Steven J. Brams
Names
| first: |
Steven |
| middle: |
J. |
| last: |
Brams |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
New York University
- http://politics.as.nyu.edu/page/home
- location: New York, New York
Research profile
author of:
- Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation (RePEc:ags:feemdp:52337)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, Marc - Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive (RePEc:arx:papers:1808.06922)
by Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail & D. Marc Kilgour & Walter Stromquist - Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black (RePEc:arx:papers:2108.02547)
by Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail - Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule (RePEc:arx:papers:2303.04807)
by Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail & D. Marc Kilgour - Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system (RePEc:bie:wpaper:340)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R. - Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods (RePEc:bla:socsci:v:101:y:2020:i:1:p:68-72)
by Steven J. Brams - Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations (RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:6:y:2000:i:2:n:1)
by Brams Steven J. - Transaction Flows in the International System (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:60:y:1966:i:04:p:880-898_12)
by Brams, Steven J. - Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:02:p:461-475_20)
by Brams, Steven J. - Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.) (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:04:p:1391-1392_22)
by Steven J., Brams - An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:449-470_12)
by Brams, Steven J. & O'Leary, Michael K. - Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’†(RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:65:y:1971:i:03:p:766-766_13)
by Brams, Steven J. & O'Leary, Michael K. - The Paradox of Vote Trading (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:04:p:1235-1247_14)
by Riker, William H. & Brams, Steven J. - The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:01:p:113-134_23)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. - Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College†(RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:69:y:1975:i:01:p:155-156_24)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. - Approval Voting (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:03:p:831-847_15)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:04:p:1362-1364_15)
by Brams, Steven J. - Another Solution (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:04:p:1365-1366_15)
by Brams, Steven J. - Replies (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:73:y:1979:i:02:p:552-553_27)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Balinski, M. L. & Young, H. P. - Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346) (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:02:p:495-496_28)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Straffin, Philip D. - Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958) (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:03:p:816-818_22)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Rejoinder to Niemi (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:03:p:819-819_22)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:03:p:833-850_20)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95 (RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:02:p:527-528_09)
by Brams, Steven J. - Fair Division (RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521556446)
by Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D. - Nonmyoptic Equilibria (RePEc:cvs:starer:80-10)
by Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald - Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience (RePEc:cvs:starer:80-11)
by Brams, Steven J. - Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries (RePEc:cvs:starer:80-13)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. - Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:80-27)
by Brams, Steven J. & Hessel Marek - Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration (RePEc:cvs:starer:81-25)
by Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III - Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections (RePEc:cvs:starer:82-03)
by Brams, Steven J. - Threat Power in Sequential Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:82-14)
by Brams, Steven J. & Hessel, Marek P. - The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:83-12)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. - Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures (RePEc:cvs:starer:83-15)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:84-06)
by Brams, Steven J. - Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best (RePEc:cvs:starer:84-07)
by Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III - Optimal Deterrence (RePEc:cvs:starer:84-18)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - New Chairman Paradoxes (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-09)
by Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve - Rational De-Escalation (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-10)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-12)
by Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve - The Path to Stable Deterrence (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-17)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-30)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:85-37)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-03)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-08)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-13)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-23)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - The Probability of Nuclear War (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-24)
by Avenhaus, Rudolf & Brams, Steven J. & Fichtner, John & Kilgour, D. Marc - Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars (RePEc:cvs:starer:86-35)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal? (RePEc:cvs:starer:87-12)
by Brams, Steven J. - The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen (RePEc:cvs:starer:87-18)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III - National Security Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:87-42)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? (RePEc:cvs:starer:87-45)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:88-01)
by Affuso, Paul J. & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus (RePEc:cvs:starer:88-03)
by Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III - Are Crisis Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:88-18)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Optimal Cheating And Inspection Strategies Under Inf (RePEc:cvs:starer:88-24)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Approval Voting in Practice (RePEc:cvs:starer:89-07)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Coalition Voting (RePEc:cvs:starer:89-08)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Constrained Approval Voting: A Custom-Designed Election System (RePEc:cvs:starer:89-11)
by Brams, Steven J. - Sequential Arbitration Procedures (RePEc:cvs:starer:89-13)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Weber, Shlomo - The Box Problem: To Switch Or Not To Switch? (RePEc:cvs:starer:90-26)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Unraveling In Exchange Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:90-27)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Davis, Morton D. - Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System To Elect A Governing Board (RePEc:cvs:starer:90-28)
by Brams, Steven J. - Approval Voting In Practice (RePEc:cvs:starer:90-29)
by Brams, Steven J. & Nagel, Jack H. - Arms-Control Inspection Strtegies That Induce Compliance: A Game-Theoritic Analysis (RePEc:cvs:starer:90-40)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Yes-No Voting (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-09)
by Fishburn, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J. - When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-27)
by Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D. - Games Theory and Literature (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-29)
by Brams, Steven J. - A Generic Negotiation Game (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-31)
by Brams, Steven J. - Arbitration Procedures (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-38)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Merrill, Samuel III - Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-43)
by Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. - Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round (RePEc:cvs:starer:91-45)
by Brams, Steven J. & Doherty, Ann E. & Weidner, Matthew L. - Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-01)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-02)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-07)
by Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J. - Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-30)
by Brams, S.J. & Doherty, A.E. - An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-31)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - Cycles of Conflict (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-51)
by Brams, Steven J. - Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples (RePEc:cvs:starer:92-52)
by Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter - Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness (RePEc:cvs:starer:93-29)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting? (RePEc:cvs:starer:93-30)
by Brams, S.J. & Merrill, S. - Fair Division by Point Allocation (RePEc:cvs:starer:93-42)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions (RePEc:cvs:starer:94-07)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves (RePEc:cvs:starer:94-10)
by Brams, Steven J. - Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:94-28)
by Fishburns, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J. - Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes (RePEc:cvs:starer:94-30)
by Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S. - A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem (RePEc:cvs:starer:95-01)
by Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S. - How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted? (RePEc:cvs:starer:95-10)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S. - Modeling Free Choice in Games (RePEc:cvs:starer:95-11)
by Brams, Steven J. - Game Theory and Emotions (RePEc:cvs:starer:95-23)
by Brams, S.J. - Fair Division and Politics (RePEc:cvs:starer:95-26)
by Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D. - The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-03)
by Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M. - Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-04)
by Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M. - A Procedure for Divorce Settlements (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-06)
by Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. - The Paradox of Multiple Elections (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-09)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S. - Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-10)
by Brams, Steven J. & Denoon, David - Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem (RePEc:cvs:starer:96-21)
by Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J. - The Truel (RePEc:cvs:starer:97-05)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark - Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options (RePEc:cvs:starer:97-06)
by Brams, Steven J. & Potthoff, Richard F. - Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions (RePEc:cvs:starer:97-15)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William - Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power (RePEc:cvs:starer:97-23)
by Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B. - Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case (RePEc:cvs:starer:97-29)
by Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M. - Fallback Bargaining (RePEc:cvs:starer:98-10)
by Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M. - To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises (RePEc:cvs:starer:98-11)
by Brams, S.J. - Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach (RePEc:cvs:starer:98-13)
by Brams, S.J. & Kulikov, M.S. - Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity (RePEc:cvs:starer:98-20)
by Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C. - Voting Procedures (RePEc:cvs:starer:98-30)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter - Voting procedures (RePEc:eee:gamchp:2-30)
by Brams, Steven J. - Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:185-202)
by Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Game Theory and Literature (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:32-54)
by Brams Steven J. - Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:373-388)
by Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. - Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:251-269)
by Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. - A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:3:p:191-195)
by Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay - Final-offer arbitration with a bonus (RePEc:eee:poleco:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:79-92)
by Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III - Voting procedures (RePEc:eee:socchp:1-04)
by Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. - Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System (RePEc:exe:wpaper:0202)
by Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan - Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.97)
by Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour - Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation (RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.41)
by Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams - Sequential Arbitration Procedures (RePEc:fth:yorkca:90-5)
by Weber, S. & Kilgour, M. & Brams, S.J. - A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game (RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:35-:d:401551)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices (RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201102)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd & Kilgour, D. Marc - Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board (RePEc:inm:orinte:v:20:y:1990:i:5:p:67-80)
by Steven J. Brams - The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule (RePEc:inm:orinte:v:7:y:1977:i:4:p:102-109)
by Steven J. Brams - Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:29:y:1983:i:8:p:927-941)
by Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III - Response to Rabow (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:31:y:1985:i:3:p:375-376)
by Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III - Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best (RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:10:p:1346-1355)
by Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III - Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:26:y:1978:i:6:p:966-991)
by Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis - Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:28:y:1980:i:4:p:1024-1025)
by Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis - Optimal Threats (RePEc:inm:oropre:v:35:y:1987:i:4:p:524-536)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Forming stable coalitions: The process matters (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:67-94)
by Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour - The normative turn in public choice (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:127:y:2006:i:3:p:245-250)
by Steven Brams - Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:361-366)
by Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison - Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:131:y:2007:i:3:p:465-468)
by Richard Potthoff & Steven Brams - A minimax procedure for electing committees (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:401-420)
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver - Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009 (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:3:p:525-539)
by Steven Brams & Gustavo Camilo & Alexandra Franz - The paradox of grading systems (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:165:y:2015:i:3:p:193-210)
by Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff - Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0386-8)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:178:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0609-2)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Richard F. Potthoff - When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:17:y:1974:i:1:p:11-25)
by Steven Brams & John Heilman - Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:32:y:1977:i:1:p:67-83)
by Steven Brams & Douglas Muzzio - Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:1:p:89-114)
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:3:p:425-434)
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:44:y:1984:i:3:p:397-410)
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:59:y:1988:i:2:p:121-131)
by Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill - Approval Voting in Practice (RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:71:y:1991:i:1-2:p:1-17)
by Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H - Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem (RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:263-289)
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour - Fair Division Of Indivisible Items (RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:147-180)
by Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn - Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium (RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09824-1)
by Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail - Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) (RePEc:kap:theord:v:93:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09851-y)
by Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts - Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? (RePEc:mtl:montde:2000-15)
by BOSSERT, Walter & BRAMS, Steven J. & KILGOUR, D. Marc - Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? (RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-15)
by Bossert, W. & Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M. - Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262015226)
by Steven J. Brams - Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262518252)
by Brams, Steven J. - Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible (RePEc:mtp:titles:0262523329)
by Steven J. Brams - Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium (RePEc:pra:mprapa:106718)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. - Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible (RePEc:pra:mprapa:106775)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian - A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game (RePEc:pra:mprapa:106809)
by Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc - Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates (RePEc:pra:mprapa:108784)
by Isaksen, Aaron & Ismail, Mehmet & Brams, Steven J. & Nealen, Andy - Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties (RePEc:pra:mprapa:109395)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, Marc & Klamler, Christian - Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black (RePEc:pra:mprapa:111075)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. - How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12751)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12772)
by Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. & Stromquist, Walter - The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12774)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian - Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership (RePEc:pra:mprapa:12776)
by Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay - Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:22703)
by Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. - Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:22704)
by Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian - Satisfaction approval voting (RePEc:pra:mprapa:22709)
by Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc - Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation (RePEc:pra:mprapa:22710)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share (RePEc:pra:mprapa:24807)
by Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay - A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices (RePEc:pra:mprapa:28999)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R & Kilgour, D. Marc - Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule (RePEc:pra:mprapa:30388)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009 (RePEc:pra:mprapa:30390)
by Brams, Steven J. & Camilo, Gustavo & Franz, Alexandra D. - When does approval voting make the "right choices"? (RePEc:pra:mprapa:34262)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts (RePEc:pra:mprapa:34263)
by Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. - N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division (RePEc:pra:mprapa:34264)
by Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian - Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes (RePEc:pra:mprapa:41773)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:47400)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian - Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal (RePEc:pra:mprapa:48113)
by Steven, Brams & Marc, Kilgour - Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too (RePEc:pra:mprapa:56582)
by Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc - An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items (RePEc:pra:mprapa:56587)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian - The Instability of Power Sharing (RePEc:pra:mprapa:5769)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - Stabilizing Power Sharing (RePEc:pra:mprapa:5771)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc - How to divide things fairly (RePEc:pra:mprapa:58370)
by Brams, Steven & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian - Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items (RePEc:pra:mprapa:63189)
by Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc & Klamler, Christian - The Paradox of Grading Systems (RePEc:pra:mprapa:63268)
by Brams, Steven & Potthoff, Richard - Making the Rules of Sports Fairer (RePEc:pra:mprapa:69714)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. - Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive (RePEc:pra:mprapa:75650)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Stromquist, Walter - Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games (RePEc:pra:mprapa:77655)
by Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc - Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach (RePEc:pra:mprapa:77931)
by Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Potthoff, Richard F. - 3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm (RePEc:pra:mprapa:84683)
by Brams, Steven & Landweber, Peter - Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases (RePEc:pra:mprapa:86295)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. - The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes (RePEc:pra:mprapa:89739)
by Steven, Brams & Markus, Brill - Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict (RePEc:pra:mprapa:91370)
by Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S. - How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis (RePEc:pra:mprapa:97604)
by Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D. - Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures (RePEc:pup:chapts:8566-1)
by Steven J. Brams - Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples (RePEc:sae:compsc:v:12:y:1993:i:2:p:1-39)
by Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli - Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair? (RePEc:sae:compsc:v:15:y:1996:i:1:p:99-112)
by Steven J. Brams & Jeffrey M. Togman - Deception in 2 × 2 Games (RePEc:sae:compsc:v:2:y:1977:i:2:p:171-203)
by Steven J. Brams - Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games (RePEc:sae:compsc:v:6:y:1981:i:1:p:39-62)
by Steven J. Brams & Donald Wittman - Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:4:p:596-612)
by Steven J. Brams - Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:4:p:547-572)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:3:p:395-414)
by D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams - Intransigence in Negotiations (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:4:p:692-708)
by Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty - Response to Randall Stone (RePEc:sae:jocore:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:245-254)
by Steven J. Brams - Proportional Representation (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:147-178)
by Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams - Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:359-383)
by Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour - Dividing the Indivisible (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:143-173)
by Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan - Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:24:y:2012:i:4:p:507-525)
by Steven J Brams & D Marc Kilgour - A Generic Negotiation Game (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:53-66)
by Steven J. Brams - When is Size a Liability? (RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:301-316)
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - The Probability of Nuclear War (RePEc:sae:joupea:v:26:y:1989:i:1:p:91-99)
by Rudolf Avenhaus & John Fichtner & Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Catch-22 And King-Of-The-Mountain Games (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:139-167)
by Steven J. Brams & Christopher B. Jones - Efficient Fair Division (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:387-421)
by Steven J. Brams & Daniel L. King - Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Play†(RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:252-257)
by Steven J. Brams - When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:432-454)
by Steven J. Brams & Ben D. Mor - Game Theory And Emotions (RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:91-124)
by Steven J. Brams - Fallback Bargaining (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1011252808608)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9395-5)
by Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan & D. Marc Kilgour - Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items (RePEc:spr:grdene:v:26:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-016-9502-x)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler - Proportional pie-cutting (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:353-367)
by Steven Brams & Michael Jones & Christian Klamler - Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible (RePEc:spr:snopef:v:3:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s43069-021-00115-7)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler - Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:397-417)
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - The paradox of multiple elections (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:211-236)
by Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour - Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:247-267)
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - A nail-biting election (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:409-414)
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:457-474)
by Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn - The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:615-631)
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler - Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:1-18)
by Steven Brams & D. Kilgour - Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021) (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01354-7)
by Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts - The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01358-3)
by Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George - The Instability of Power Sharing (RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_12)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games (RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_14)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Peter Fishburn (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-62769-0_10)
by Steven Brams & William Gehrlein & Fred Roberts & Maurice Salles - Satisfaction Approval Voting (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_18)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-35605-9_6)
by D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79128-7_12)
by Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting (RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_3)
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order (RePEc:spr:stchwe:978-3-540-79128-7)
by None - Unknown item repec:spr:thdchp:978-3-642-02865-6_12
- Competitive Fair Division (RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:418-443)
by Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - Agreement Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case (RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:01:y:1999:i:03n04:n:s0219198999000189)
by Steven J. Brams & Jeffrey M. Togman