ran spiegler

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• University College London (UCL) → Department of Economics (weight: 50%)
  • website
  • location: London, United Kingdom
• Tel Aviv University → Eitan Berglas School of Economics (weight: 50%)
  • website
  • location: Tel Aviv, Israel

Research profile

author of:

• Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
  by Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler
• Optimal speculative trade among large traders
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Money Pumps in the Market
  by Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler
• Contradiction as a form of Contractual Incompleteness
  by Dana Heller & Ran Spiegler
• Consumer optimism and price discrimination
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates
  by Ran Spiegler
• A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Testing threats in repeated games
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources?
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Extracting Interaction-Created Surplus
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Inferring a linear ordering over a power set
  by Ran Spiegler
• Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
  by Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubenstein & Ran Spiegler
• Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games.
  by Spiegler, R.
• Pro Arguments, Con Arguments and Status Quo Bias in Multi-Issue Decision Problems.
  by Spiegler, R.
• Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
  by Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler
• Speculative Contracts
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Price Competition Under Limited Comparability
  by Michele Piccione & Ran Spiegler
• Testing Threats in Repeated Games
  by Ran Spiegler
• Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Consumer bounded rationality and rigidity/flexibility retail price patterns
  by Spiegler, Ran
• ‘BUT CAN'T WE GET THE SAME THING WITH A STANDARD MODEL?’ RATIONALIZING BOUNDED-RATIONALITY MODELS
  by Spiegler, Ran
• "But Can't we Get the Same Thing with a Standard Model?" Rationalizing Bounded-Rationality Models
  by Spiegler, Ran
• On the strategic use of attention grabbers
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• COMMENTS ON THE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NEUROECONOMICS FOR ECONOMIC THEORY
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Price Competition under Limited Comparability
  by Piccione, Michele & Spiegler, Ran
• Price Competition under Limited Comparability
  by Michele Piccione & Ran Spiegler
• On the Strategic Use of Attention Grabbers
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Monopoly Pricing when Consumers are Antagonized by Unexpected Price Increases: A "Cover Version" of the Heidhues-Koszegi-Rabin Model
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Testing Threats in Repeated Games
  by Ran Spiegler
• Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a “cover version” of the Heidhues–Kőszegi–Rabin model
  by Ran Spiegler
• Coordination and Matchmakers.
  by Spiegler, R.
• A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Bargaining over bets
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Anticipatory Feelings and Attitudes to Information
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Testing Threats in Repeated Games
  by Ran Spiegler
• Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession Game
  by Ran Spiegler
• Reference Dependence and Labor-Market Fluctuations
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Testing Threats in Repeated Games.
  by Spiegler, R.
• Argumentation in Multi-Issue Debates
  by Ran Spiegler
• The Market for Quacks
  by Ran Spiegler
• Reference Dependence and Labor Market Fluctuations
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
  edited by
• Reference-Dependence and Labor-Market Fluctuations
  by Kfir Eliaz & Rani Spiegler
• Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games
  by Ran Spiegler
• Placebo Reforms
  by Ran Spiegler
• Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations
  by Ran Spiegler
• Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run Relationship
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• X-games
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations
  by Spiegler, Ran
• The Market for Keywords
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Reference Dependence and Labor Market Fluctuations
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run Relationship
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Manipulating market sentiment
  by Piccione, Michele & Spiegler, Ran
• X-Games
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Competitive Framing
  by Ran Spiegler
• Agility in repeated games: An example
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Beyond “Ellison’s Matrix”: New Directions in Behavioral Industrial Organization
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Incentive Compatible Advertising on a Social Network
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Search Design and Broad Matching
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• On the Equilibrium Effects of Nudging
  by Ran Spiegler
• Manipulating market sentiment
  by Piccione, Michele & Spiegler, Ran
• Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systemically Fooled?
  by Ran Spiegler
• Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations
  by Ran Spiegler
• Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical Style
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Choice Complexity and Market Competition
  by Ran Spiegler
• Can agents with causal misperceptions be systematically fooled?
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Price Competition under Limited Comparability
  by Piccione, Michele & Spiegler, Ran
• Incentive Compatible Estimators
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Buridanic competition
  by Bachi, Benjamin & Spiegler, Ran
• The Market for Keywords
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• “Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics
  by Ran Spiegler
• Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• The Model Selection Curse
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• News and Archival Information in Games
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Reference Dependence and Labor-Market Fluctuations
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Competitive Framing
  by Spiegler, Ran
• A Model of Competing Narratives
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Buridanic Competition
  by Bachi, Benjamin & Spiegler, Ran
• X-Games
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• A Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations
  by Spiegler, Ran
• A Model of Competing Narratives
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
• Strategic Interpretations
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi Christina
• Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical Style
  by Ran Spiegler
• Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Incentive‐compatible advertising on nonretail platforms
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations
  by Ran Spiegler
• A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
  by Kfir Eliaz & Rani Spiegler
• Money Pumps in the Market
  by Ariel Rubinstein & Rani Spiegler
• Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?
  by Ran Spiegler
• Cheating with (Recursive) Models
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler & Yair Weiss
• A simple model of a money-management market with rational and extrapolative investors
  by Spiegler, Ran
• Cheating with (recursive) models
  by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Weiss, Yair
• The Market for Quacks
  by Rani Spiegler
• The Model Selection Curse
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness
  by Dana Heller & Ran Spiegler
• A Model of Competing Narratives
  by Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler
• Speculative Contracts
  by Kfir Eliaz & Rani Spiegler