eloisa campioni
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eloisa |
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campioni |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata"
/ Facoltà di Economia
/ Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza
Research profile
author of:
- Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:7)
by Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael - Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment (RePEc:cor:louvco:2004050)
by ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël & RAJAN, Uday - Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market (RePEc:cor:louvco:2005031)
by ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16807)
by Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Pavan, Alessandro - Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005024)
by Andrea, ATTAR & Eloisa, CAMPIONI & Gwenaël, PIASER - Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s0165176522004062)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:111:y:2018:i:c:p:1-15)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:125:y:2021:i:c:p:79-93)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël - On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:376-380)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday - Private communication in competing mechanism games (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:258-283)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:1:p:62-70)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:57:y:2003:i:4:p:315-343)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa - Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy (RePEc:eee:streco:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:249-269)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa - On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01897713)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03106896)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenaël Piaser - Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04216626)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03266804)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan - Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03790171)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2015-632)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:196)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan - Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:201)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser - Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:205)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser - A Proof Without Words and a Maximum without Calculus (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:316)
by Eloisa Campioni & Luca Panaccione - Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:402)
by Eloisa Campioni & Vittorio Larocca & Loredana Mirra & Luca Panaccione - On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:421)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:441)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:460)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenael Piaser - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:519)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan - Born to Run: Adaptive and Strategic Behavior in Experimental Bank-Run Games (RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:529)
by Federico Belotti & Eloisa Campioni & Vittorio Larocca & Francesca Marazzi & Luca Panaccione & Andrea Piano Mortari - Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:4:p:283-296)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan - Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123080)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël - Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:123148)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (RePEc:tse:wpaper:125751)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro - Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (RePEc:tse:wpaper:127377)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (RePEc:tse:wpaper:29906)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games (RePEc:tse:wpaper:32199)
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël - Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_29)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwen�el Piaser - On multiple agent models of moral hazard (RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32)
by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwena�l Piaser & Uday Rajan