Olivier Bos
Names
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Université Paris-Saclay
/ Graduate School of Economics and Management
/ Centre for Economics at Paris-Saclay (CEPS) (weight: 95%)
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École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay (ENS)
/ Département de sciences sociales (weight: 5%)
Research profile
author of:
- All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:361-377)
by Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger - Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets (RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2018:i:129:p:127-144)
by Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger - Auctions with signaling concerns (RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:30:y:2021:i:2:p:420-448)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Charitable asymmetric bidders (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:320-337)
by Olivier Bos - Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction (RePEc:bla:scandj:v:118:y:2016:i:4:p:785-815)
by Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer - Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders (RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_158)
by Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich - L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_621_0005)
by Olivier Bos - Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l’inégalité des perdants (RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_pr2_0172)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2398)
by Olivier Bos - Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4345)
by Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer - Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7261)
by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts - Auctions with Signaling Concerns (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8650)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9900)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - How lotteries outperform auctions for charity (RePEc:cor:louvco:2009049)
by BOS, Olivier - All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards (RePEc:cor:louvco:2009059)
by BOS, Olivier & RANGER, Martin - Auctions with prestige motives (RePEc:cor:louvco:2014030)
by BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom - Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling (RePEc:cor:louvco:2016017)
by BOS, Olivier & TRUYTS, Tom - How lotteries outperform auctions (RePEc:cor:louvrp:2321)
by BOS, Olivier - How lotteries outperform auctions (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:262-264)
by Bos, Olivier - Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:187:y:2021:i:c:p:448-469)
by Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom - Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:2:p:83-91)
by Bos, Olivier - Charity auctions for the happy few (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:79:y:2016:i:c:p:83-92)
by Bos, Olivier - Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (RePEc:ete:ceswps:539875)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Signaling in auctions: experimental evidence (RePEc:ete:ceswps:585499)
by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts - Auctions with prestige motives (RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces14.19)
by Olivier BOS & Tom TRUYTS - How lotteries outperform auctions (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01079501)
by Olivier Bos - Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01079504)
by Olivier Bos - Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01484843)
by Olivier Bos & Beatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer - Auctions with signaling concerns (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04120416)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04120443)
by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts - Charitable asymmetric bidders (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04129340)
by Olivier Bos - Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04134778)
by Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger - Charity auctions for the happy few (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04149234)
by Olivier Bos - Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04469151)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (RePEc:kls:series:0045)
by Olivier Bos - All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Rewards (RePEc:kls:series:0046)
by Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger - Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition (RePEc:kls:series:0047)
by Olivier Bos - Charitable asymmetric bidders (RePEc:pra:mprapa:31877)
by Olivier, Bos - Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition (RePEc:pra:mprapa:34810)
by Bos, Olivier - All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards (RePEc:pra:mprapa:47587)
by Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin - Charity Auctions for the Happy Few (RePEc:pra:mprapa:68212)
by Bos, Olivier - Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets (RePEc:pra:mprapa:74785)
by Bos, Olivier & Ranger, Martin - Auctions with Signaling Concerns (RePEc:pra:mprapa:79181)
by Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom - Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00823-2)
by Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts - Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170053)
by Olivier Bos & Francisco Gomez-Martinez & Sander Onderstal & Tom Truyts - Risk pooling in redistributive agreements (RePEc:yor:yorken:12/17)
by Bos, O & P. Schweinzer - Optimal auctions with signaling bidders (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20091)
by Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin - Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21037)
by Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom - Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22016)
by Bos, Olivier & Truyts, Tom