Levent Celik
Names
| first: |
Levent |
| last: |
Celik |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and Economics Institute (CERGE-EI) (weight: 10%)
-
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)
/ Faculty of Economics (weight: 90%)
Research profile
author of:
- Score Disclosure (RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0285)
by Levent Celik & Mikhail Drugov - When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority (RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:347-89)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren - Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:62:y:2014:i:1:p:113-136)
by Levent Celik - Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:68:y:2020:i:4:p:591-639)
by Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli & Levent Celik - Determination of Odds in Prediction Markets: Coexistence of Posted-offer and Double-auction Designs (RePEc:buc:jpredm:v:9:y:2015:i:1:p:68-86)
by Levent Celik & Esen Onur - Informative Advertising and Consumer Search in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly (RePEc:cer:papers:wp332)
by Levent Celik - Strategic Informative Advertising in a Horizontally Differentiated Duopoly (RePEc:cer:papers:wp359)
by Levent Çelik - Monopoly Provision of Tune-ins (RePEc:cer:papers:wp362)
by Levent Çelik - Viewer Sampling and Quality Signaling in a Television Market (RePEc:cer:papers:wp363)
by Levent Çelik - A Note on Equilibrium Uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn Model (RePEc:cer:papers:wp440)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay - Product Line Design (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10324)
by Anderson, Simon & Celik, Levent - Opaque selling (RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:52:y:2020:i:c:s0167624519300988)
by Anderson, Simon P. & Celik, Levent - Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:113-122)
by Celik, Levent - Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:127:y:2020:i:c:s0022199620301070)
by Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John - Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining (RePEc:eee:inecon:v:91:y:2013:i:2:p:179-190)
by Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John - Product line design (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:517-526)
by Anderson, Simon P. & Celik, Levent - A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive (RePEc:kap:revind:v:44:y:2014:i:2:p:161-178)
by Levent Celik - Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model (RePEc:kap:theord:v:81:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-015-9520-1)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay - Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17262)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren - When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authority (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17810)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren - Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24427)
by Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren