Aart de Zeeuw

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Affiliations

• Universiteit van Tilburg / School of Economics and Management / CentER Graduate School for Economics and Business
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Optimal Management with Potential Regime Shifts (RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:10-10)
  by De Zeeuw, A. & Polasky, S. & Wagener, F.O.O.
• The Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements in the case of Stock Pollution (RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:11-02)
  by De Zeeuw, A. & Polasky, S. & Wagener, F.O.O.
• On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (RePEc:aue:wpaper:1010)
  by George Kossioris & Michael Plexousakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw
• Optimal Management with Potential Regime Shifts (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3237)
  by Stephen Polasky & Aart de Zeeuw & Florian Wagener
• Regime Shifts and Uncertainty in Pollution Control (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3697)
  by Aart de Zeeuw & Amos Zemel
• Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control (RePEc:cor:louvco:1998032)
  by GERMAIN, Marc & TOINT, Philippe & TULKENS, Henry & DE ZEEUW, Aart
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Competitive Model of Arms Accumulation (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:206)
  by de Zeeuw, Aart J. & van der Ploeg, Frederick
• Stabilité stratégique et pollution-stock transnationale : le cas linéaire (RePEc:ctl:louvir:1997001)
  by Germain, Marc & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart
• ‘Key issues for attention from ecological economists’: a comment (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:13:y:2008:i:01:p:21-24_00)
  by De Zeeuw, Aart
• Asymmetries in international environmental agreements (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:18:y:2013:i:01:p:51-68_00)
  by Pavlova, Yulia & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems: modeling and policy implications (RePEc:cup:endeec:v:18:y:2013:i:02:p:111-132_00)
  by Levin, Simon & Xepapadeas, Tasos & Crépin, Anne-Sophie & Norberg, Jon & de Zeeuw, Aart & Folke, Carl & Hughes, Terry & Arrow, Kenneth & Barrett, Scott & Daily, Gretchen & Ehrlich, Paul & Kautsky, Nils
• Note on the Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel versus Fringe Model (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:102:y:1992:i:415:p:1478-84)
  by Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart
• On expectations, information and dynamic game equilibria (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:10:y:1986:i:1-2:p:63-66)
  by Meijdam, A. C. & de Zeeuw, A. J.
• Note on 'Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism' (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:16:y:1992:i:1:p:139-145)
  by de Zeeuw, Aart
• Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:25:y:2001:i:10:p:1665-1687)
  by Feenstra, Talitha & Kort, Peter M. & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:28:y:2003:i:1:p:79-99)
  by Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:28:y:2003:i:2:p:287-306)
  by Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:4:p:1312-1331)
  by Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A. & Mäler, K.-G.
• On the optimal taxation of common-pool resources (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:11:p:1868-1879)
  by Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A.
• Regime shifts and uncertainty in pollution control (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:7:p:939-950)
  by de Zeeuw, Aart & Zemel, Amos
• Control, coordination and conflict on international commodity markets (RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:8:y:1991:i:1:p:90-101)
  by van Groenendaal, Willem & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Regime shifts and management (RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:84:y:2012:i:c:p:15-22)
  by Crépin, Anne-Sophie & Biggs, Reinette & Polasky, Stephen & Troell, Max & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Consistency of conjectures and reactions? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:24:y:1987:i:2:p:181-185)
  by De Zeeuw, Aart J. & Van Der Ploeg, Frederick
• The repeated lake game (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:76:y:2002:i:1:p:109-114)
  by Brock, William A. & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Do causes of environmental problems affect Hicksian equivalent surplus? Evidence from the field (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:85:y:2004:i:2:p:157-162)
  by Bulte, Erwin H. & Gerking, Shelby & List, John A. & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Changing incentives for economic research in the Netherlands (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:35:y:1991:i:2-3:p:603-611)
  by Kapteyn, Arie & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs.-fringe model (RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:22:y:2000:i:2:p:209-223)
  by Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Environmental Policy and Competitiveness: The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:37:y:1999:i:2:p:165-182)
  by Xepapadeas, Anastasios & de Zeeuw, Aart
• The effect of varying the causes of environmental problems on stated WTP values: evidence from a field study (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:330-342)
  by Bulte, Erwin & Gerking, Shelby & List, John A. & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:55:y:2008:i:2:p:163-174)
  by de Zeeuw, Aart
• Optimal management with potential regime shifts (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:229-240)
  by Polasky, Stephen & de Zeeuw, Aart & Wagener, Florian
• Climate Policy and Catastrophic Change: Be Prepared and Avert Risk (RePEc:eus:ce3swp:0213)
  by Frederick van der Ploeg & Aart de Zeeuw
• Do causes of environmental problems affect hicksian equivalent surplus? Evidence from the field (RePEc:feb:framed:00133)
  by Erwin Bulte & Aart de Zeeuw & Shelby Gerking & John List
• The effect of varying the causes of environmental problems on stated wtp values: Evidence from a field study (RePEc:feb:framed:00134)
  by Erwin Bulte & Aart de Zeeuw & Shelby Gerking & John List
• Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.41)
  by Aart de Zeeuw
• On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.101)
  by Georgios Kossioris & Michael Plexousakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw
• Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.07)
  by Michael Hoel & Aart de Zeeuw
• Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly (RePEc:fth:teavsa:45-95)
  by Fershtman,C. & de Zeeuw,A.
• International Aspects Of Pollution Control (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9065)
  by Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J.
• Comment on "Nash and Stackelberg Solutions in a Differential Game Model of Capitalism" (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9139)
  by De Zeeuw, A.
• Capital Accumulation and Entry Deterrence: A Clariying Note (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9141)
  by Fershtman, C. & De Zeeuw, A.
• Strategic Bargaining for the Control of Dynamic System in State-Space Form (RePEc:fth:tilbur:9236)
  by Houba, H. & De Zeeuw, A.
• General Resilience to Cope with Extreme Events (RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:4:y:2012:i:12:p:3248-3259:d:21829)
  by Stephen R. Carpenter & Kenneth J. Arrow & Scott Barrett & Reinette Biggs & William A. Brock & Anne-Sophie Crépin & Gustav Engström & Carl Folke & Terry P. Hughes & Nils Kautsky & Chuan-Zhong Li & Geof
• Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries (RePEc:hhs:osloec:2013_002)
  by Hoel, Michael & de Zeeuw, Aart
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:31:y:1990:i:1:p:131-46)
  by van der Ploeg, F & de Zeeuw, A J
• The Acid Rain Differential Game (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:12:y:1998:i:2:p:167-184)
  by Karl-Göran Mäler & Aart De Zeeuw
• The Economics of Shallow Lakes (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:26:y:2003:i:4:p:603-624)
  by Karl-Göran Mäler & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw
• Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements? (RePEc:kap:enreec:v:47:y:2010:i:3:p:395-406)
  by Michael Hoel & Aart Zeeuw
• Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements? (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15043)
  by Michael Hoel & Aart de Zeeuw
• International Agricultural Trade Negotiations under GATT/WTO: Experiences, Future Challenges and Possible Outcomes (RePEc:oup:erevae:v:24:y:1997:i:3-4:p:470-79)
  by de Zeeuw, Aart
• Difference Games and Policy Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework (RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:4:p:612-36)
  by de Zeeuw, A J & van der Ploeg, F
• Stabilité stratégique en matière de pollution internationale avec effet de stock. Le cas linéaire (RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_6_410049)
  by Marc Germain & Henry Tulkens & Aart de Zeeuw
• Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:0cf028c6-1985-4fc8-a111-e30df243b7eb)
  by Houba, H.E.D. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Comment on "Nash and Stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism" (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:12ad6019-a601-4b91-bcb1-763fafae47cf)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:22773d9c-cb37-4646-bed9-f3f3e5061ffc)
  by Fershtman, C. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• International aspects of pollution control (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2a1900cf-0e05-459e-8c68-a6d932c3305c)
  by van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Environmental Policy and Competitiveness : The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:574efb6e-556c-43af-b12e-2b1e231e7293)
  by Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Capital accumulation and entry deterrence : A clarifying note (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:58bf298e-04fe-4c69-b469-47c63b3a1fbd)
  by Fershtman, C. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Theory of natural exhaustible resources : The cartel-versus-fringe model reconsidered (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:7090dd76-6edc-48cc-9e7d-72b659726b82)
  by Groot, F. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Corporate tax rate policy and public and private employment (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:753757a1-88d6-4887-a9ec-82326e032af9)
  by Gradus, R.H.J.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• The Economics of Shallow Lakes (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:77912e04-373f-4bd4-a1b9-bc223bb330b2)
  by Mäler, K-G. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Environmental Policy in an International Duopoly : An Analysis of Feedback Investment Strategies (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:aa85bfe9-4670-4386-8154-e8f0fe5eb97c)
  by Feenstra, T.L. & Kort, P.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b04300ed-fa0f-4797-b2f6-951613a08cdb)
  by van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Strong Time-Consistency in the Cartel-versus-Fringe Model (RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d6fb278a-1af5-4097-ae40-78511b16f527)
  by Groot, A.M. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• On expectations, information and dynamic game equilibria (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:3d7dc261-2540-44fe-8bd8-f0c642f2ef26)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J. & Meijdam, A.C.
• Control, coordination and conflict on international commodity markets (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:3e2cadf3-da4f-4a07-8968-dfe64c16b4e9)
  by van Groenendaal, W.J.H. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Stackelberg solutions in macroeconometric policy models with a decentralized decision structure I (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:5b1ad24c-a9e4-4509-831b-133ec96485f3)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:6a60ef8b-7c1f-46b4-b861-da51db9dbca5)
  by van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Consistency of conjectures and reactions : A critique (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:70923318-c980-497f-9f1f-3e726069f166)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J. & van der Ploeg, F.
• Non-cooperative strategies for dynamic policy games and the problem of time inconsistency : A comment (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:932c07e6-6331-41c4-902e-0081f359be00)
  by van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Pareto optimality and incentives to cooperate in linear quadratic difference games (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:a835296a-0e5b-4275-96d3-64b03bab6795)
  by Plasmans, J.E.J. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Inflation and reputation : Comment (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:a9101904-a8f8-4544-8fe6-a6688a72ee2c)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Changing incentives for economic research in the Netherlands (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:b3f2af74-731b-4c86-bcb6-faaabc6da7b2)
  by Kapteyn, A.J. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Two notes on Nash and information (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:b6f4055c-10e5-4c48-9633-5f465c0e3baf)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J.
• From structural form to state-space form (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:c16dcc39-3584-4808-b7ec-b87ed1c89d01)
  by Merbis, M.D. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Difference games and policy evaluation : A conceptual framework (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:d3e835ac-299c-4455-a358-832f2bda71ac)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J. & van der Ploeg, F.
• Hierarchical decentralized optimal control in econometric policy models (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:d48b0177-024b-4275-8078-575bbf5ff5af)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J.
• Conflict over arms accumulation in market and command economies (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:e452393c-226d-4b27-a5ab-bd26189ca477)
  by van der Ploeg, F. & de Zeeuw, A.J.
• On credible optimal tax rate policies (RePEc:tiu:tiurem:e63248ed-f9ca-47e9-8ce4-d917e4f1ecf5)
  by de Zeeuw, A.J. & Groot, F. & Withagen, C.A.A.M.