Johannes Buckenmaier
Names
| first: |
Johannes |
| last: |
Buckenmaier |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Universität Zürich
/ Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutält
/ Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Research profile
author of:
- Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions (RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:065)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt - Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8113)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt - The Experience Is (Not) Everything: Sequential Outcomes and Social Decision-Making (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9097)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant - Imitation, network size, and efficiency (RePEc:cup:netsci:v:9:y:2021:i:1:p:123-133_8)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes & Farolfi, Federica - When are efficient conventions selected in networks? (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:124:y:2021:i:c:s0165188921000099)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes & Farolfi, Federica - Cournot vs. Walras: A reappraisal through simulations (RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:257-272)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes - The experience is (not) everything: Sequential outcomes and social decision-making (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:205:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001932)
by Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen - The reinforcement paradox: Monetary incentives and Bayesian updating (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:211:y:2022:i:c:s0165176521004511)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes & Garagnani, Michele & Ritschel, Alexander - Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:388-401)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes - Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:175:y:2020:i:c:p:296-313)
by Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen & Mittone, Luigi - Trader matching and the selection of market institutions (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:118-127)
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes - Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:24:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-020-09672-w)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier - Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions? (RePEc:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09710-1)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger - Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions (RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:62:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11166-021-09352-x)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt - Effects of Institutional History and Leniency on Collusive Corruption and Tax Evasion (RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-13)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Luigi Mittone - Effects of Institutional History and Leniency on Collusive Corruption and Tax Evasion (RePEc:not:notcdx:2018-05)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Luigi Mittone - Tax Evasion and Institutions. An Experiment on The Role of Principal Witness Regulations (RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0007)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Luigi Mittone - Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Punishment (RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0010)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt - Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Punishment (RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0014)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt - Tax Evasion Revised: Surprising Experimental Evidence on the Role of Principal Witness Regulations and Differences in Gender Attitudes (RePEc:trn:utwpce:1505)
by Luigi Mittone & Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant - Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions ? (RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/322288)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger - On punishment institutions and effective deterrence of illicit behavior (RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2090)
by Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen & Posten, Ann-Christin & Schmidt, Ulrich - Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times (RePEc:zur:econwp:292)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier - Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion (RePEc:zur:econwp:295)
by Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Luigi Mittone - Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences (RePEc:zur:econwp:302)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier - Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions? (RePEc:zur:econwp:364)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger - Stochastic choice and preference reversals (RePEc:zur:econwp:370)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Michele Garagnani - Voting for compromises: alternative voting methods in polarized societies (RePEc:zur:econwp:394)
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier