Umut Mert Dur
Names
| first: |
Umut |
| middle: |
Mert |
| last: |
Dur |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
North Carolina State University
/ Poole College of Management
Research profile
author of:
- Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:164-85)
by Umut Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Fei Song & Tayfun Sönmez - Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms (RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:10:y:2018:i:1:p:187-213)
by Umut Dur & Robert G. Hammond & Thayer Morrill - Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise (RePEc:arx:papers:2205.00032)
by Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Umut Dur & A. Arda Gitmez & Ozgur Y{i}lmaz - Responsiveness to priority‐based affirmative action policy in school choice (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:25:y:2023:i:2:p:229-244)
by Umut Dur & Yifan Xie - Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible? (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:125:y:2023:i:2:p:321-338)
by Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur - Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools (RePEc:boc:bocoec:1050)
by Julien Combe & Umut Mert Dur & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier & M. Utku Ünver - Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange (RePEc:boc:bocoec:815)
by Umut Mert Dur & M. Utku Ünver - Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools (RePEc:boc:bocoec:906)
by Umut Mert Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez - Turkiye'de Kredi Karti Sektorunde Yasal Duzenlemeler ve Rekabet (RePEc:bou:wpaper:2007/06)
by Ahmet Faruk Aysan & Umut Dur & Gazi I. Kara & Ahmet N. Muslim & Levent Yildiran - Many-to-one matchings without substitutability (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:123-126)
by Dur, Umut & Ikizler, Devrim - Incompatibility between stability and consistency (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:135-137)
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut Mert - Competitive equilibria in school assignment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:269-274)
by Dur, Umut & Morrill, Thayer - What you don't know can help you in school assignment (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:246-256)
by Dur, Umut Mert & Morrill, Thayer - Capacity design in school choice (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:277-291)
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut & Van der Linden, Martin - Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:187:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118302801)
by Dur, Umut & Pathak, Parag A. & Sönmez, Tayfun - Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001617)
by Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur - Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:109:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823001003)
by Dur, Umut & Zhang, Yanning - When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful? (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:16-24)
by Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert - School choice with neighbors (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:p:101-109)
by Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas - The modified Boston mechanism (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:101:y:2019:i:c:p:31-40)
by Dur, Umut Mert - Rawlsian Matching (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:101-106)
by Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut - Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:34-41)
by Almeer, Abdullah & Dur, Umut & Harris, Will & Hauser, Greg & Phan, William & Zhang, Yanning - A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:129:y:2024:i:c:p:93-100)
by Dur, Umut & Paiement, Scott - School Choice with Hybrid Schedules (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:37-:d:543124)
by Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur & William Harris - Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools (RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2018_039)
by Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten, Onur - The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:22:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-018-9594-z)
by Umut Dur & Robert G. Hammond & Thayer Morrill - Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1508)
by Umut Mert Dur & M. Utku Unver - The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18981)
by Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez - Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22109)
by Umut Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez - Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25024)
by Umut M. Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Fei Song & Tayfun Sönmez - School Assignment by Match Quality (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28512)
by Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Umut M. Dur & Aram Grigoryan - A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem (RePEc:pra:mprapa:41366)
by Dur, Umut - Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1133-9)
by Umut Dur & Onur Kesten - Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01252-4)
by Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Mert Dur - School choice under partial fairness (RePEc:the:publsh:2482)
by Dur, Umut & Gitmez, A. Arda & Yılmaz, Özgür - Family ties: school assignment with siblings (RePEc:the:publsh:4086)
by Dur, Umut & Morrill, Thayer & Phan, William - Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/699974)
by Umut Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez - Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/701358)
by Umut Mert Dur & M. Utku Ünver