Roger D. Congleton

Names

Identifer

Contact

Affiliations

• George Mason University / Economics Department (weight: 1%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• West Virginia University / College of Business and Economics / Department of Economics (weight: 98%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:
• George Mason University / Economics Department / Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC) (weight: 1%)
  • EDIRC entry
  • location:

Research profile

author of:

• Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:50:y:1997:i:4:p:485-505)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:4:p:483-510)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio
• Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective (RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:77:y:2024:i:1:p:3-21)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform (RePEc:cam:camdae:0764)
  by Congleton, R.D.
• Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership (RePEc:cje:issued:v:22:y:1989:i:3:p:662-72)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Economic Conditions and National Elections, Post-Sample Forecasts of the Kramer Equations (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:76:y:1982:i:04:p:873-875_18)
  by Atesoglu, H. Sonmez & Congleton, Roger
• Rationality, Morality, and Exit (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:02:p:418-431_08)
  by Vanberg, Viktor J. & Congleton, Roger D.
• Politics by Principle, Not Interest (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521031325)
  by Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D.
• Perfecting Parliament (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521151696)
  by Congleton,Roger D.
• Politics by Principle, Not Interest (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521621878)
  by Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D.
• Perfecting Parliament (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521764605)
  by Congleton,Roger D.
• Constitutional bargaining and the quality of contemporary African institutions: a test of the incremental reform hypothesis (RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:14:y:2018:i:02:p:233-258_00)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Yoo, Dongwoo
• Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:11:y:1989:i:2:p:175-190)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• The economic role of a work ethic (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:15:y:1991:i:3:p:365-385)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:30:y:1996:i:1:p:133-136)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Fudulu, Paul
• Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:145-167)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Vanberg, Viktor J.
• The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:15:y:1999:i:2:p:193-205)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D.
• From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:2:p:261-284)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:102-114)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Lee, Sanghack
• On the codetermination of tax-financed medical R&D and healthcare expenditures: Models and evidence (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:175-188)
  by Batinti, Alberto & Congleton, Roger D.
• The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300392)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• Committees and rent-seeking effort (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:25:y:1984:i:1-2:p:197-209)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:44:y:1991:i:1:p:65-86)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• In Defense of Ignorance: On the Significance of a Neglected Form of Incomplete Information (RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:27:y:2001:i:4:p:391-407)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking (RePEc:elg:eebook:15325)
  by None
• The Economic Analysis Of Rent Seeking (RePEc:elg:eebook:592)
  by None
• Informational Limits to Public Policy: Ignorance and the Jury Theorem (RePEc:elg:eechap:12578_12)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Public choice and the modern welfare state (RePEc:elg:eechap:14039_22)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Feler Bose & Youngshin Kim & Rinaldo Pietrantonio
• Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 (RePEc:elg:eechap:14863_4)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Federalism and tax-financed healthcare: economic advantages, dilemmas, and solutions (RePEc:elg:eechap:20654_5)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization (RePEc:elg:eechap:3584_5)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• The politics of government growth (RePEc:elg:eechap:459_22)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• The Political Economy of Crisis Management: Surprise, Urgency, and Mistakes in Political Decision Making (RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-2134(05)08007-5)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the Evolution of Organizational Government (RePEc:esi:evopap:2010-09)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• A Test of the Unraveling Hypothesis: Constitutional Bargaining and the Quality of African Institutions (RePEc:hit:hitcei:2014-4)
  by Congleton, Roger D. & Yoo, Dongwoo
• Economic Development and Democracy. Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage? (RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:283-314)
  by Roger Congleton
• Constitutional Political Economy (RePEc:kap:copoec)
  from Springer as editor
• On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:3:p:193-215)
  by Roger Congleton
• A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:3:p:167-190)
  by Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria
• On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:3:p:145-159)
  by Roger Congleton
• America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:1:p:35-59)
  by Roger Congleton
• On the editorial transition (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:1:p:1-1)
  by Roger Congleton & Stefan Voigt
• Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:2:p:108-124)
  by Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang
• On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:3:p:177-198)
  by Roger Congleton
• The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:25:y:2014:i:1:p:39-67)
  by Roger Congleton
• Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9213-y)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• A short history of constitutional liberalism in America (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:29:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-018-9257-2)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Governance by true believers: supreme duties with and without totalitarianism (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:31:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-020-09300-y)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Readership and citations as alternative measures of impact (RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09333-x)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Alex Marsella & Alexander J. Cardazzi
• Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1-2:p:35-64)
  by Congleton, Roger D
• Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1:p:35-64)
  by Roger Congleton
• The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:213-238)
  by Roger Congleton
• The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:127:y:2006:i:1:p:5-30)
  by Roger Congleton
• Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:333-352)
  by Roger Congleton
• Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:509-511)
  by Roger Congleton
• Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:3:p:499-501)
  by Roger Congleton
• On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009 (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:3:p:287-317)
  by Roger Congleton
• The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:144:y:2010:i:3:p:535-555)
  by Roger Congleton & Feler Bose
• Dennis C. Mueller: Reason, religion, and liberal democracy (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:585-587)
  by Roger Congleton
• Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:149:y:2011:i:1:p:187-207)
  by Roger Congleton
• On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:3:p:399-423)
  by Roger Congleton
• The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:1:p:131-146)
  by Roger Congleton
• Growing up with The Calculus of Consent (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:3:p:273-278)
  by Roger Congleton
• Thanks to Gordon Tullock (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:162:y:2015:i:3:p:229-233)
  by Roger Congleton
• The Logic of Collective Action and beyond (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:164:y:2015:i:3:p:217-234)
  by Roger Congleton
• Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:171:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0422-3)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0545-1)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:181:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0542-4)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00689-1)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Youngshin Kim & Alexander Marsella
• Ethics and good governance (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00824-3)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00679-3)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:195:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00915-9)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:34:y:1979:i:2:p:217-230)
  by James Buchanan & Roger Congleton
• A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:3:p:421-425)
  by R. Congleton
• Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:3:p:441-448)
  by Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton
• Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:49:y:1986:i:3:p:249-263)
  by Roger Congleton
• Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count? (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:56:y:1988:i:2:p:181-184)
  by Roger Congleton
• Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:2:p:101-118)
  by Roger Congleton
• Information, Special Interests, and Single-Issue Voting (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:69:y:1991:i:1:p:39-49)
  by Congleton, Roger D
• Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:73:y:1992:i:1:p:1-19)
  by Congleton, Roger D & Sweetser, Wendell
• The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:79:y:1994:i:1-2:p:47-60)
  by Buchanan, James M & Congleton, Roger D
• On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:84:y:1995:i:1-2:p:1-24)
  by Congleton, Roger D & Bennett, Randall W
• Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:3-4:p:287-305)
  by Congleton, Roger D & Steunenberg, Bernard
• Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?” (RePEc:kap:revaec:v:23:y:2010:i:1:p:103-105)
  by Roger Congleton
• Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective (RePEc:mof:journl:ppr15_02_01)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262033496)
  by None
• The Growth of Social Security: Electoral Push or Political Pull? (RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:1:p:109-32)
  by Congleton, Roger D & Shughart, William F, II
• Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association (RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:49-78)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan (RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:16:y:1988:i:2:p:131-157)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence (RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:5:p:456-476)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors (RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:20:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10101-018-0218-z)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Yang Zhou
• Grounding multidisciplinary public policy analysis in methodological individualism: with an illustrating study of the economic and political effects of variations in a nation’s average work ethic (RePEc:spr:ijoeps:v:17:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s42495-023-00109-9)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations (RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:319-336)
  by Roger Congleton
• 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 (RePEc:spr:sprbok:978-3-540-79182-9)
  by None
• 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 (RePEc:spr:sprbok:978-3-540-79247-5)
  by None
• Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_1)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad
• Commitees and rent-seeking effort (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_17)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_4)
  by Roger Congleton
• Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_1)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad
• Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_16)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Monitoring rent-seeking managers: advantages of diffuse ownership (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_40)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_42)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_46)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On Some Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock (RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4614-5909-5_3)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Political Institutions and Pollution Control (RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:3:p:412-21)
  by Congleton, Roger D
• The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper) (RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:145-147)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:13-04)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:13-08)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the Political Economy of Privacy: Information Sharing between Friends and Foes (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-21)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-23)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-25)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-27)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Dongwoo Yoo
• A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:18-02)
  by Roger D. Congleton & Yang Zhou
• Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus (RePEc:wvu:wpaper:18-09)
  by Roger D. Congleton
• Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs? (RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:62011)
  by Congleton, Roger D.
• Return to Rio: Agency problems and the political economy of environmental treaties (RePEc:zbw:kondp2:261)
  by Congleton, Roger D.