Martin Besfamille
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Martin |
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Besfamille |
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Affiliations
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Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
/ Facultad de Ciencia Económicas y Administrativas
/ Instituto de Economía
Research profile
author of:
- Are Hard Budget Constraints for Sub-National Governments Always Efficient? (RePEc:ags:uwarer:269611)
by Besfamille, Marin & Lockwood, Ben - How do subnational governments react to shocks to revenue sources? Evidence from Argentina (RePEc:aoz:wpaper:73)
by Martin Besfamille & Diego Jorrat & Osmel Manzano & Pablo Sanguinetti - Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:897-926)
by Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto - The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Indirect Taxes (RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:15:y:2013:i:6:p:856-883)
by Martin Besfamille & Philippe Donder & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur - Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation with Evaders (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10732)
by Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & Léon Guzmán - Tax decentralization notwithstanding regional disparities (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7607)
by Antonio Andrés Bellofatto & Martin Besfamille - How do subnational governments react to shocks to revenue sources? Evidence from Argentina (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7622)
by Martin Besfamille & Diego Jorrat & Osmel Manzano & Pablo Sanguinetti - How Do Subnational Governments React to Shocks to Different Revenue Sources? Evidence from Hydrocarbon-Producing Provinces in Argentina (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9251)
by Martín Besfamille & Diego Jorrat & Ósmel Manzano & Bernardo F. Quiroga & Pablo Sanguinetti & Martin Besfamille - Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9592)
by Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán - Construction of facilities under asymmetric information: do constitutions matter ? (RePEc:cor:louvco:2002042)
by BESFAMILLE, Martin & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie - The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Sales Tax (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7108)
by Besfamille, Martin & De Donder, Philippe & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie - Public expenditures and debt at the subnational level: Evidence of fiscal smoothing from Argentina (RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1009)
by Besfamille, Martín & Grosman, Nicolás & Jorrat, Diego & Manzano, Osmel & Sanguinetti, Pablo - The economics of tax evasion (RePEc:dbl:dblwop:225)
by Besfamille, Martín - The relationship between tax evasion and tax revenue in Chang, Lai and Chang (1999) (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08e60012)
by Martin Besfamille - Tax enforcement may decrease government revenue (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00621)
by Martin Besfamille & Philippe De Donder & Jean Marie Lozachmeur - Exerting local tax effort or lobbying for central transfers?: Evidence from Argentina (RePEc:ecm:latm04:249)
by Pablo Sanguinetti & Martin Besfamille - Tax decentralization notwithstanding regional disparities (RePEc:eee:juecon:v:123:y:2021:i:c:s0094119021000280)
by Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés & Besfamille, Martín - How do subnational governments react to shocks to different revenue sources? Evidence from hydrocarbon-producing provinces in Argentina (RePEc:eee:juecon:v:136:y:2023:i:c:s009411902300027x)
by Besfamille, Martín & Jorrat, Diego A. & Manzano, Osmel & Quiroga, Bernardo F. & Sanguinetti, Pablo - Regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:159:y:2018:i:c:p:225-243)
by Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés & Besfamille, Martín - Local public works and intergovernmental transfers under asymmetric information (RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:88:y:2004:i:1-2:p:353-375)
by Besfamille, Martin - Fiscal Federalism, Local Public Works and Corruption (RePEc:fth:gemame:2000/01)
by Besfamille, M. - Central Funding of Local Public Works (RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.513)
by Besfamille, M. - Collusion In Local Public Works (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:4:p:1193-1219)
by Martin Besfamille - Bailouts In Federations: Is A Hard Budget Constraint Always Best? (RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:577-593)
by Martin Besfamille & Ben Lockwood - Regional State Capacity and the Optimal Degree of Fiscal Decentralization (RePEc:ioe:doctra:460)
by Antonio A. Bellofatto & Martín Besfamille - The Flypaper Effect is not a Puzzle (RePEc:ioe:doctra:464)
by Martín Besfamille & Nicolás Grosman & Pablo Sanguinetti - Public Expenditures and Debt at the Subnational Level: Evidence of Fiscal Smoothing from Argentina (RePEc:ioe:doctra:482)
by Martín Besfamille & N. Grosman & D. Jorrat & O. Manzano & P. Sanguinetti - Tax Decentralization Notwithstanding Regional Disparities (RePEc:ioe:doctra:520)
by Martín Besfamille & Antonio Bellofatto - How Do Subnational Governments React to Shocks to Revenue Sources? Evidence from Argentina (RePEc:ioe:doctra:522)
by Martín Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti & Diego Jorrat & Osmel Manzano - Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation (RePEc:ioe:doctra:566)
by Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán - Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders (RePEc:ioe:doctra:576)
by Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán - NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints (RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:114-132)
by Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur - Fiscal federalism, local public works and corruption (RePEc:rpp:wpaper:0001)
by Martin Besfamille - NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2008-11)
by Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur - Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2009-07)
by Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto - Inspectors or Google Earth? Optimal fiscal policies under uncertain detection of evaders (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-09)
by Martin Besfamille & Pablo Olmos - Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy (RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-10)
by Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti - Bailouts In Federations: Is A Hard Budget Constraint Always Best? (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:2:p:577-593)
by Martin Besfamille & Ben Lockwood - Are Hard Budget Constraints for Sub-National Governments Always Efficient? (RePEc:wrk:warwec:717)
by Besfamille, Martin & Lockwood, Ben