Vera Angelova
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Vera |
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Angelova |
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Contact
Affiliations
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Technische Universität Berlin
/ Fakultät Wirtschaft und Management
Research profile
author of:
- Can Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Threats Foster Cooperation? An Experimental Test Of Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems (RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:2:p:1345-1356)
by Vera Angelova & Lisa V. Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke - Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-03)
by Vera Angelova & Olivier Armantier & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart - Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance? (RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:31-34)
by Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? Experimental evidence from markets for expert services (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:154:y:2018:i:c:p:362-378)
by Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias - Competition and fatigue (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:198:y:2022:i:c:p:236-249)
by Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - On the evolution of professional consulting (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:1:p:113-126)
by Gehrig, Thomas & Güth, Werner & Leví0nský, René & Popova, Vera - Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game (RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:205-218)
by Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias - Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents (RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:1:p:48-58)
by Angelova, Vera & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. - Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-027)
by Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner - Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-028)
by Vera Angelova & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart - What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and reciprocity (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-029)
by Vera Angelova - Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game (RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-030)
by Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner - Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (RePEc:ihs:ihswps:10)
by Angelova, Vera & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. - Voluntary Cooperation Based on Equilibrium Retribution - An Experiment Testing Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-030)
by Lisa V. Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke & Vera Popova - Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-016)
by Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher & Vera Popova - What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity - (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-036)
by Vera Popva - Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-011)
by Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner - Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-012)
by Vera Angelova & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart - Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? Experimental Evidence from Markets for Expert Services (RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2018-009)
by Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner - Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence (RePEc:kap:theord:v:77:y:2014:i:4:p:531-556)
by Vera Angelova & Olivier Armantier & Giuseppe Attanasi & Yolande Hiriart - Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:ler:wpaper:25818)
by Angelova, Vera & Attanasi, Giuseppe & Hiriart, Yolande - Competition and Fatigue At Work (RePEc:rco:dpaper:134)
by Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (RePEc:rco:dpaper:202)
by Angelova, Vera & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. - Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services (RePEc:rco:dpaper:26)
by Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias - Lying to Individuals versus Lying to Groups (RePEc:rco:dpaper:350)
by Angelova, Vera & Tolksdorf, Michel - Does a Short-Term Increase in Incentives Boost Performance? (RePEc:rco:dpaper:60)
by Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence (RePEc:tse:wpaper:25820)
by Angelova, Vera & Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Hiriart, Yolande - Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-027)
by Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias - Relative performance of liability rules: Experimental evidence (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-028)
by Angelova, Vera & Attanasi, Giuseppe & Hiriart, Yolande - What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and reciprocity (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-029)
by Angelova, Vera - Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game (RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2016-030)
by Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias