Tijmen R. Daniëls
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author of:
- Unknown item RePEc:dnb:dnbocs:1405 (paper)
- Unknown item RePEc:dnb:dnbocs:1503 (paper)
- Pure strategy dominance with quasiconcave utility functions (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70023)
by Tijmen Daniëls - Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:62:y:2013:i:c:p:41-57)
by Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Dönges, Jutta & Heinemann, Frank - Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:85:y:2011:i:1:p:14-24)
by Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc - Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2620-2637)
by Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank - Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:749-754)
by Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. - Defending Against Speculative Attacks (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2009-011)
by Tijmen Daniëls & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen - Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-008)
by Christian Basteck & Tijmen R. Daniëls & Frank Heinemann - Every Symmetric 3 x 3 Global Game of Strategic Complementarities Is Noise Independent (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-061)
by Christian Basteck & Tijmen R. Daniëls - Crossing Network versus Dealer Market: Unique Equilibrium in the Allocation of Order Flow (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-007)
by Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann & Tijmen R. Daniëls - Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks (RePEc:kap:decono:v:157:y:2009:i:4:p:417-439)
by Tijmen Daniëls - Defending against Speculative Attacks (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080090)
by Tijmen R. Daniels & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen - Defending against speculative attacks (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2009-011)
by Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc - Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2010-008)
by Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank - Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2010-061)
by Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. - Crossing network versus dealer market: Unique equilibrium in the allocation of order flow (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2013-007)
by Dönges, Jutta & Heinemann, Frank & Daniëls, Tijmen R.