Augustin Bergeron
Names
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Augustin |
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Bergeron |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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University of Southern California
/ Department of Economics
Research profile
author of:
- Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:3:p:762-97)
by Pablo Balán & Augustin Bergeron & Gabriel Tourek & Jonathan L. Weigel - Income Concentration in British India, 1885-1946 (RePEc:cpm:docweb:1701)
by Facundo Alvaredo & Augustin Bergeron & Guilhem Cassan - Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15138)
by Weigel, Jonathan & Balán, Pablo & Bergeron, Augustin & Tourek, Gabriel - The State Capacity Ceiling On Tax Rates: Evidence From Randomized Tax Abatements In The Drc (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16116)
by Weigel, Jonathan & Bergeron, Augustin & Tourek, Gabriel - Optimal Assignment Of Bureaucrats: Evidence From Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors In The Drc (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16771)
by Weigel, Jonathan & Bergeron, Augustin & Bessone Tepedino , Pedro & Kabeya, John Kabeya & Tourek, Gabriel - Zero-Sum Thinking, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:18484)
by Carvalho, Jean-Paul & Bergeron, Augustin & Henrich, Joseph & Nunn, Nathan & Weigel, Jonathan - Income concentration in British India, 1885–1946 (RePEc:eee:deveco:v:127:y:2017:i:c:p:459-469)
by Alvaredo, Facundo & Bergeron, Augustin & Cassan, Guilhem - Income concentration in British India, 1885–1946 (RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01626656)
by Facundo Alvaredo & Augustin Bergeron & Guilhem Cassan - Income concentration in British India, 1885–1946 (RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01626656)
by Facundo Alvaredo & Augustin Bergeron & Guilhem Cassan - Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the DRC (RePEc:idq:ictduk:18379)
by Bergeron, Augustin & Ngindu, Elie Kabue & Tourek, Gabriel & Weige, Jonathan L. - Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the DRC (RePEc:idq:ictduk:18396)
by Bergeron, Augustin & Kabue Ngindu, Elie & Tourek, Gabriel & Weigel, Jonathan L. - Optimal Assignment of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the DRC (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30413)
by Augustin Bergeron & Pedro Bessone & John Kabeya Kabeya & Gabriel Z. Tourek & Jonathan L. Weigel - Zero-Sum Environments, the Evolution of Effort-Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31663)
by Augustin Bergeron & Jean-Paul Carvalho & Joseph Henrich & Nathan Nunn & Jonathan L. Weigel - The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC (RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31685)
by Augustin Bergeron & Gabriel Z. Tourek & Jonathan L. Weigel - Zero-Sum Thinking, the Evolution of Effort Suppressing Beliefs, and Economic Development (RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1024)
by Jean-Paul Carvalho & Augustin Bergeron & Joseph Henrich & Nathan Nun & Jonathan Weigel - The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence From Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC (RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:92:y:2024:i:4:p:1163-1193)
by Augustin Bergeron & Gabriel Tourek & Jonathan L. Weigel