Pierre Fleckinger
Names
first: |
Pierre |
last: |
Fleckinger |
Identifer
Contact
email: |
pierre.fleckinger at domain minesparis.psl.eu
|
Affiliations
-
Paris School of Economics (weight: 50%)
-
Mines Paris
/ Centre d'Économie Industrielle (CERNA) (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:242-74)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_190_0095)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - 18. Information, concurrence et régulation (RePEc:cai:rcedec:rce_025_0220)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0573)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_643_0457)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier - Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners (RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_284_0493)
by Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort - Informed principal and countervailing incentives (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:94:y:2007:i:2:p:240-244)
by Fleckinger, Pierre - Energy Performance Certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: A theoretical analysis (RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:84:y:2019:i:s1:s0140988319303998)
by Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu & Tamokoué Kamga, Paul-Hervé - The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:57-66)
by Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu - Correlation and relative performance evaluation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:147:y:2012:i:1:p:93-117)
by Fleckinger, Pierre - Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:1-13)
by Fleckinger, Pierre - Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:1:p:61-68)
by Fleckinger, Pierre & Lafay, Thierry - La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00447028)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00529632)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00641861)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00641865)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Correlation and relative performance evaluation (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00670892)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Cycle (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00818339)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01693887)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - Energy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01952969)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga - Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01952988)
by Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort - The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation (RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01952992)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Wanda Mimra & Angelo Zago - Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00977587)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier - The organization of extended producer responsibility in waste policy with product differentiation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00446819)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00447028)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00529632)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00607075)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00641861)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00641865)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00641873)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Correlation and relative performance evaluation (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00670892)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Cycle (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00818339)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01693887)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952988)
by Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort - Energy Performance Certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: A theoretical analysis (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02451677)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga - Les dilemmes de la transparence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02555194)
by Romain Bizet & Pierre Fleckinger - Catalog competition in Hotelling's duopoly
[Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02662743)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Catalog competition in Hotelling's duopoly
[Concurrence en catalogue dans le duopole d'Hotelling] (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02823910)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00977587)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier - Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00607075)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00641865)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00641873)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay - Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01693887)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville - Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01952988)
by Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort - Energy Performance Certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: A theoretical analysis (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-02451677)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga - Rémunération des dirigeants et risque de fraude d'entreprise (RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00977587)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay & Constance Monnier - Controling externalities with asymmetric information : Ferrous Scrap Recycling and the Gold Rush Problem (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243017)
by Ignace Adant & Pierre Fleckinger - Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-of (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243080)
by Pierre Fleckinger - Energy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01952969)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga - The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01952992)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Wanda Mimra & Angelo Zago - Energy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis (RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2018-11)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Paul-Hervé Tamokoué Kamga - La responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2009_num_190_4_7997)
by Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant - Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127855)
by Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas - The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation (RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168283)
by Fleckinger, Pierre & Mimra, Wanda & Zago, Angelo