Salvador Barberà
Names
| first: |
Salvador |
| last: |
Barberà |
Identifer
Contact
| homepage: |
http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera |
|
| phone: |
34 93 581 18 14 |
| postal address: |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona;
Facultat d'Economia i Empresa;
Edifici B;
08193 Bellaterra (BARCELONA);
SPAIN |
Affiliations
-
Barcelona School of Economics (BSE)
/ Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
/ Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
/ Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Research profile
author of:
- Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:4:p:1073-99)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Wine rankings and the Borda method (repec:ags:aawewp:321842)
by Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. - Order-k Rationality (repec:aoz:wpaper:4)
by Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy De Cleppel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozeen - Protective Behaviour in Matching Models (repec:aub:autbar:157.91)
by Barbera, S. & Dutta, B. - Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees (repec:aub:autbar:184.92)
by Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E. - Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems (repec:aub:autbar:196.92)
by Alcalde, J. & Barberà, S. - Voting Under Constraints (repec:aub:autbar:200.92)
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A. - Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions (repec:aub:autbar:292.95)
by Barbera, S. - Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers (repec:aub:autbar:330.96)
by Barbera, S & Bogomolnaia, A & van der Stel, H - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (repec:aub:autbar:358.96)
by Barbera, S & Masso, J & Serizawa, S - Self-Selection Consistent Functions (repec:aub:autbar:468.00)
by Carmen Bevi? & Salvador Barber? - Voting by Committees under Constraints (repec:aub:autbar:501.01)
by Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro NEME - Voting by Committees under Constraints (repec:aub:autbar:505.01)
by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (repec:aub:autbar:512.02)
by Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers - Stable Condorcet Rules (repec:aub:autbar:539.02)
by Salvador Barber?Author-Name: Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es - Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation (repec:aub:autbar:557.02)
by Salvador Barberà & Carmen Bevia - Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions (repec:aub:autbar:596.03)
by Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Matthew O. JACKSON - On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union (repec:aub:autbar:597.03)
by Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Matthew O. JACKSON - Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice (repec:aub:autbar:598.03)
by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (repec:aub:autbar:599.03)
by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers - Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects (repec:aub:autbar:600.03)
by Salvador Barberà - A Theorem on Preference Aggregation (repec:aub:autbar:601.03)
by Salvador Barberà - On the rule of K names (repec:aub:autbar:636.04)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (repec:aub:autbar:656.05)
by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber - How to choose a non-controversial list with k names (repec:aub:autbar:675.06)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (repec:aub:autbar:761.09)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Single-dipped preferences (repec:aub:autbar:801.09)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Strategy-proof social choice (repec:aub:autbar:828.10)
by Salvador Barberà - Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (repec:aub:autbar:853.10)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (repec:aub:autbar:892.11)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences (repec:aub:autbar:91.88)
by Barbera, S. & Peleg, B. - Voting By Quota And Committee (repec:aub:autbar:95-88)
by Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H. - Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models (repec:bge:wpaper:1024)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (repec:bge:wpaper:1095)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Daunou's Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities (repec:bge:wpaper:1107)
by Kotaro Suzumura & Walter Bossert & Salvador Barberà - Order-k Rationality (repec:bge:wpaper:1130)
by Kareen Rozen & Alejandro Neme & Geoffroy De Clippel & Salvador Barberà - Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices (repec:bge:wpaper:1256)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò & Salvador Barberà - Opinion Aggregation: Borda and Condorcet Revisited (repec:bge:wpaper:1262)
by Walter Bossert & Salvador Barberà - Compromising on Compromise Rules (repec:bge:wpaper:1263)
by Danilo Coelho & Salvador Barberà - Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation (repec:bge:wpaper:128)
by Carmen Beviá & Salvador Barberà - (Not) Addressing Issues in Electoral Campaigns (repec:bge:wpaper:1353)
by Anke Gerber & Salvador Barberà - Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers (repec:bge:wpaper:1380)
by Walter Bossert & Salvador Barberà - Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties (repec:bge:wpaper:1442)
by Danilo Coelho & Salvador Barberà - On the Endogenous Order of Play in Sequential Games (repec:bge:wpaper:1443)
by Anke Gerber & Salvador Barberà - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (repec:bge:wpaper:15)
by Lars Ehlers & Salvador Barberà - A Theorem on Preference Aggregation (repec:bge:wpaper:166)
by Salvador Barberà - Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice (repec:bge:wpaper:2)
by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal - On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (repec:bge:wpaper:220)
by Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson - A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (repec:bge:wpaper:248)
by Anke Gerber & Salvador Barberà - On the rule of K names (repec:bge:wpaper:264)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - How to choose a non-controversial list with k names (repec:bge:wpaper:291)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result (repec:bge:wpaper:297)
by Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide? (repec:bge:wpaper:372)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences (repec:bge:wpaper:418)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Strategy-proof social choice (repec:bge:wpaper:420)
by Salvador Barberà - Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions with Binary Ranges and Arbitrary Domains: Characterization Results (repec:bge:wpaper:448)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions (repec:bge:wpaper:57)
by Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson - Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? (repec:bge:wpaper:598)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects (repec:bge:wpaper:61)
by Salvador Barberà - Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers (repec:bge:wpaper:696)
by Danilo Coelho & Salvador Barberà - Voting by Committees under Constraints (repec:bge:wpaper:7)
by Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Salvador Barberà - Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations (repec:bge:wpaper:737)
by Clara Ponsatà & Carmen Beviá & Salvador Barberà - Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation (repec:bge:wpaper:773)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking (repec:bge:wpaper:782)
by Anke Gerber & Salvador Barberà - Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments (repec:bge:wpaper:790)
by Alejandro Neme & Salvador Barberà - Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies (repec:bge:wpaper:801)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth (repec:bge:wpaper:893)
by Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Salvador Barberà - Information Disclosure with Many Alternatives (repec:bge:wpaper:904)
by Antonio Nicolò & Salvador Barberà - A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information (repec:bge:wpaper:951)
by Matthew O. Jackson & Salvador Barberà - Deciding on what to Decide (repec:bge:wpaper:973)
by Anke Gerber & Salvador Barberà - On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names (repec:bla:ijethy:v:14:y:2018:i:1:p:51-60)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers (repec:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:2:n:e70024)
by Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert - Compromising on compromise rules (repec:bla:randje:v:53:y:2022:i:1:p:95-112)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules (repec:clt:sswopa:1145)
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Barbera, Salvador - On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (repec:clt:sswopa:1196)
by Barbera, Salvador & Matthew O. Jackson - Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution (repec:cor:louvco:1998022)
by BARBERA, Salvador & MASCHLER, Michael & SHALEV, Jonathan - Supporting others and the evolution of influence (repec:cte:werepe:6171)
by Barberá, Salvador & Perea, Andrés - Wine rankings and the Borda method (repec:cup:jwecon:v:18:y:2023:i:2:p:122-138_2)
by Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. - Voting by Committees (repec:cwl:cwldpp:941)
by Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou - The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:7:p:1573-88)
by Barbera, Salvador - A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:3:p:637-40)
by Barbera, Salvador - Collective Probabilistic Judgements (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:51:y:1983:i:4:p:1033-46)
by Barbera, Salvador & Valenciano, Federico - Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:54:y:1986:i:3:p:707-15)
by Barbera, Salvador & Pattanaik, Prasanta K - Voting by Committees (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:3:p:595-609)
by Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin - Strategy-Proof Exchange (repec:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:1:p:51-87)
by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O - Self-Selection Consistent Choices (repec:ecm:wc2000:1322)
by Salvador Barbera & Carmen Bevia - Voting by Committees Under Constraints (repec:ecm:wc2000:1328)
by Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme - Supporting others and the evolution of influence (repec:eee:dyncon:v:26:y:2002:i:12:p:2051-2092)
by Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres - Pivotal voters : A new proof of arrow's theorem (repec:eee:ecolet:v:6:y:1980:i:1:p:13-16)
by Barbera, Salvador - A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games (repec:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:85-90)
by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke - Balancing the power to appoint officers (repec:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:189-203)
by Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo - Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models (repec:eee:gamebe:v:131:y:2022:i:c:p:1-28)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules (repec:eee:gamebe:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:1-21)
by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (repec:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:272-291)
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S. - Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (repec:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:40-78)
by Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J. - Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation (repec:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:185-200)
by Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen - Michael Maschler in Barcelona (repec:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:361-362)
by Barberà, Salvador - A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler (repec:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:1:p:288-288)
by Zamir, Shmuel & Barbera, Salvador - On the rule of k names (repec:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:44-61)
by Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo - Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result (repec:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:345-359)
by Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo - Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? (repec:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:490-509)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Protective behavior in matching models (repec:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:281-296)
by Barberà, S. & Dutta, B. - Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations (repec:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:237-257)
by Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara - Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences (repec:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:374-394)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Self-Selection Consistent Functions (repec:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:263-277)
by Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen - Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] (repec:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:275-275)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - Voting by committees under constraints (repec:eee:jetheo:v:122:y:2005:i:2:p:185-205)
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? (repec:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1648-1674)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Manipulation of social decision functions (repec:eee:jetheo:v:15:y:1977:i:2:p:266-278)
by Barbera, Salvador - Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings (repec:eee:jetheo:v:18:y:1978:i:2:p:244-254)
by Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo - Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited (repec:eee:jetheo:v:210:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000509)
by Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter - Stable voting schemes (repec:eee:jetheo:v:23:y:1980:i:2:p:267-274)
by Barbera, Salvador - Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach (repec:eee:jetheo:v:32:y:1984:i:1:p:185-191)
by Barbera, Salvador & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. - On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives (repec:eee:jetheo:v:33:y:1984:i:2:p:301-308)
by Barbera, S. & Barrett, C. R. & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. - Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons (repec:eee:jetheo:v:46:y:1988:i:1:p:34-44)
by Barbara, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew - Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees (repec:eee:jetheo:v:61:y:1993:i:2:p:262-289)
by Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio - Voting under Constraints (repec:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:2:p:298-321)
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro - Implementability via protective equilibria (repec:eee:mateco:v:10:y:1982:i:1:p:49-65)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar - Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice (repec:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:3:p:272-278)
by Barberà, Salvador & Grodal, Birgit - General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria (repec:eee:matsoc:v:11:y:1986:i:2:p:109-127)
by Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar - Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers (repec:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:89-103)
by Barbera, Salvador & Bogomolnaia, Anna & van der Stel, Hans - On coalition formation: durable coalition structures (repec:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:185-203)
by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke - Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] (repec:eee:matsoc:v:46:y:2003:i:3:p:355-356)
by Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke - Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:129-140)
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice (repec:eee:socchp:2-25)
by Barberà, Salvador - On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (repec:fem:femwpa:2004.76)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (repec:fth:inecpu:156)
by Masso, J. & Barbera, S. - A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information (repec:hic:wpaper:243)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects (repec:idb:brikps:3200)
by Barberá, Salvador - Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (repec:ier:iecrev:v:24:y:1983:i:2:p:413-17)
by Barbera, Salvador - Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice (repec:kud:kuiedp:0222)
by Salvador Barberà & Birgit Grodal - Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result (repec:mal:wpaper:2008-9)
by Salvador Barberà & Bernardo Moreno - Ranking Sets of Objects (repec:mtl:montde:2001-02)
by BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K. - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (repec:mtl:montde:2007-02)
by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador - Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (repec:mtl:montec:02-2007)
by EHLERS, Lars & BARBERÀ, Salvador - Ranking Sets of Objects (repec:mtl:montec:2001-02)
by Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K. - A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information (repec:now:jlqjps:100.00019002)
by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. - Strategy-Proof Exchange (repec:nwu:cmsems:1021)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules (repec:nwu:cmsems:1142)
by Salvador Barbera - The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance (repec:nwu:cmsems:193)
by Salvador Barbera - A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods (repec:nwu:cmsems:964)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson - Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions (repec:oup:qjecon:v:119:y:2004:i:3:p:1011-1048.)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework (repec:oup:restud:v:46:y:1979:i:2:p:379-389.)
by Salvador Barbera - Wine rankings and the Borda method (repec:pab:wpaper:23.04)
by Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero - On the Relationship between Economic Development and Political Democracy (repec:pal:intecp:978-1-349-24076-0_2)
by John E. Roemer & Salvador Barberà - Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions (repec:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25214-5_3)
by Salvador Barberà - (Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns (repec:sae:jothpo:v:35:y:2023:i:4:p:259-291)
by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber - Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems (repec:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:3:p:417-35)
by Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador - Order-k rationality (repec:spr:joecth:v:73:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01350-z)
by Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy de Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen - Memorial (repec:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:1-2)
by Salvador Barberà & Shmuel Zamir - Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results (repec:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:791-808)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms (repec:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:2:p:111-127)
by Bhaskar Dutta & Salvador BarberÁ - Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes (repec:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:321-336)
by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ - An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (repec:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:619-653)
by Salvador Barberà - How to choose a non-controversial list with k names (repec:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:1:p:79-96)
by Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho - Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule (repec:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:559-574)
by Salvador Barberà & Lars Ehlers - Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences (repec:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:335-352)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel (repec:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01196-4)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno - Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities (repec:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01276-w)
by Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura - Information disclosure with many alternatives (repec:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01341-y)
by Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò - Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems (repec:spr:sochwe:v:65:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01575-6)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò - Editor's note (repec:spr:specre:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:153-153)
by Salvador Barberà - Salvador Barberà on Hugo F. Sonnenschein (repec:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-74057-5_6)
by Salvador BarberÀ - Sequential voting and agenda manipulation (repec:the:publsh:2118)
by Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke - On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (repec:ucp:jpolec:v:114:y:2006:i:2:p:317-339)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - Deciding On What To Decide (repec:wly:iecrev:v:63:y:2022:i:1:p:37-61)
by Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber - Condorcet Consistency And Pairwise Justifiability Under Variable Agendas (repec:wly:iecrev:v:66:y:2025:i:1:p:313-329)
by Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò - Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (repec:wpa:wuwpga:9804001)
by Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev - Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules (repec:wpa:wuwpmi:0211003)
by Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson - A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (repec:zur:iewwpx:238)
by Salvador Barber� & Anke Gerber