Jörgen W. Weibull
Names
first: 
Jörgen 
middle: 
W. 
last: 
Weibull 
in English: 
Jorgen W. Weibull 
Contact
Affiliations

Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
→ Department of Economics (weight: 65%)
 website
 location: Stockholm, Sweden

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
→ Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) (weight: 25%)

Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan  Matematiska institutionen (weight: 10%)
 English name: Royal Institute of Technology  Department of Mathematics
 website
 location: Stockholm, Sweden
Research profile
author of:

Better May be Worse: Some Monotonicity Results and Paradoxes in Discrete Choice Under Uncertainty
by JÃrgen Weibull & LarsGÃran Mattsson & Mark Voorneveld

POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
by LINDBECK, A. & WEIBULL, J. W.

Political Polarization
by Dixit, Avinash & Weibull, Jörgen

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
by Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörg Weibull

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games.
by Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J. W.

On Self Enforcement in ExtensiveForm Games.
by Weibull, J. W.

Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium
by Laslier, JeanFrançois & Weibull, Jörgen

Probabilistic Choice as a Result of Mistakes.
by Mattsson, L.G. & Weibull, J. W.

Natural selection and social preferences
by Weibull, Jörgen & Salomonsson, Marcus

Prices and quality signals
by Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W.

The Fetters of the Sib: Weber Meets Darwin
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen

Price competition and convex costs
by Weibull, Jörgen

Internal Efficiency and External Conditions.
by Weibull, J.W.

Better may be worse: Some monotonicity results and paradoxes in discrete choice
by Mattsson, LarsGöran & Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Efficiency, communication and honesty
by Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen

Family ties, incentives and development: a model of coerced altruism
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen

Punctuality  A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium
by Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation.
by Bjornerstedt, J. & Weibull, J. W.

Probabilistic Choice as a Result of Mistakes
by Mattsson, LarsGöran & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour.
by Basu, K. & Weibull, J. W.

Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution
by Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull

Testing Game Theory
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State.
by Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S. & Weibull, J.W.

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs.
by Van Damme, E. & Weibull, J. W.

What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Welfare Foundations of Discounting
by SáezMartí, María & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
by Weibull, J. W.

Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems
by VIEILLE, Nicolas & WEIBULL, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players.
by Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J. W.

Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting.
by Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S. & Weibull, J.W.

Social Norms, the WelfareState, and Voting.
by Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S. & Weibull, J. W.

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities.
by van Damme, E. & Weibull, J. W.

Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
by Vieille, Nicolas & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms
by Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen

STRATEGY SUBSETS CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOR.
by BASU, K. & WEIBULL, J.

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model.
by SaezMarti, M. & Weibull, J. W.

Social norms and optimal incentives in firms
by Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
by Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull

Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting
by Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities
by van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs
by Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
by Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W.

What have we learned from evolutionary game theory so far?
by WEIBULL JORGEN. W.

Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
by Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
by Weibull, Jörgen W. & SaezMarti, Maria

Altruism and Climate
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

Altruism and Climate
by Weibull, Jörgen & Alger, Ingela

Discounting and Future Selves
by SáezMartí, María & Weibull, Jörgen W.

A NEW SELF ENFORCEMENT CRITERION FOR EXTENSIVEFORM GAMES
by WEIBULL, J. W.

Dynamic Bertrand competition with intertemporal demand
by Weibull, Jörgen & Dutta, Prajit & Matros, Alexander

Crime, punishment and social norms
by Weibull, Jörgen & Villa, Edgar

Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
by SaezMarti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games.
by Benaim, M. & Weibull, J. W.

A Note on Social Norms and Transfers.
by Sunden, D. & Weibull, J.W.

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Coordination Games
by Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull

Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies.
by Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jîrgen W.

Evolutionary Selection in NormalForm Games.
by Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Markets with Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz
by Karl–Gustaf Lofgren & Torsten Persson & Jorgen W. Weibull

Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games
by Weibull, Jorgen W.

Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies
by Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs
by Eric Van Damme & Jorgen W. Weibull

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in CheapTalk Coordination Games
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
by SaezMarti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
by Mattsson, LarsGoran & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?
by Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W.

Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
by Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
by Michel BenaÔm & J.–rgen W. Weibull

Stability and efficiency from a NeoKeynesian viewpoint
by Svensson, LarsGunnar & Jorgen Weibull, W.

Paternalism, buyers' and sellers' market
by Kornai, Janos & Weibull, Jorgen W.

The 'as if' approach to game theory: Three positive results and four obstacles
by Weibull, Jorgen W.

A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy
by Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Discounting and altruism to future decisionmakers
by SaezMarti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Competition and accessibility on a regional labour market
by Mattsson, LarsGoran & Weibull, Jorgen W.

On selfenforcement in extensiveform games
by Weibull, Jorgen W.

Constrained Paretooptimal taxation of labour and capital incomes
by Svensson, LarsGunnar & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities
by van Damme, Eric & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Discounting and altruism to future decisionmakers
by Maria SaezMarti & Jorgen W. Weibull

An upper bound on optimal income taxes
by Svensson, LarsGunnar & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli.
by Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W.

A note on the continuity of incentive schedules
by Weibull, Jorgen W.

Welfare effects of alternative forms of public spending
by Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W.

An axiomatic approach to the measurement of accessibility
by Weibull, Jorgen W.

A minimum information principle : Theory and practice
by Snickars, Folke & Weibull, Jorgen W.

Outer measure and utility
by Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution
by Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull

Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior
by Asheim, Geir & Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Game Theory
by Jorgen W. Weibull

"Entropy and information theory": critique, comments, and reply Entropy and information theory: are we missing something?
by C. Fisk & T. E. Smith & J. W. Weibull & S. Erlander & J. R. Roy & D. F. Batten & A. Norcliffe

On the numerical measurement of accessibility
by J. W. Weibull

Multiple solutions under quasiexponential discounting
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull

Corrigendum: Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution
by Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull

Finding all minimal CURB sets
by Klimm, Max & Weibull, Jörgen

Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition
by Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen

Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
by Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen W.

A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation
by Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull

Evolutionary Selection in NormalForm Games
by K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull

Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium
by JeanFrançois Laslier & Jörgen Weibull

The fetters of the sib: Weber meets Darwin
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull

Finding all minimal curb sets
by Max Klimm & Jörgen Weibull

Multiple solutions under quasiexponential discounting
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull

Evolutionary Selection against dominated strategies
by J. Hofbauer & J. Weibull

Epistemically stable strategy sets
by Geir B. Asheim & Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen Weibull

Meanfield approximation of stochastic population processes in games
by Michel Benaïm & Jörgen Weibull

Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution
by Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull

Kinship, Incentives and Evolution
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull

Outer measure and utility
by Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen Weibull

Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets
by Geir B., Asheim & Voorneveld, Max & W. Weibull, Jörgen

Social norms and economic incentives in firms
by Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen

Homo MoralisPreference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
by Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State
by Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Longrun price competition
by Prajit Dutta & Alexander Matros & Jörgen W. Weibull

Homo Moralis: Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Internal Efficiency and External Conditions
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Managerial Incentives and Market Integration
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting
by Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation
by Björnerstedt, Jonas & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Kinship, Incentives and Evolution – revised version: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibul

The MassAction Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Stability, Cooperation and Hamilton’s Rule
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

An IncentiveCompatible Condorcet Jury Theorem
by JeanFrançois Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull

Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Balancedbudget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
by Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull

Extreme values, invariance and choice probabilities
by Mattsson, LarsGöran & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lindberg, Per Olov

Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent GameTheoretic Results
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles
by Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games
by Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W.

A Note on Social Norms and Transfers
by Sundén, David & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies
by Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Homo MoralisPreference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, JÃrgen

Social norms and optimal incentives in firms
by Huck, S. & Kübler, D. & Weibull, J.

Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (Revision of DP 201070)
by Andersson, O. & Argenton, C. & Weibull, J.

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Weibull, J.

Equilibrium in strategic interaction : The contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Weibull, J. W.

Robustness to strategic uncertainty
by Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W.

The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory
by Kuhn, H. W. & Harsanyi, J. C. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J. W. & van Damme, E. E. C. & Nash Jr, J. F. & Hammerstein, P.

Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Weibull, J.

Evolution leads to Kantian morality
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Weibull, J.

Evolution leads to Kantian morality
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

The work of John Nash in game theory
by van Damme, E. E. C. & Kühn, H. & Harsanyi, J. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J. & Nash Jr., J. & Hammerstein, P.

Invariance of the distribution of the maximum
by Fosgerau, Mogens & Lindberg, Per Olov & Mattsson, LarsGöran & Weibull, Jörgen

Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?
by Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?
by Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Invariance of the distribution of the maximum
by Fosgerau, Mogens & Lindberg, Per Olov & Mattsson, LarsGöran & Weibull, Jörgen

Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems
by Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull

On the Numerical Measurement of Accessibility
by J. W. Weibull

Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State
by Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull

Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
by Roger Myerson & Jörgen Weibull

Pay Schemes, Bargaining, and Competition for Talent
by Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen

Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets
by Geir B. Asheim & Mark Voorneveld & Jörgen W. Weibull

Evolution and Kantian morality
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Morality: evolutionary foundations and policy implications
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Morality: evolutionary foundations and policy implications
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Epistemically robust strategy subsets
by Asheim, Geir & Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W.

DiscountedValue Representations of Temporal Preferences
by Jörgen W. Weibull

Revealed Preferences in a Sequential Prisoners' Dilemma: A HorseRace Between Six Utility Functions
by Topi Miettinen & Michael Kosfeld & Ernst Fehr & Jörgen W. Weibull

A Model of Wealth Accumulation
by Sylvain Gibaud & Jorgen W. Weibull

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists,
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Investment, Rational Inattention, and Delegation
by Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors
by Dufwenberg, M. & Bjornerstedt, J. & Norman, P. & Weibull, J.

Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game
by Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution of preferences in groupstructured populations: genes, guns, and culture
by Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists
by Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull

Evolution of preferences in groupstructured populations: genes, guns, and culture
by Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W.

A note on the invariance of the distribution of the maximum
by Fosgerau, Mogens & Lindberg, Per Olov & Mattsson, LarsGöran & Weibull, Jörgen

Spatial competition with unitdemand functions
by Ga\"etan Fournier & Karine Van Der Straeten & J.\"orgen Weibull

Testing Game Theory
by Jorgen W. Weibull

Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
by Alger, Ingela & Van Leeuwen, Boris & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Does moral play equilibrate?
by Bomze, Immanuel & Schachinger, Werner & Weibull, Jorgen

Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Van Leeuwen, Boris

Spatial competition with unitdemand functions
by Fournier, Gaëtan & Van Der Straeten, Karine & Weibull, Jörgen W.

Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent