Luca Anderlini
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first: |
Luca |
last: |
Anderlini |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Georgetown University
/ Economics Department (weight: 50%)
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Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF) (weight: 50%)
Research profile
author of:
- Tournament Auctions (RePEc:arx:papers:2403.08102)
by Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim - When is Trust Robust? (RePEc:arx:papers:2403.12917)
by Luca Anderlini & Larry Samuelson & Daniele Terlizzese - Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder (RePEc:arx:papers:2409.11048)
by Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:7:y:2011:i:1:n:2)
by Anderlini Luca & Felli Leonardo & Postlewaite Andrew - The Emergence of Enforcement (RePEc:cam:camdae:2250)
by Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M. - Costly Coasian Contracts (RePEc:cam:camdae:9704)
by Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. - The Emergence of Enforcement (RePEc:cam:camjip:2222)
by Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M. - Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? (RePEc:cca:wpaper:355)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Communication and Learning (RePEc:cca:wpaper:82)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Statute Law or Case Law? (RePEc:cca:wpaper:83)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - Costly Contingent Contracts (RePEc:cep:stitep:/1996/313)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics (1994), vol.109, pp.1085-1124.) (RePEc:cep:stitep:263)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Incomplete Written Contracts: Endogenous Agency Problems (Revised version, 'Describability and Agency Problems', published in European Economic Review, vol.42 (1998), pp.35-59.) (RePEc:cep:stitep:267)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.) (RePEc:cep:stitep:361)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Costly Coasian Contracts (RePEc:cep:stitep:362)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts (RePEc:cep:stitep:407)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem (RePEc:cep:stitep:409)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cep:stitep:431)
by Nabil J Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cep:stitep:447)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:cep:stitep:511)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Statute Law or Case Law? (RePEc:cep:stitep:528)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - Undescribable Events (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1092)
by Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1852)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_213)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Statute Law or Case Law? (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2358)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth (RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3489)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni - Why Stare Decisis? (RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000068)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - Equilibrium Trust (RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000379)
by Luca Anderlini & Daniele Terlizzese - The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000577)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Communication and Learning (RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001868)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000850)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000926)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000664)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Costly Coasian Contracts (RePEc:cla:penntw:c5b2efc4326ca8bb8162440d62ce6510)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Costly Pretrial Agreements (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13074)
by Felli, Leonardo & Anderlini, Luca & Immordino, Giovanni - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2835)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3271)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Al-Najjar, Nabil I. - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4197)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Statute Law or Case Law? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6912)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro - Why Stare Decisis? (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8266)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro - Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth (RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8433)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni & Riboni, Alessandro - Legal Efficiency and Consistency (RePEc:crs:wpaper:2016-22)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1490)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1601)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Communication and Learning (RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1639)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - NSF conference on decentralization (RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01cc0045)
by Roger Lagunoff & Luca Anderlini - Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem (RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:116:y:2006:i:508:p:223-245)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Communication and Learning (RePEc:ecl:yaleco:37)
by Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger - Cooperation and Effective Computability (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:6:p:1337-69)
by Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid - Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation (RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:69:y:2001:i:2:p:377-411)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Procurement with a strong insider (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:241:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002696)
by Anderlini, Luca & Kim, GaOn - Modelling the strategy of mid-water trawlers targeting small pelagic fish in the Adriatic Sea and its drivers (RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:300:y:2015:i:c:p:102-113)
by Russo, Tommaso & Pulcinella, Jacopo & Parisi, Antonio & Martinelli, Michela & Belardinelli, Andrea & Santojanni, Alberto & Cataudella, Stefano & Colella, Sabrina & Anderlini, Luca - Legal efficiency and consistency (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:121:y:2020:i:c:s0014292119301837)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro - Describability and agency problems (RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:1:p:35-59)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Equilibrium trust (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:624-644)
by Anderlini, Luca & Terlizzese, Daniele - Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:2:p:141-177)
by Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella - Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games (RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:1:p:1-37)
by Anderlini, Luca - Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:393-408)
by Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger - Structural Stability Implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality (RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:101:y:2001:i:2:p:395-422)
by Anderlini, Luca & Canning, David - Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:71-90)
by Anderlini, Luca - Cooperation and computability in n-player games (RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:2:p:99-137)
by Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid - Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (RePEc:eee:reecon:v:58:y:2004:i:1:p:3-30)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Active courts and menu contracts (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3569)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3576)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Unforeseen contingencies (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3578)
by Al-Najjar, Nabil & Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3582)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Costly coasian contracts (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3583)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3591)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Costly bargaining and renegotiation (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3592)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:3593)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Statute law or case law? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:4433)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, A. - Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? (RePEc:ehl:lserod:4677)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew - Unknown item RePEc:ehl:lserod:58189 (paper)
- Costly pretrial agreements (RePEc:ehl:lserod:89255)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni - Equilibrium Trust (RePEc:eie:wpaper:0913)
by Luca Anderlini & Daniele Terlizzese - Active courts and menu contracts (RePEc:elg:eechap:14720_13)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Church's Thesis and Game Theory: An Overview of Some Results (RePEc:elg:eechap:326_9)
by Luca Anderlini - The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result (RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco96/05)
by Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H - Communication, Computability And Common Interest Games (RePEc:fth:cambri:159)
by Anderlini, L. - Cooperation and Effective Computability (RePEc:fth:cambri:167)
by Anderlini, L. & Sabourian, H. - Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature (RePEc:fth:cambri:183)
by Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. - Endogenous Agency Problems (RePEc:fth:cambri:200)
by Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. - Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups' (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~01-01-03)
by Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-26)
by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-27)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-28)
by Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-29)
by Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite - The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~04-04-09)
by Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University) - A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-01)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-07)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-08)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~07-07-01)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Communication and Learning (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~08-08-01)
by Roger Lagunoff & Dino Gerardi & Luca Anderlini - Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~14-14-04)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Costly Pre-Trial Agreements (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~18-18-11)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino - Legal Efficiency and Consistency (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~18-18-12)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - The Emergence of Enforcement (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~22-22-08)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Michele Piccione - The Emergence of Enforcement (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~23-23-06)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Michele Piccione - Tournament Auctions (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~24-24-01)
by Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim - When is Trust Robust? (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~24-24-02)
by Luca Anderlini & Larry Samuelson & Daniele Terlizzese - The Law of General Average (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~24-24-03)
by Luca Anderlini & Joshua Teitlebaum - Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder (RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~24-24-04)
by Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim - Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs (RePEc:kap:theord:v:46:y:1999:i:1:p:23-50)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Undescribable Contingencies (RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1370)
by Nabil Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature (RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:4:p:1085-1124.)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Undescribable Events (RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:4:p:849-868)
by Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Communication and Learning (RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:2:p:419-450)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:03-026)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (RePEc:pen:papers:06-001)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:06-024)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Active Courts and Menu Contracts (RePEc:pen:papers:06-025)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (RePEc:pen:papers:09-004)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite - Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs (RePEc:pra:mprapa:28483)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo - Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict (RePEc:red:issued:08-92)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Why Stare Decisis? (RePEc:red:issued:13-137)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni - Statute Law or Case Law? (RePEc:red:sed007:952)
by Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni & Luca Anderlini - Legal Origins and Creative Destruction (RePEc:red:sed008:733)
by Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni & Luca Anderlini - Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth (RePEc:sef:csefwp:256)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni - Costly Pretrial Agreements (RePEc:sef:csefwp:449)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino - When is Trust Robust? (RePEc:sef:csefwp:710)
by Luca Anderlini & Larry Samuelson & Daniele Terlizzese - The Emergence of Enforcement (RePEc:sef:csefwp:711)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Michele Piccione - Tournament Auctions (RePEc:sef:csefwp:712)
by Luca Anderlini & Gaon Kim - The Law of General Average (RePEc:sef:csefwp:725)
by Luca Anderlini & Joshua C. Teitelbaum - Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:265-299)
by Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff - A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games (RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:3:p:357-394)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution (RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:413-447)
by Luca Anderlini & Paolo Siconolfi - Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ (RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-29578-5_2)
by Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff - Costly Pretrial Agreements (RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/699841)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino - Legal Institutions, Innovation, And Growth (RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:937-956)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino & Alessandro Riboni - "Costly Coasian Contracts'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-11)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - "Cooperation and Computability in N-Player Games'' (RePEc:wop:pennca:97-15)
by Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian - Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0107001)
by Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff - The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0410001)
by Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff - The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9510001)
by Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian - Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9510003)
by Luca Anderlini - Describability and Agency Problems (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9511001)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - Costly Coasian Contracts (RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610006)
by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli - The emergence of enforcement (RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:301156)
by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Piccione, Michele