Peter Cramton
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Affiliations
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Universität zu Köln
/ Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
/ Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar (weight: 50%)
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University of Maryland
/ Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Implementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:418-24)
by Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & John Shim - Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:1:p:100-121)
by Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S - A Review of Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program by A. Denny Ellerman, Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Juan-Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey (RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:38:y:2000:i:3:p:627-633)
by Peter Cramton - Global Climate Games: How Pricing and a Green Fund Foster Cooperation (RePEc:aen:eeepjl:1_2_a09)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Capacity Market Fundamentals (RePEc:aen:eeepjl:2_2_a02)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft - An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation (RePEc:aen:eeepjl:eeep4-2-cramton)
by Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft - Symposium on "International Climate Negotiations" - Introduction (RePEc:aen:eeepjl:eeep4-2-introduction)
by Peter Cramton, Axel, Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft - Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia (RePEc:ags:aareaj:162006)
by Betz, Regina & Seifert, Stefan & Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi - Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia (RePEc:ags:eerhrr:94878)
by Betz, Regina & Seifert, Stefan & Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi - Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (RePEc:ags:rffdps:10668)
by Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi - Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather (RePEc:ags:umdrwp:197846)
by Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi - Fostering Resiliency with Good Market Design: Lessons from Texas (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:145)
by Peter Cramton - Flow Trading (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:146)
by Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec - Local Flexibility Market (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:182)
by Peter Cramton - Electricity Markets in Transition: A Multi-Decade Micro-Model of Entry and Exit in Advanced Wholesale Markets (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:183)
by Peter Cramton & Emmanuele Bobbio & David Malec & Pat Sujarittanonta - Resilient Electricity Requires Consumer Engagement (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:184)
by Emmanuele Bobbio & Simon Brandkamp & Stephanie Chan & Peter Cramton & David Malec & Lucy Yu - Price Responsive Demand in Britain's Electricity Market (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:185)
by Emmanuele Bobbio & Simon Brandkamp & Stephanie Chan & Peter Cramton & David Malec & Lucy Yu - It is Time to Auction Slots at Congested Airports (RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:013)
by Martin Bichler & Peter Cramton & Peter Gritzmann & Axel Ockenfels - Toward an EU Gas-Purchasing Cartel (RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:033)
by Peter Cramton & François Lévêque & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft - Germany's Electricity Market Reform Should Harness the Power of Efficient Spot and Forward Trade to Foster Innovation, Investment, and Resiliency (RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:062)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels - Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia (RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:219-238)
by Regina Betz & Stefan Seifert & Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - Designed To Fail: The Medicare Auction For Durable Medical Equipment (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:469-485)
by Peter Cramton & Sean Ellermeyer & Brett Katzman - Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:4:y:1995:i:2:p:267-343)
by Cramton, Peter C - Unknown item RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:4:y:1995:i:2:p:267-343:a (article)
- The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:3:p:431-495)
by Peter Cramton - Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:3:p:497-527)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan - Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.1:y:2002:i:1:n:11)
by Cramton Peter & Schwartz Jesse A - Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:5:y:2008:i:5:n:5)
by Ausubel Lawrence M & Cramton Peter - No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:6:y:2009:i:2:n:2)
by Ausubel Lawrence M & Cramton Peter - Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:6:y:2009:i:3:n:2)
by Ausubel Lawrence M & Cramton Peter - Price Is a Better Climate Commitment (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:7:y:2010:i:1:n:3)
by Cramton Peter & Stoft Steven - Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:7:y:2010:i:4:n:8)
by Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E - Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:8:y:2011:i:2:n:7)
by Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E. - How to Fix the Inefficiency of Global Cap and Trade (RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:9:y:2012:i:1:n:9)
by Cramton Peter & Stoft Steven - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs (RePEc:clt:sswopa:619)
by Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:clt:sswopa:731)
by Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R. - Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice (RePEc:cup:buetqu:v:1:y:1991:i:02:p:135-167_00)
by Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C. - Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics (RePEc:cup:buetqu:v:3:y:1993:i:04:p:359-394_00)
by Cramton, Peter C. & Dees, J. Gregory - Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler1 (RePEc:cup:buetqu:v:5:y:1995:i:04:p:823-832_01)
by Dees, J. Gregory & Cramton, Peter C. - Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:3:p:615-32)
by Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul - Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1210)
by Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz - Ascending auctions (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:745-756)
by Cramton, Peter - Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather (RePEc:eee:enepol:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:333-345)
by Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi - Bargaining with incomplete information (RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-50)
by Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter & Deneckere, Raymond J. - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:2:p:255-283)
by Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R. - Improving the cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program: A laboratory study (RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:108:y:2021:i:c:s009506962100022x)
by Cramton, Peter & Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel & Iovanna, Richard & López-Vargas, Kristian & Wallander, Steven - Using auctions to divest generation assets (RePEc:eee:jelect:v:10:y:1997:i:10:p:22-31)
by Cameron, Lisa J. & Cramton, Peter & Wilson, Robert - The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM (RePEc:eee:jelect:v:12:y:1999:i:3:p:71-81)
by Cameron, Lisa & Cramton, Peter - Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond (RePEc:eee:jelect:v:14:y:2001:i:6:p:70-79)
by Kahn, Alfred E. & Cramton, Peter C. & Porter, Robert H. & Tabors, Richard D. - A Capacity Market that Makes Sense (RePEc:eee:jelect:v:18:y:2005:i:7:p:43-54)
by Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven - Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets (RePEc:eee:jelect:v:20:y:2007:i:1:p:26-37)
by Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven - Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market power, more efficiency (RePEc:eee:juipol:v:16:y:2008:i:3:p:194-201)
by Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven - Using forward markets to improve electricity market design (RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:195-200)
by Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter - Virtual power plant auctions (RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:201-208)
by Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter - The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35 (RePEc:eee:telpol:v:32:y::i:3-4:p:273-290)
by Cramton, Peter & Ingraham, Allan T. & Singer, Hal J. - Open access wireless markets (RePEc:eee:telpol:v:41:y:2017:i:5:p:379-390)
by Cramton, Peter & Doyle, Linda - An open-access market for global communications (RePEc:eee:telpol:v:48:y:2024:i:9:s0308596124001174)
by Cramton, Peter & Bohlin, Erik & Brandkamp, Simon & Dark, Jason & Hoy, Darrell & Kyle, Albert S. & Malec, David & Ockenfels, Axel & Wilkens, Chris - Bringing the efficiency of electricity market mechanisms to multimodal mobility across congested transportation systems (RePEc:eee:transa:v:131:y:2020:i:c:p:58-69)
by Beheshtian, Arash & Richard Geddes, R. & Rouhani, Omid M. & Kockelman, Kara M. & Ockenfels, Axel & Cramton, Peter & Do, Wooseok - Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia (RePEc:een:eenhrr:0929)
by Regina Betz & Stefan Seifert & Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - Market Design, Human Behavior and Management (RePEc:feb:artefa:00685)
by Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John List & Axel Ockenfels - ESOP fables: the impact of employee stock ownership plans on labor disputes (RePEc:fip:fednsr:347)
by Peter Cramton & Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:31:y:1990:i:1:p:17-47)
by Cramton, Peter C & Palfrey, Thomas R - Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction (RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:40-57)
by Peter Cramton & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:37:y:1991:i:10:p:1221-1233)
by Peter C. Cramton - Erratum: "Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs" (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:39:y:1993:i:2:p:253-253)
by Peter C. Cramton - Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:67:y:2021:i:9:p:5317-5348)
by Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels - Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:60:y:2012:i:3:p:588-603)
by Robert W. Day & Peter Cramton - Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:2:p:309-322)
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:kap:regeco:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:229-52)
by Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A - Spectrum Auction Design (RePEc:kap:revind:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:161-190)
by Peter Cramton - The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity with Special Attention to the CAISO’s Resource Adequacy Problem (RePEc:mee:wpaper:0607)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Using Technology to Eliminate Traffic Congestion (RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2019-0012)
by Peter Cramton & R. Richard Geddes & Axel Ockenfels - Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (RePEc:mit:worpap:406)
by Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer - Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262033429)
by None - Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262514133)
by None - Price carbon — I will if you will (RePEc:nat:nature:v:526:y:2015:i:7573:d:10.1038_526315a)
by David J. C. MacKay & Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft - Set road charges in real time to ease traffic (RePEc:nat:nature:v:560:y:2018:i:7716:d:10.1038_d41586-018-05836-0)
by Peter Cramton & R. Richard Geddes & Axel Ockenfels - Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed (RePEc:nat:nature:v:582:y:2020:i:7812:d:10.1038_d41586-020-01750-6)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth & Robert B. Wilson - Innovation and Market Design (RePEc:nbr:nberch:8186)
by Peter Cramton - Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26873)
by Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels - Flow Trading (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31098)
by Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec - The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5105)
by Peter C. Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph S. Tracy - The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989 (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5106)
by Peter C. Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1527)
by Peter Cramton & Luciano I. de Castro - Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation (RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:27-53)
by Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Alan - Electricity market design (RePEc:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:589-612.)
