Gorkem Celik
Names
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Gorkem |
| last: |
Celik |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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ESSEC Business School (weight: 50%)
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Université de Cergy-Pontoise
/ Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA) (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Selling Certification of Private and Market Information (RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0045)
by Gorkem Celik & Roland Strausz - Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures (RePEc:bla:jindec:v:71:y:2023:i:1:p:256-290)
by Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz - Implementation by Gradual Revelation (RePEc:bla:randje:v:46:y:2015:i:2:p:271-296)
by Gorkem Celik - Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider (RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:2:p:314-333)
by Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz - Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:3)
by Celik Gorkem - Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:24)
by Celik Gorkem & Yilankaya Okan - Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design (RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:1:p:374-411)
by Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters - Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:37-44)
by Celik, Gorkem - Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:375-387)
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael - Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation (RePEc:eee:indorg:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:148-174)
by Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan - Mechanism design with collusive supervision (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:69-95)
by Celik, Gorkem - Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation (RePEc:koc:wpaper:1501)
by Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya - Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation (RePEc:naz:wpaper:1602)
by Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya - Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures (RePEc:rco:dpaper:105)
by Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland - Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider (RePEc:rco:dpaper:251)
by Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland - Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures (RePEc:rco:dpaper:356)
by Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland - On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:3:p:209-227)
by Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan - Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-01-23-02-48-07)
by Celik, Gorkem - Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-42-19)
by Celik, Gorkem - Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-50-40)
by Celik, Gorkem - Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-05-05-09-03-55-40)
by Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan - To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-05-08-03-12-50-26)
by Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar - Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:gorkem_celik-2008-10)
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael - Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design (RePEc:ubc:pmicro:gorkem_celik-2011-19)
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael - Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design (RePEc:wly:canjec:v:49:y:2016:i:1:p:374-411)
by Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters