Laura Doval
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Identifer
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Affiliations
-
Columbia University
/ Graduate School of Business
Research profile
author of:
- Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment (repec:arx:papers:1811.03579)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta - Constrained Information Design (repec:arx:papers:1811.03588)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta - Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (repec:arx:papers:1904.07456)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta - Dynamically Stable Matching (repec:arx:papers:1906.11391)
by Laura Doval - Purchase history and product personalization (repec:arx:papers:2103.11504)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta - Persuasion and Welfare (repec:arx:papers:2109.03061)
by Laura Doval & Alex Smolin - The Core of Bayesian Persuasion (repec:arx:papers:2307.13849)
by Laura Doval & Ran Eilat - Managing Congestion in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Online Rentals (repec:arx:papers:2308.14703)
by Caterina Calsamiglia & Laura Doval & Alejandro Robinson-Cort'es & Matthew Shum - Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets (repec:arx:papers:2407.04857)
by Laura Doval & Pablo Schenone - Local hedging approximately solves Pandora's box problems with nonobligatory inspection (repec:arx:papers:2410.19011)
by Ziv Scully & Laura Doval - Social Learning in Lung Transplant Decision (repec:arx:papers:2411.10584)
by Laura Doval & Federico Echenique Wanying Huang & Yi Xin - Revealed Information (repec:arx:papers:2411.13293)
by Laura Doval & Ran Eilat & Tianhao Liu & Yangfan Zhou - Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (repec:cpr:ceprdp:13967)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura - The Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides (repec:cpr:ceprdp:14666)
by Kastl, Jakub & Buchholz, Nicholas & Doval, Laura & Matějka, Filip & Salz, Tobias - Purchase history and product personalization (repec:cpr:ceprdp:15969)
by Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura - Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective (repec:cpr:ceprdp:16543)
by Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura - Persuasion and Welfare (repec:cpr:ceprdp:18104)
by Doval, Laura & Smolin, Alex - Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments (repec:eee:eecrev:v:167:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001065)
by Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki - On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets (repec:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:106-130)
by Doval, Laura & Szentes, Balázs - Whether or not to open Pandora's box (repec:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:127-158)
by Doval, Laura - Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets (repec:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:114-127)
by Doval, Laura & Schenone, Pablo - Persuasion and Welfare (repec:hal:journl:hal-04865537)
by Laura Doval & Alexey Smolin - Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides (repec:nbr:nberwo:27087)
by Nicholas Buchholz & Laura Doval & Jakub Kastl & Filip Matějka & Tobias Salz - Whether or not to open Pandora's box (repec:nwu:cmsems:1574)
by Laura Doval - The Value of Time: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides (repec:pri:econom:2022-22)
by Nicholas Buchholz & Laura Doval & Jakub Kastl & Filip Matejka & Tobias Salz - Dynamically stable matching (repec:the:publsh:4187)
by Doval, Laura - Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good (repec:the:publsh:4485)
by Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki - Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective (repec:tse:wpaper:125927)
by Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura - Persuasion and Welfare (repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/729067)
by Laura Doval & Alex Smolin - Sequential Information Design (repec:wly:emetrp:v:88:y:2020:i:6:p:2575-2608)
by Laura Doval & Jeffrey C. Ely - Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment (repec:wly:emetrp:v:90:y:2022:i:4:p:1463-1500)
by Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta - Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence From Auctioned Cab Rides (repec:wly:emetrp:v:93:y:2025:i:3:p:929-958)
by Nicholas Buchholz & Laura Doval & Jakub Kastl & Filip Matejka & Tobias Salz