by Peter Cramton - Editor's Choice The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:130:y:2015:i:4:p:1547-1621)
by Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & John Shim - Policy Brief—Translating the Collective Climate Goal Into a Common Climate Commitment (RePEc:oup:renvpo:v:11:y:2017:i:1:p:165-171.)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Jean Tirole - Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty (RePEc:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:4:p:579-593.)
by Peter C. Cramton - Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty (RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:1:p:205-225.)
by Peter C. Cramton - Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (RePEc:oup:restud:v:81:y:2014:i:4:p:1366-1400)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka - Papers of Peter Cramton (RePEc:pcc:pccumd)
from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton as editor - Eliminating the Flaws in New England's Reserve Markets (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00flaws)
by Peter Cramton & Jeffrey Lien - A Review of Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00jel)
by Peter Cramton - Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00jre)
by Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz - Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00senate)
by Peter Cramton - Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing? (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01calpx)
by Alfred E. Kahn & Peter Cramton & Robert H. Porter & Richard D. Tabors - Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01ej)
by Alfred E. Kahn & Peter Cramton & Robert H. Porter & Richard D. Tabors - Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01hte)
by Peter Cramton - Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01nao)
by Peter Cramton - Bargaining with Incomplete Information (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02barg)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Raymond J. Deneckere - Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02collude)
by Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz - Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02emd)
by Peter Cramton - Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02eptc)
by Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - Unions, Bargaining and Strikes (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02ubs)
by Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy - Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:03ferc1)
by Peter Cramton - Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:03ferc2)
by Peter Cramton - Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04hicss)
by Peter Cramton - Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04jeea)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit)
by Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg - Simultaneous Ascending Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit4)
by Peter Cramton - The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - A Capacity Market that Makes Sense (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:05licap)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:05mdi)
by Peter Cramton & Hung-po Chao & Robert Wilson - The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:06mdfra)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - How Best to Auction Oil Rights (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:06oil)
by Peter Cramton - Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:06scfem)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft & Jeffrey West - The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07c700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Colombia Firm Energy Market (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07cfem)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07cpm)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07d700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07el700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Simon Wilkie & Robert Wilson - Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07entry700mhz)
by Peter Cramton - Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73 (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07fcc700mhz)
by Peter Cramton & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Colombia’s Forward Energy Market (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07fem)
by Peter Cramton - Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07mbac)
by Michael O. Ball & Lawrence M. Ausubel & Frank Berardino & Peter Cramton & George Donohue & Mark Hansen & Karla Hoffman - An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07oca)
by Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg - Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rev700)
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - Comments on the RGGI Market Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rggi)
by Peter Cramton - Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08adcfrp)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08frm)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08gm)
by Peter Cramton - The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35 (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08ibsaa)
by Peter Cramton & Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer - Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08qcspr)
by Robert Day & Peter Cramton - A Review of the L-Band Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08rlba)
by Peter Cramton - A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08rtfghz)
by Peter Cramton - A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08tara)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Auctioning the Digital Dividend (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09add)
by Peter Cramton - Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09aghg)
by Regina Betz & Stefan Seifert & Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09aibc)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - How Best to Auction Natural Resources (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09anr)
by Peter Cramton - Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09ccpre)
by Luciano I. de Castro & Peter Cramton - Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09cvawln)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Nathaniel Higgins & Erkut Ozbay & Andrew Stocking - No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09fop)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09gcp)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Innovation and Market Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09imd)
by Peter Cramton - Market Design: Auctions and Matching (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09mdc)
by Peter Cramton - Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09msab)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09prca)
by Peter Cramton & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Spectrum Auction Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09sad)
by Peter Cramton - A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09tsall)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09ufm)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Virtual Power Plant Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09vpp)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Fix Medicare’s Bizarre Auction Program (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10acfm)
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton - System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10acmhc)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10ard)
by Peter Cramton & Samuel Dinkin & Robert Wilson - An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10cgsma)
by Peter Cramton & Ulrich Gall & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10ckrhc)
by Peter Cramton - Medicare Auction Conference (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10cmac)
by Peter Cramton - Market Design: Harnessing Market Methods to Improve Resource Allocation (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10cmd)
by Peter Cramton - Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10dca)
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10icg)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Kyoto’s Climate Game and How to Fix It (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10kcg)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Letter from 167 Concerned Auction Experts on Medicare Competitive Bidding Program (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10ltcs)
by Peter Cramton - Price is a Better Climate Commitment (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10pbcc)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Wind Energy in Colombia: A Framework for Market Entry (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10wec)
