Ariel Rubinstein
Names
first:  Ariel 
last:  Rubinstein 
Contact
email:  
homepage:  http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il 
phone:  +972544235347 
Affiliations

Tel Aviv University
→ Eitan Berglas School of Economics (weight: 75%)
 website
 location: Tel Aviv, Israel

New York University (NYU)
→ Department of Economics (weight: 25%)
 website
 location: New York City, New York (United States)
Research profile
author of:

NONCOOPERATIVE MODELS OF BARGAINING
by BINMORE, K. & OSBORNE, M. J. & RUBINSTEIN, A. 
Correct Belief, Wrong Action and a Puzzling Gender Difference.
by Huberman, G. & Rubinstein, A. 
Is it "Economics and Psychology"?: the Case of Hyperbolic Discounting.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Economics and Language
by Rubinstein, A. 
Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules.
by Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A. 
A,A,A,A,A or A,A,B,C,D? OverDiversification in Repeated Decision Problems.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Naive Strategies in Competitive Games.
by Rubinstein, A. & Tversky, A. & Heller, D. 
Definable Preferences: An Example.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point.
by Rubinstein, A. & Zhou, L. 
John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling.
by Rubinstein, A. 
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model.
by Rubenstein, A. 
Defineable Preferences: Another Example.
by Rubinstein, A. 
The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses.
by Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A. 
Games with Procedurally Rational Players.
by Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A. 
Finite Automata Play A Repeated Extensive Game.
by Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A. 
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and PostClass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Why Are Linear Orderings so Common in Natural Language?
by Rubinstein, A. 
Naive Strategies in ZeroSum Games.
by Rubinstein, A. & Tversky, A. 
What Motives Should Guide Referees? On the Design of Mechanisms to Elict Options.
by Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A. 
A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games.
by Rubinstein, A. & Wolnsky, A. 
On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games v.s. Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games.
by Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A. 
A Comment on the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
RenegotiationProof Implementation and Time Preferences
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
A,A,A,A,A or A,A,B,C,D? OverDiversification in Repeated Decision Problems
by A. Rubinstein 
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point
by A. Rubinstein & L. Zhou 
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
by A. Rubinstein 
On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach
by A. Rubinstein & A. Kasher 
Economics and Language
by A. Rubinstein 
Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules
by A. Rubinstein & J. Glazer 
Defineable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town)
by A. Rubinstein 
A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining.
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher 
A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata.
by Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences.
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William 
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
by Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
RenegotiationProof Implementation and Time Preferences.
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher 
Definable preferences: An example1
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), pp.184193.)
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures,
by Fershtman, Chaim & Rubinstein, Ariel 
The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behaviour: An Introduction (Now published in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: John Robinson and Beyond, edited by G. Feiwel, (1989), pp.24325.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.17 (1986), pp.176188.)
by Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176188.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Irrational diversification in multiple decision problems
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
The AbsentMinded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses
by Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel 
An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
by Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler 
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction (Now published in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (eds.), (Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.1732.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Comments on the interpretation of game theory (Now published in Econometrica, 59 (1991), pp.909924.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
by Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler 
Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
by Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Time Preference.
by Fishburn, Peter C. & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 11331150.)
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
Similarity and DecisionMaking Under Risk (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), pp.145153.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Modelling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognise Equilibrium Patterns
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
Games with Procedurally Rational Players.
by Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel 
The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.12591282.)
by Dilip Abreu & Ariel Rubinstein 
Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
by Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel 
A theorist's view of experiments
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Is it 'Economics and Psychology'?: The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
by Ariel Rubinstein 
A Game with Almost Common Knowledge: An Example (Now published in American Economic Review, 79 (1989), pp.385391.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Choice problems with a 'reference' point
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Zhou, Lin 
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
"Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
by Ariel Rubinstein 
The Competitive Stock Market as Cartel Maker: Some Examples
by Ariel Rubinstein & Menahem E. Yaari 
Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp.6378.)
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
The curse of wealth and power
by Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Is it "Economics and Psychology"?: the Case of Hyperbolic Discounting.
by Rubinstein, A. 
Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Correct Belief, Wrong Action and a Puzzling Gender Difference.
by Huberman, G. & Rubinstein, A. 
On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
Games with Procedurally Rational Players
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein 
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher 
Remarks on Infinitely Repeated ExtensiveForm Games
by Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher 
On the logic of "agreeing to disagree" type results
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher 
On Bargaining, Settling, and Litigation: A Problem in Multistage Games With Imperfect Information
by Ordover, Janusz A. & Rubinstein, Ariel 
On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons
by Ariel Rubinstein & Uzi Segal 
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
by Ariel Rubinstein 
On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons
by Ariel Rubinstein & Uzi Segal 
Noncooperative models of bargaining
by Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel
edited by 
Modeling Bounded Rationality
by Ariel Rubinstein 
The 1120 Money Request Game: Evaluating the Upper Bound of kLevel Reasoning
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
Money Pumps in the Market
by Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler 
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability.
by A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky 
Is It 'Economics and Psychology?' : The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times
by Ariel Rubinstein 
FreakFreakonomics
by Rubinstein Ariel 
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E. 
Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory
by Ariel Rubinstein 
LUXURY PRICES: AN EXPOSITORY NOTE*
by MICHELE PICCIONE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN 
Reputation and Patience in the “War of Attrition”
by Kornhauser, Lewis A. & Rubinstein, Ariel & Wilson, Charles 
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Similarity and Decision Making Under Risk
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting
by Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein 
Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty
by Amos Arieli & Yaniv BenAmi & Ariel Rubinstein 
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma
by Ariel Rubinstein 
What Motives Should Guide Referees? On The Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Reputation and Patience in the "War of Attrition"
by Kornhauser, Lewis A. & Rubinstein, Ariel & Wilson, Charles 
Similarity and decisionmaking under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Fairness Motivations and Procedures of Choice between Lotteries as Revealed through Eye Movements
by Amos Arieli & Yaniv BenAmi & Ariel Rubinstein 
A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Comments on Neuroeconomics
by Ariel Rubinstein 
The Choice of Conjectures In A Bargaining Game With Incomplete Information
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Stability of decision systems under majority rule
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Colonel Blotto’s Top Secret Files
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
Choice From Lists
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salunt 
Choosing the two finalists
by Kfir Eliaz & Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein 
COMMENTS ON NEUROECONOMICS
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Course in Game Theory
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein 
Aggregation of equivalence relations
by Peter Fishburn & Ariel Rubinstein 
A model of choice from lists
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Salant, Yuval 
Algebraic aggregation theory
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C. 
A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics
by Ariel Rubinstein 
A note on the duty of disclosure
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Economics and Language
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Economics and Language
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Equilibrium in the Jungle
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
Dilemas de un teórico económico
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: Framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
by Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Economics and Language
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Edgar Allen Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game?
by Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein 
Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
by AR. RUBINSTEIN. 
Multidimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the Colonel Blotto game
by Arad, Ayala & Rubinstein, Ariel 
“Neuro”‐Observational Learning
by Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein 
On the likelihood of cyclic comparisons
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Segal, Uzi 
MultiDimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action: The Case of the Colonel Blotto Game
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
(A, f): Choice with Frames super1
by Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein 
A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
The 1120 Money Request Game: A Levelk Reasoning Study
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
On Fairness of Random Procedures
by Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein 
Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioural Data Sets
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
Complex Questionnaires
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
10 Q&A: Experienced Advice for “Lost” Graduate Students in Economics
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Back to Fundamentals: Convex Geometry and Economic Equilibrium
by Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein 
Strategic Tournaments
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
A further characterization of Borda ranking method
by Shmuel Nitzan & Ariel Rubinstein 
Modelling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognise equilibrium patterns
by Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel 
RenegotiationProof Implementation and Time Preferences
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
On the fairness of random procedures
by Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (Now published in Econometrica, vol.50, (1982), pp. 97100.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
A model of boundedly rational “neuro” agents
by Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein 
Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies
by Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein 
The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logics Approach (Now published in International Economic Review, (1984) pp.719730.)
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Complex Questionnaires
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
Commentaires sur la neuroéconomie
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
On the Interpretation of Two Theoretical Models of Bargaining
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
On the fairness of random procedures
by Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel 
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
New Directions in Economic Theory  Bounded Rationality
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Noncooperative Models of Bargaining
by Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Modeling Bounded Rationality
by Ariel Rubinstein 
The People's Perspective on LibertarianPaternalistic Policies
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
Middlemen
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky 
Strategic Tournaments
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
Luxury Prices: An Expository Note
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
Multidimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium, and Applications
by Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein 
Money mechanisms and the shifting mode of reproduction model
by V. Mayevsky & S. Andryushin & S. Malkov & A. Rubinstein. 
Money Pumps in the Market
by Ariel Rubinstein & Rani Spiegler 
The 1120 Money Request Game: Evaluating the Upper Bound of kLevel Reasoning
by Arad, Ayala & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent Second Edition
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Two Tales of Power and Distribution of Wealth in the Jungle
by Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein 
Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Slalant 
Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent
by Ariel Rubinstein 
A Course in Game Theory
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein 
A Typology of Players: Between Instinctive and Contemplative
by Ariel Rubinstein 
John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Choice from Lists
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
Bargaining and Markets
by Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein 
Introduction
by Ariel Rubinstein
edited by 
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Response Time and Decision Making: A “Free” Experimental Study
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies
by Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel 
"Isn't everyone like me?": On the presence of selfsimilarity in strategic interactions
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information
by Janusz A. Ordover & Ariel Rubinstein 
A Model of Boundedly Rational “Neuro” Agents
by Eliaz, Kfir & Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
(A,f) Choice with Frames
by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant 
"Convex preferences": a new definition
by Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
by Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher 
A simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures
by Fershtman, Chaim & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Comments on Economic Models, Economics, and Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by Dani Rodrik
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Complex Questionnaires
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Comments on Neuroeconomics
by Rubinstein, Ariel 
A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules
by Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein 
Economics and Language
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Fairness Motivations and Procedures of Choice between Lotteries as Revealed through Eye Movements
by Arieli, Amos & BenAmi, Yaniv & Rubinstein, Ariel 
Discussion of 'BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS'
by Ariel Rubinstein 
Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
by Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky
editor of:

Game Theory in Economics
edited by Ariel Rubinstein