:hal-00803919)
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
  Working Papers, HAL (2014)
  by Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
  (ReDIF-paper, hal:wpaper:hal-01094061)
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems
  Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales (2011)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
  (ReDIF-paper, imd:wpaper:wp2011-14)
• Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:13:y:1988:i:2:p:191-231 (article)
• Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:33:y:2008:i:4:p:1002-1022 (article)
• Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited
  Theory and Decision, Springer (2006)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:329-344)
• Trading Games With Asymmetric Information
  Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (1990)
  by Francoise Forges
  (ReDIF-paper, nwu:cmsems:880)
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College (1990)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:2:p:375-398.)
• Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization
  MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2012)
  by Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent
  (ReDIF-paper, pra:mprapa:36519)
• Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation
  Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition (2017)
  by Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich
  (ReDIF-paper, rco:dpaper:17)
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
  Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) (2001)
  by Aviad Heifetz & Françoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
  (ReDIF-article, spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:349-365)
• Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium
  Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) (1995)
  by Forges, Francoise & Peck, James
  (ReDIF-article, spr:joecth:v:5:y:1995:i:1:p:33-50)
• Essential data, budget sets and rationalization
  Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) (2013)
  by Françoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé
  (ReDIF-article, spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:449-461)
• Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
  International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society (2016)
  by Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon
  (ReDIF-article, spr:jogath:v:45:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0520-8)
• Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments
  Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2006)
  by Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:2:p:403-419)
• Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
  Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society (2013)
  by , & ,
  (ReDIF-article, the:publsh:944)
• Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets
  Working Papers, University of Brescia, Department of Economics (2006)
  by Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli
  (ReDIF-paper, ubs:wpaper:ubs0609)
• Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types
  International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. (2008)
  by Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges
  (ReDIF-article, wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:n:s0219198908001844)
• Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems
  International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. (2013)
  by Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano
  (ReDIF-article, wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:02:n:s0219198913400094)