by Walter Vergara & Alejandro Deeb & Natsuko Toba & Peter Cramton & Irene Leino - Auction Design for Wind Rights (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acadw)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Activity Rules for the Combinatorial Clock Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acar)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Comparison of Auction Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11accw)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acjam)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Wynne P. Jones - Multiple Factor Auction Design for Wind Rights (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acmf)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Auction Design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11cadm)
by Peter Cramton - Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckev)
by Peter Cramton - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckrs)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Medicare Auction Failure: Early Evidence from the Round 1 Rebid (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11cmaf)
by Peter Cramton - Ökonomik und Design von Kapazitätsmärkten im Stromsektor (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11cocaps)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels - Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11iat)
by Peter Cramton - Incentive Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11iauc)
by Peter Cramton - Letter from 244 Concerned Auction Experts on the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11lto)
by Peter Cramton - Medicare Auction Reform (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11marv)
by Peter Cramton - System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmec)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmhc)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - Designed to Fail: The Medicare Auction for Durable Medical Equipment (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cekdtf)
by Peter Cramton - Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cfosdca)
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Fear of Losing in a Clock Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cfosf)
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - The Hidden Costs of a Flawed Medicare Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12chcfma)
by Peter Cramton - Response to the Congressional Hearing on Medicare's Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cmafc)
by Peter Cramton - Medicare Auction Reform (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cmaft)
by Peter Cramton - Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cocap)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels - Global Climate Games: How Pricing and a Green Fund Foster Cooperation (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12csgcg)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - How to Fix the Inefficiency of Global Cap and Trade (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cshtf)
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:84res)
by Peter Cramton - Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:85roth)
by Peter Cramton - Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:87econ)
by Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer - Nonrandom Mixing Models of HIV Transmission (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:89aids)
by Peter Cramton & Edward Kaplan & A. David Paltiel - Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:90ier)
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91beq)
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees - Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91jleo)
by Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz - Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91ms)
by Peter Cramton - Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:92aer)
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:92res)
by Peter Cramton - Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:93beq)
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees - Relational Investing and Agency Theory (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:94clr)
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton - The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:94jole)
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:94jolew)
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95beq)
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees - Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95geb)
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey - Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:95jems)
by Peter Cramton - Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:96slr)
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton - Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra1b)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97elec)
by Lisa J. Cameron & Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson - Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jems)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan - The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jemsfcc)
by Peter Cramton - Auction Design for Standard Offer Service (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97wpad)
by Peter Cramton & Andrew Parece & Robert Wilson - Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2)
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - Ascending Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98eer)
by Peter Cramton - Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jleer)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams - The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jlefcc)
by Peter Cramton - The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989 (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jole)
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98mdi)
by Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson - Auctioning Securities (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpas)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpdr)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Bargaining with a Shared Interest: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpesop)
by Peter Cramton & Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy - The Optimality of Being Efficient (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpoe)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99eedecr)
by Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99ej)
by Lisa Cameron & Peter Cramton - Impacts of Strike Replacement Bans in Canada (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99irra)
by Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy - The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99res)
by Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy - Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience in the First Four Months (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99reserves)
by Peter Cramton - Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99wpvic)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-98-34)
by Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter - The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-034)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-015)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:493-505)
by Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton - Fear of losing in a clock auction (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:2:p:119-134)
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:2-3:p:480-493)
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:81:y:1999:i:3:p:475-487)
by Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy - Innovation and Market Design (RePEc:ucp:ipolec:doi:10.1086/592423)
by Peter Cramton - The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:12:y:1994:i:2:p:180-209)
by Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S - Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:12:y:1994:i:4:p:594-617)
by Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S - The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989 (RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:16:y:1998:i:4:p:667-701)
by Cramton, Peter & Tracy, Joseph - Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/661939)
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:647-75)
by Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John - The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions (RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:727-36)
by Cramton, Peter - Strategic Climate Cooperation and Greenhouse Gas Price Coordination (RePEc:vrs:intere:v:59:y:2024:i:1:p:55-56:n:10)
by Clausing Kimberly & Cramton Peter & Ockenfels Axel & Wolfram Catherine - COP28: Strategische Klimakooperation (RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:103:y:2023:i:12:p:796-796:n:2)
by Clausing Kim & Cramton Peter & Ockenfels Axel & Wolfram Catherine - Wind Energy in Colombia : A Framework for Market Entry (RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:2493)
by Walter Vergara & Alejandro Deeb & Natsuko Toba & Peter Cramton & Irene Leino - The optimality of being efficient : designing auctions (RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1985)
by Ausubel, Lawerence M. & Cramton, Peter - The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour (RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:605:p:f305-f324)
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels