Angel Hernando-Veciana
Names
| first: |
Angel |
| last: |
Hernando-Veciana |
Identifer
Contact
Affiliations
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Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
/ Departamento de Economía
Research profile
author of:
- Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints (repec:ags:uwarer:270532)
by Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel - Maximum Entropy Principle underlying the dynamics of automobile sales (repec:arx:papers:1705.03458)
by A. Hernando & D. Villuendas & M. Sulc & R. Hernando & R. Seoane & A. Plastino - Pooling Liquidity Pools in AMMs (repec:arx:papers:2503.09765)
by Marcelo Bagnulo & Angel Hernando-Veciana & Efthymios Smyrniotis - Price Discovery in Cryptocurrency Markets (repec:arx:papers:2506.08718)
by Juan Plazuelo Pascual & Carlos Tardon Rubio & Juan Toro Cebada & Angel Hernando Veciana - Optimal Benchmark Design under Costly Manipulation (repec:arx:papers:2506.22142)
by 'Angel Hernando-Veciana - Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions (repec:cer:papers:wp489)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - On the Optimality of Not Allocating (repec:cer:papers:wp514)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - When are signals complements or substitutes? (repec:cte:werepe:we072111)
by Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Krähmer, Daniel - Comment on: "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences" (repec:cte:werepe:we1019)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel - Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints (repec:cte:werepe:we1133)
by Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel - Successful Uninformed Bidding (repec:ecm:wc2000:0791)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana - On the optimality of not allocating (repec:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:233-235)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - On the efficiency of the first price auction (repec:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:159-161)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - Successful uninformed bidding (repec:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:29-53)
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel - Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids (repec:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:372-405)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel - The insider's curse (repec:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:339-350)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael - Second best efficiency and the English auction (repec:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:496-506)
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - Competition among auctioneers in large markets (repec:eee:jetheo:v:121:y:2005:i:1:p:107-127)
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel - When are signals complements or substitutes? (repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:165-195)
by Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel - The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints (repec:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:234-261)
by Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel - Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices (repec:eee:jetheo:v:196:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001344)
by Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel - Auctions (repec:elg:eechap:17978_12)
by Ángel Hernando-Veciana - Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales (repec:iec:inveco:v:22:y:1998:i:3:p:361-392)
by Ángel Hernando-Veciana - Successful Uninformed Bidding (repec:ivi:wpasad:2001-06)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana - Competition Among Auctioneers (repec:ivi:wpasad:2001-18)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana - (Sub-)Optimal Entry Fees (repec:ivi:wpasad:2002-03)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana - The Insider'S Curse (repec:ivi:wpasad:2005-08)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge - Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids (repec:ivi:wpasad:2006-10)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana - Second Best Efficiency in Auctions (repec:ivi:wpasad:2008-17)
by Ángel Hernando Veciana & Fabio Michelucci - Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions (repec:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:6:p:2585-2621.)
by Ángel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge & Philip Strahan - When are Signals Complements or Substitutes? (repec:pra:mprapa:29124)
by Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel - On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry (repec:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:1:p:53-61)
by Ángel Hernando-Veciana - Inefficient rushes in auctions (repec:the:publsh:2513)
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio - The Insider's Curse (repec:wpa:wuwpmi:0503012)
by Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge - Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints (repec:wrk:warwec:1017)
by Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel