Alejandro Neme
Names
first: 
Alejandro 
last: 
Neme 
Contact
email: 

Affiliations

Universidad Nacional de San Luis
→ Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (IMASL)
→ Grupo de Teoría de Juegos
 website
 location: San Luis, Argentina
Research profile
author of:

The Multiplepartners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multiunit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On Exiting after Voting
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

The Multiplepartners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multiunit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On exiting after voting
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On group strategyproof mechanisms for a manytoone matching model
by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthorEmail: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

On group strategyproof mechanisms for a manytoone matching model
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejdanro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
by Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

Single Agents and the Set of ManytoOne Stable Matchings
by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge

Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

The Multiplepartners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multiunit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
by Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme

On Exiting After Voting
by D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategyproofness for generalized median voter schemes
by Alejandro Neme & Jordi MassÔ & Salvador BarberÁ

On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

The network of concepts in written texts
by S. M. G. Caldeira & T. C. Petit Lobão & R. F. S. Andrade & A. Neme & J. G. V. Miranda

On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria
by Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme

Little Perfection and Complexity.
by Neme, Alejandro

Voting by Committees with Exit
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthorEmail: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme

The Strength of a Little Perfection.
by Kalai, E. & Neme, A.

Stability and voting by committees with exit
by Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Voting by Committees Under Constraints
by Salvador Barbera & Jordi Masso & Alejandro Neme

Voting by Committees under Constraints
by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Little Perfection and Complexity.
by Neme, A.

The Strength of a Little Perfection
by Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme

Voting by Committees under Constraints
by Salvador Barberà & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Voting Under Constraints.
by Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A.

Voting by Committees under Constraints
by Salvador BARBER? & Jordi MassóAuthorEmail: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro NEME

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation.
by Neme, A. & Quintas, L.

Voting by committees under constraints
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

Bribeproof rules in the division problem
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

Bribeproof Rules in the Division Problem
by Jordi MassóAuthorEmail: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme

Voting under Constraints
by Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games.
by Masso, J. & Neme, A.

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs
by Neme Alejandro & Quintas Luis

Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation
by Alejandro Neme & Luis Quintas

Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games.
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation
by Neme, Alejandro & Quintas, Luis

StrategyProof Allotment Rules
by Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro

The Blocking Lemma for a manytoone matching model
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge

The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

The division problem with voluntary participation
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Topsonly Rules in the Division Problem
by Jordi MassóAuthorEmail: jordi. masso@uab. es & Alejandro Neme

The Division Problem under Constraints
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
by Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

An algorithm to compute the full set of manytomany stable matchings
by Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge

A nash type equilibrium in games without transitive preferences
by Cesco, J. C. & Neme, A.

A maximal domain of preferences for strategyproof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
by Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massé & Alejandro Neme

The Division Problem under Constraints
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM
by Jordi MassóAuthorName: Alejandro Neme

AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANYTOMANY STABLE MATCHINGS.
by Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthorName: Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo

On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
by Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

Ordinal Relative Satisficing Behavior: Theory and Experiments
by Salvador Barberà & Alejandro Neme

The multiplepartners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands: competitive equilibria
by Daniel Jaume & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

The division problem under constraints
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategyproofness
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Orderk Rationality
by Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy De Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen

On obvious strategyproofness and singlepeakedness
by Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION
by DELFINA FEMENIA & MABEL MARÍ & ALEJANDRO NEME & JORGE OVIEDO

Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme

All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategyproof
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Orderk Rationality
by Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy de Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen

On Obvious Strategyproofness and Singlepeakedness
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro

All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously StrategyProof
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme

On Obvious StrategyProofness and SinglePeakedness
by R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme