Agustín G. Bonifacio
Names
first: |
Agustín |
middle: |
G. |
last: |
Bonifacio |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
-
Universidad Nacional de San Luis
/ Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (IMASL)
/ Grupo de Teoría de Juegos
Research profile
author of:
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (RePEc:aep:anales:4498)
by Pablo Neme & Agustín Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Jorge Oviedo - Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (RePEc:aep:anales:4536)
by Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín Bonifacio - Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (RePEc:aep:anales:4543)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & R. Pablo Arribillaga & Marcelo Fernández - Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:110)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme - Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:121)
by Agustín Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme - Core and Stability Notions in Many-to-one Matching Markets with Indifferences (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:138)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - The Lattice of Envy-Free Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:155)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:166)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez - Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:191)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin Bonifacio - Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:223)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio - Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:23)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme - Trade-off between Manipulability and Dictatorial Power: a Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:254)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio - Not Obviously Manipulable Allotment Rules (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:284)
by Pablo R. Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio - Counting Steps for Re-Stabilization in a Labor Matching Market (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:328)
by Agustín Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Lattice Operations for the Stable Set in Substitutable Matching Markets via re-equilibration Dynamics (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:333)
by Agustín Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Paola Manasero - The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:64)
by Agustín Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Cycles to Compute the Full Set of Many-to-many Stable Matchings (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:99)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games (RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11689)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme - The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (RePEc:arx:papers:2103.16330)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guinazu & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings (RePEc:arx:papers:2110.11846)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences (RePEc:arx:papers:2203.16293)
by Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:arx:papers:2206.10758)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guinazu & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Regret-free truth-telling voting rules (RePEc:arx:papers:2208.13853)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Marcelo Ariel Fernandez - Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.11627)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio - Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences (RePEc:arx:papers:2210.12794)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio - Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (RePEc:arx:papers:2306.04587)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio - Not obviously manipulable allotment rules (RePEc:arx:papers:2309.06546)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio - Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market (RePEc:arx:papers:2405.07084)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Gui~nazu & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Lattice operations for the stable set in substitutable matching markets via re-equilibration dynamics (RePEc:arx:papers:2407.21198)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Paola B. Manasero - Mechanisms for a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem (RePEc:arx:papers:2411.07851)
by Adriana Amieva & Agust'in Bonifacio & Pablo Neme - Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule (RePEc:arx:papers:2412.12495)
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio - On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (RePEc:aub:autbar:965.19)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Jordi Massó - On Strategy-Proofness and Semilattice Single-Peakedness (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1087)
by Agustín G Bonifacio & Jordi Massó - Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (RePEc:bge:wpaper:1324)
by Agustín G Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme - On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:219-238)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi - Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:684-689)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi - The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:188-200)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Guiñazú, Nadia & Juarez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge - Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:12-24)
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Bonifacio, Agustín G. - A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:1-22)
by Bonifacio, A.G. & Inarra, E. & Neme, P. - Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000381)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Pablo - Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:117:y:2022:i:c:p:20-29)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Juarez, Noelia & Neme, Pablo & Oviedo, Jorge - Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:130:y:2024:i:c:p:1-3)
by Bonifacio, Agustín G. - The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts (RePEc:kap:theord:v:96:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-023-09940-0)
by Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:53:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-023-00865-0)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo - Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:3:p:617-638)
by Agustín Bonifacio - Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences (RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01487-x)
by Agustín G. Bonifacio