Battal Doğan
Names
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Battal |
| last: |
Dogan |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Bristol
/ School of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:4:p:1362-64)
by Battal Doğan - Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:556-82)
by Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers - Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints (RePEc:arx:papers:1910.13237)
by Battal Dogan & Serhat Dogan & Kemal Yildiz - Mechanism Design Approach to School Choice: One versus Many (RePEc:arx:papers:2104.08485)
by Battal Dogan - Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:1:p:172-196)
by Battal Doğan & Serhat Doğan & Kemal Yıldız - When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment? (RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/704)
by Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez - Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago (RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/705)
by Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez - Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:8-12)
by Cho, Wonki Jo & Doğan, Battal - Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:366-373)
by Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin - Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:47-58)
by Doğan, Battal & Yıldız, Kemal - Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:165-171)
by Doğan, Battal - Responsive affirmative action in school choice (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:165:y:2016:i:c:p:69-105)
by Doğan, Battal - A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:178-200)
by Doğan, Battal & Doğan, Serhat & Yıldız, Kemal - Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:73:y:2017:i:c:p:103-110)
by Doğan, Battal - Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:79:y:2018:i:c:p:140-156)
by Doğan, Battal & Klaus, Bettina - Choice with Affirmative Action (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:4:p:2284-2296)
by Battal Doğan & Kemal Yildiz - On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules (RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:46:y:2021:i:3:p:856-868)
by Battal Doğan & Serhat Doğan & Kemal Yıldız - Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice (RePEc:lau:crdeep:15.02)
by Battal Dogan - Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.15)
by Battal Dogan & Bettina Klaus - How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment (RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.21)
by Battal Dogan - Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.02)
by Battal Dogan & Serhat Dogan & Kemal Yildiz - Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago (RePEc:lau:crdeep:17.10)
by Battal Dogan & Bumin Yenmez - Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-01)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice (RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-02)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (RePEc:mtl:montec:02-2020)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students : Stability Comparisons in School Choice (RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2020)
by Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers - Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism (RePEc:spr:etbull:v:8:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-019-00172-6)
by Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez - When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:76:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01488-y)
by Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez - Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0562-6)
by Wonki Jo Cho & Battal Doğan - Maskin-monotonic scoring rules (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:2:p:423-432)
by Battal Doğan & Semih Koray - Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance (RePEc:the:publsh:4257)
by Dogan, Battal & Ehlers, Lars