Lars Ehlers
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) (weight: 1%)
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Université de Montréal
/ Département de Sciences Économiques (weight: 99%)
Research profile
author of:
- Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:338-73)
by Tommy Andersson & Ágnes Cseh & Lars Ehlers & Albin Erlanson - Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:556-82)
by Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (RePEc:aub:autbar:512.02)
by Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers - Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:aub:autbar:554.02)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:aub:autbar:566.03)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (RePEc:aub:autbar:599.03)
by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers - Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets (RePEc:aub:autbar:637.04)
by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó - Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:bge:wpaper:103)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers - Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets (RePEc:bge:wpaper:147)
by Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (RePEc:bge:wpaper:15)
by Lars Ehlers & Salvador Barberà - Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation (RePEc:bge:wpaper:33)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers - An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities (RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:50-60)
by Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers - Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:167-184)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:122:y:2020:i:3:p:937-965)
by Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers - Externalities, Potential, Value And Consistency (RePEc:cde:cdewps:168)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Lars Ehlers & Anirban Kar - School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds (RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-1102298478)
by Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim - School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds (RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:925558684)
by Lars Ehlers & Isa Hafalir & Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed Yildirim - Indifference and the uniform rule (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:67:y:2000:i:3:p:303-308)
by Ehlers, Lars - Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:411-422)
by Ehlers, Lars - Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:1-27)
by Ehlers, Lars - In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:249-270)
by Ehlers, Lars - Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:1:p:103-116)
by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton - Efficient priority rules (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:372-384)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina - Sharing a river among satiable agents (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:35-50)
by Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars - Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:533-547)
by Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton - Manipulation via capacities revisited (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:302-311)
by Ehlers, Lars - Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:128-146)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina - Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:298-317)
by Ehlers, Lars - Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:408-434)
by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton - On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:106:y:2002:i:2:p:472-477)
by Ehlers, Lars - Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:114:y:2004:i:2:p:358-369)
by Ehlers, Lars - Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:123:y:2005:i:2:p:161-186)
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Deb, Rajat & Ehlers, Lars - Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:537-547)
by Ehlers, Lars - Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:587-600)
by Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi - Efficient assignment respecting priorities (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:1269-1282)
by Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek - Externalities, potential, value and consistency (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2380-2411)
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Ehlers, Lars & Kar, Anirban - Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:64-87)
by Ehlers, Lars - School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:153:y:2014:i:c:p:648-683)
by Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A. - Matching markets under (in)complete information (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:295-314)
by Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi - Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:643-671)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:393-407)
by Ehlers, Lars - Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000145)
by Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars - Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:37:y:2002:i:1:p:1-15)
by Ehlers, Lars - Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:3:p:329-339)
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia - Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:1:p:87-94)
by Ehlers, Lars & Sprumont, Yves - Oligarchies in spatial environments (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:3-4:p:250-256)
by Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton - Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:88:y:2020:i:c:p:31-41)
by Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava - Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:128:y:2024:i:c:p:10-15)
by Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Ehlers, Lars - Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:41:y:2001:i:2:p:239-250)
by Ehlers, Lars - Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:69:y:2014:i:c:p:43-49)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.116)
by Messan Agbaglah & Lars Ehlers - Sharing a river among satiable countries (RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200605)
by Ambec, S. & Ehlers, L. - Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem (RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200705)
by Ambec, S. & Ehlers, L. - Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets (RePEc:has:discpr:1818)
by Tommy Andersson & Agnes Cseh & Lars Ehlers & Albin Erlanson - Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" (RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-110)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers - En sundhedsøkonomisk analyse af antallet af røntgenundersøgelser af lænderyggen hos 20-49 årige henvist fra primærsektoren (RePEc:hhs:jdaecn:0155)
by Ehlers, Lars & Svarer, Michael & Løvschall, Claus - Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2010_016)
by Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Ehlers, Lars - Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2012_008)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_023)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_035)
by Andersson , Tommy & Ehlers, Lars - Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2015_012)
by Andersson , Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson , Lars-Gunnar - Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_018)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars - Dynamic Refugee Matching (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2018_007)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Martinello, Alessandro - Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2018_017)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Tierney, Ryan - Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2018_019)
by Andersson, Tommy & Csehz, Ágnes & Ehlers, Lars & Erlanson, Albin - Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2020_028)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2021_002)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars - Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:33:y:2008:i:2:p:327-335 (article)
- Unknown item RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:39:y:2014:i:4:p:949-966 (article)
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:47:y:2022:i:4:p:3110-3128)
by Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney - Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:lau:crdeep:12.06)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) (RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.10)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (RePEc:lau:crdeep:14.08)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs (RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.05)
by Bettina Klaus & Lars Ehlers - Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle (RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.18.324)
by Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars - Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff (RePEc:mib:wpaper:519)
by Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Lars Ehlers - On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-24)
by EHLERS, Lars - Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-25)
by EHLERS, Lars - Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-27)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-30)
by EHLERS, Lars & WEYMARK, John A. - Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments (RePEc:mtl:montde:2002-03)
by EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton - Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-13)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-14)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets (RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-15)
by EHLERS, Lars - Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-08)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems (RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-11)
by EHLERS, Lars - Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-14)
by EHLERS, Lars - Top-Cycle Rationalizability (RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-20)
by SPRUMONT, Yves & EHLERS, Lars - Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools (RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-04)
by EHLERS, Lars - Sharing a River among Satiable Countries (RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-10)
by AMBEC, Stefan & EHLERS, Lars - Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-01)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-02)
by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador - Oligarchies in Spatial Environments (RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-08)
by Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton - Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency (RePEc:mtl:montde:2008-06)
by DUTTA, Bhaskar & EHLERS, Lars & KAR, Anirban - Manipulation via Capacities Revisited (RePEc:mtl:montde:2009-03)
by EHLERS, Lars - Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2009-16)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - School Choice with Control (RePEc:mtl:montde:2010-05)
by EHLERS, Lars - Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability (RePEc:mtl:montde:2010-09)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle (RePEc:mtl:montde:2011-01)
by AMBEC, Stefan & EHLERS, Lars - Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking (RePEc:mtl:montde:2011-07)
by EHLERS, Lars & WESTKAMP, Alexander - School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds (RePEc:mtl:montde:2011-08)
by EHLERS, Lars & HAFALIR, Isa E. & YENMEZ, M. Bumin & YILDIRIM, Muhammed A. - Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods (RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-02)
by EHLERS, Lars - (Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-03)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-12)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities (RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-12)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars - Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-02)
by EHLERS, Lars - Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design (RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-05)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-10)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Continuity and incentive compatibility (RePEc:mtl:montde:2016-04)
by EHLERS, Lars & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & MISHRA, Debasis & SEN, Arunava - Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: stable maximum matchings (RePEc:mtl:montde:2016-08)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars - (Il)legal assignments in school choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2017-02)
by EHLERS, Lars & MORRILL, Thayer - Externalities and the nucleolus (RePEc:mtl:montde:2017-04)
by ALVAREZ-MOZOS, Mikel & EHLERS, Lars - Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-02)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi - Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-05)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar & TIERNEY, Ryan - Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-08)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & CSEH, Ágnes & EHLERS, Lars & ERLANSON, Albin - Dynamic refugee matching (RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-16)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & MARTINELLO, Alessandro - Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-01)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-02)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Matching Markets under (In)complete Information (RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2007)
by EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi - Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle (RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2011)
by AMBEC, Stefan & EHLERS, Lars - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (RePEc:mtl:montec:02-2007)
by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador - Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montec:02-2020)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods (RePEc:mtl:montec:03-2012)
by Lars Ehlers - Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2006)
by EHLERS, Lars - Manipulation via Capacities Revisited (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2009)
by EHLERS, Lars - (Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2012)
by Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson - Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2016)
by Lars EHLERS & Dipjyoti MAJUMDAR & Debasis MISHRA & Arunava SEN - (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2017)
by Lars EHLERS & Thayer MORRILL - Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2018)
by Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO - Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students : Stability Comparisons in School Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2020)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited (RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2014)
by Lars EHLERS - Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency (RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2008)
by DUTTA, Bhaskar & EHLERS, Lars & KAR, Anirban - House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2013)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Sharing a River among Satiable Countries (RePEc:mtl:montec:07-2006)
by AMBEC, Stefan & EHLERS, Lars - Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2005)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Externalities and the Nucleolus (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2017)
by Mikel ÁLVAREZ-MOZOS & Lars EHLERS - Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses (RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2018)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Lars-Gunnar SVENSSON & Ryan TIERNEY - Oligarchies in Spatial Environments (RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2007)
by EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton - Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking (RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2011)
by EHLERS, Lars & WESTKAMP, Alexander - Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach (RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2014)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Lars-Gunnar SVENSSON - Efficient Priority Rules (RePEc:mtl:montec:11-2003)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Organizing Time Banks : Lessons from Matching Markets (RePEc:mtl:montec:11-2018)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Ágnes CSEH & Lars EHLERS & Albin ERLANSON - Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2003)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems (RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2005)
by EHLERS, Lars - In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets (RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2003)
by EHLERS, Lars - School Choice with Control (RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2010)
by EHLERS, Lars - School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds (RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2011)
by Lars Ehlers & Isa E. Hafalir & M. Bumin Yenmez & Muhammed A. Yildirim - Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings (RePEc:mtl:montec:13-2016)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS - Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics (RePEc:mtl:montec:14-2014)
by Lars EHLERS & Bettina KLAUS - Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montec:15-2012)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities (RePEc:mtl:montec:17-2009)
by EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina - An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (RePEc:mtl:montec:17-2013)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS - Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montec:18-2005)
by EHLERS, Lars - Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability (RePEc:mtl:montec:18-2010)
by ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-24)
by Ehlers, L. - Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-25)
by Ehlers, L. - Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-27)
by Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B. - Dynamic Refugee Matching (RePEc:mtl:montec:22-2018)
by Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Alessandro MARTINELLO - Top-Cycle Rationalizability (RePEc:mtl:montec:25-2005)
by SPRUMONT, Yves & EHLERS, Lars - (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:4:p:1837-1875.)
by Lars Ehlers & Thayer Morrill - Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment (RePEc:rco:dpaper:307)
by Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars - Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:113-131)
by Lars Ehlers - Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:233-243)
by Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark - Consistent House Allocation (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:30:y:2007:i:3:p:561-574)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:3:p:505-512)
by Lars Ehlers - Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:545-560)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:281-287)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-022-00306-6)
by Lars Ehlers - Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:105-115)
by Lars Ehlers - Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:249-268)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality (RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:447-452)
by Lars Ehlers - Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:325-348)
by Lars Ehlers - Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:265-280)
by Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus - Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:559-574)
by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers - Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability (RePEc:the:publsh:1346)
by , & , & , - Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (RePEc:the:publsh:2547)
by Ehlers, Lars & Westkamp, Alexander - Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance (RePEc:the:publsh:4257)
by Dogan, Battal & Ehlers, Lars - Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2000029)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A. - Throughput rate optimization in high multiplicity sequencing problems (RePEc:unm:umamet:2001006)
by Grigoriev, A. & van de Klundert, J. - Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments, METEOR Research memorandum (RePEc:unm:umamet:2001015)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Storcken, A.J.A. - The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005007)
by Dellaert, B.G.C. & Golounov, V.Y. & Prabhu, J. - Consistent house allocation (RePEc:unm:umamet:2005008)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Klaus, B.E. - Oligarchies in spatial environments (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007042)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Storcken, A.J.A. - Arrow's theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (RePEc:unm:umamet:2007043)
by Ehlers, L.H. & Storcken, A.J.A. - Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (RePEc:van:wpaper:0113)
by Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark - Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:126:y:2016:i:593:p:884-906)
by Stefan Ambec & Lars Ehlers - On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment (RePEc:zbw:vfsc24:302429)
by Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars - Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach (RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2015207)
by Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar