J. Philipp Reiss

Names

Contact

Affiliations

• Karlsruhe Institut für Technologie → Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
  • website
  • location: Karlsruhe, Germany

Research profile

author of:

• Bidding with Outside Options
  by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp
• The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions
  by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp
• The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe
  by Heinz Handler & Bertrand Koebel & Philipp Reiss & Margit Schratzenstaller
• On Entry And Bidding In Sequential Procurement Auctions
  by Philipp Reiss & Jens Robert Schondube
• Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth
  by Rei[ss], J. Philipp & Weinert, Lutz
• Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study
  by Brosig, Jeannette & Rei[ss], J. Philipp
• The Size and Performance of Public Sector Activities in Europe
  by Heinz Handler & Bertrand Koebel & Philipp Reiss & Margit Schratzenstaller
• Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction
  by Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß
• Out-of equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids
  by Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß
• A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
  by Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß & Abdolkarim Sadrieh
• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidders - Theory and Experiment
  by Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß
• First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
  by J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube
• Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction
  by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp
• Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment
  by J. Philipp Reiss & Irenaeus Wolff
• Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids
  by Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß
• Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment
  by Irenaeus Wolff & J. Philipp Reiss
• Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment
  by J. Philipp Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff
• Non-monotonic repayment contracts are superior: an experimental approach
  by Reiss, J. P. & Wolff, I.
• A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
  by Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, J. P. & Sadrieh, A.
• Behavioral variation in Tullock contests
  by Masiliunas, Aidas & Mengel, Friederike & Reiss, J. Philipp
• First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model
  by Reiss, J. P. & Schoendube, J. R.
• A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions
  by Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, J. P. & Sadrieh, A.
• Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?
  by Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan
• Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment
  by J. Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff
• The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions
  by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp
• Bidding with outside options
  by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp
• Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse
  by David Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & J. Philipp Reiss